From Plato onward, from the “freedom” of ancient Greece to the “Enlightenment” of the modern era, the issues of philosophy of science and political philosophy have always been entangled, impossible to disentangle. By the time we reach the “official history” of twentieth-century philosophy of science, we see this especially clearly: from Popper’s liberalism to Kuhn’s “revolution” and then to Feyerabend’s anarchism, the development of philosophy of science was practically a debate in political philosophy. Looking back at the history of thought from ancient Greece to the Enlightenment, we can be certain that philosophers of science borrowing political terminology is by no means merely a coincidence or a metaphor.
Ancient Greece created both “science” and “democracy” at the same time; these two fine gentlemen also entered China together, as a buy-one-get-one-free deal, and that is certainly no coincidence. The “laws” of nature being “laws” is even less of a coincidence. To say that epistemological questions are at the same time questions in philosophy of law is not an exaggeration; Kant said that human beings “legislate” for nature.
As for political philosophy, I am still at the stage of understanding one part in ten and missing nine, but the level in China’s philosophy of science circles is not much better. People often talk about democracy, rights, freedom, and so on, yet for the most part they lack foundations and lack understanding and reflection in political philosophy; thus the positions they put forward are inevitably empty and ungrounded.
I myself have not yet resolved to plunge into that abyssal pool of political philosophy, but sooner or later I will have to dip a toe in, otherwise I would never dare to make statements on related questions.
People in science and culture often talk about “rights”: the right to be ignorant, the right to engage in pseudoscience, the rights of animals, and so on. But what are “rights”? “Right” originally meant “upright,” and later developed mainly into the meanings of “correct” and “proper”; it also carries the senses of “reason,” “having the right of it,” and “truth.” These are already concepts in philosophy of science. Its extension into the modern concept of “rights” is quite recent; at least it only gradually took shape after the Enlightenment, right?
And within the tradition since the Enlightenment, when people speak of “rights,” there are two kinds. One is the absolute “natural rights” bestowed at birth—such as the right to life and the right to freedom. These rights are innate to every person, inalienable, and universally valid under any culture or system. The other kind of rights is relative “legal rights,” rights granted by a society’s legal system; these vary with the times and with different systems.
The theory of “natural rights” of course has a series of supporting backgrounds, such as Enlightenment thought, universalism, and so on, and of course also the soil of Christianity. Later, as church and state became separated, the concept of “rights” did in fact become detached from theology, but it has never been separable from politics and law.
But some people in science and culture are now quite enthusiastic when they bring up “rights”; yet on the one hand they reject Enlightenment thought, oppose universalism, and even oppose reason itself (that is, they deconstruct even the more original meaning of right), while on the other hand they do not actually involve political or legal questions—and yet they still emphasize those “innate” absolute rights (see the discussion reposted in the previous blog post). How empty and superficial is such talk of “rights”?
Of course, there are not too many writers who are so casual with concepts, but this phenomenon is not accidental after all. People in science and culture need remedial classes in political philosophy, or at least more reflection. In fact, in my view, the most concentrated expression of scientism and of “modernity” as a whole lies in ethics, and secondarily in the accompanying political and social theory; and sociologists, political scientists, and economists are precisely the scholars who first came out clearly and forcefully against scientism. If I remember correctly, the first person to mount a clear-cut critique of scientism seems to have been Hayek, and through scientism he was in fact targeting communist planned economy. What I want to say is that, from beginning to end, claims about scientism and related issues are always tied up with claims about social institutions such as politics and the economy. In reflecting on science, one cannot avoid reflecting on politics.
Feyerabend’s “anarchism” of course cannot be regarded as unrelated to politics. In fact, the “legislation” Kant mentions in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the tribunal of reason, the traditional rationalist as dictator and the skeptic—or rather the irrationalist—as anarchist, cannot be regarded as mere allegory either. In these formulations, science and politics correspond to one another.
Kant wants to find a way out between despotism and anarchism, and that way is a society under the rule of law. The rule of law is indispensable to democracy. The existence of law is of course a suppression of freedom, but at the same time it is also the safeguard of freedom. As in Kant’s example—air is both an impediment to flying and the basis for flying (though Kant used this metaphor in another, different context). Only a democratic society under the rule of law can possibly find a balance between dictatorship and lawlessness and maintain the “necessary tension.”
“Law” is not “absolute”; it does not apply universally in every age and every cultural tradition. But the relativity of law does not mean that we should give up efforts to formulate law, nor does it mean giving up the pursuit of the continual improvement of law. It is precisely by consistently revising law that law is prevented from becoming rigid and degenerating into absolute dogma. At the same time, law possesses a certain degree of stability and authority within a relative context; this ensures social stability, enabling society and culture to continue healthily and peacefully. Of course, if the revision of law is truly lagging behind or goes badly astray, we may also, through “revolution,” rewrite new laws from scratch.
The development of science and knowledge is the same—exactly the same! And Kant’s emphasis on “human beings” as the ones who “legislate,” rather than “God,” when we inherit Kant’s idea, we will discover this: the legislator being human rather than divine means that “law” is not absolute or eternal, but something that people must tirelessly revise. Those devoted to formulating law are not propagandists for absolutism; on the contrary, they are devoted to the continual renewal of the legal order. And those who obey existing law are not believers in absolutism either; rather, they are working to maintain a healthy order. They may reflect on and question these laws at any time, but in more cases they can still respect the law and abide by it.
This is my current line of thought, and I believe it is a continuation of Kant. Of course, deeper questions still require me to spend a number of years gradually clarifying them.
January 21, 2008
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January 22, 2008 23:06:04 Anonymous 123.112.75.96
If “natural law” is like the various rules in statutory law, then general scientific method and some of the most basic presupposed articles of faith are the “constitution.”
Logically, the constitution takes precedence over other statutory laws, and statutory laws in turn take precedence over many unwritten industry rules, customs, conventions, common-sense default practices, and so on. Yet historically, the order of precedence is reversed: first there are unwritten customary laws, and only gradually are they written down, made increasingly rigorous, standardized, and systematized.
Scientific laws are similar: what comes first are unwritten customs and habits, which gradually become “convention” and are accepted by more and more people, and only then are they gradually summarized in writing; whereas logically most basic methodology is historically the most delayed.
When law is used in adjudication, the constitution occupies the foundational position and possesses the highest authority. Yet in the development of law itself, the “foundation” is always everyday life, because all law ultimately comes from what has become “convention.” The same is true in science: when making a “judgment,” the priority of the basis runs from top to bottom; yet in the development and progress of science, the driving force runs from bottom to top.
January 22, 2008
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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