Previously, in the essay “Philosophy and Poetry,” I mentioned this line. I’ve forgotten the exact source of this formulation; it was probably from Heidegger, or perhaps from my own understanding of Heidegger. Of course, no matter what Heidegger said, since I brought up this line, I always have my own set of thoughts about it. Under Unic’s questioning I gave some explanations; since it came to more than a thousand characters, I’m整理ing it here on the blog:
Of course, this is a vague way of putting it. The key is to look at what “源始” means.
If reason is the use of concepts, then what kind of use is the most originary?
For instance, if I state a proposition, you still need to further interpret the meanings of its parts in order to understand it. For example, “poetry is the most originary reason” would require asking what poetry is, what originary means, and so on.
So propositions like “poetry is the most originary reason,” as an exercise of reason, are still not originary enough, because they still need to be further excavated.
But poetry does not need further interpretation, or rather, any further interpretation of poetry is no longer within the dimension of poetry. In other words, interpreting a poem is not for the sake of understanding the poem itself; it may be for the sake of decoding the poem and the relevant background of its author. In fact, one uses this poem to interpret other things, rather than using other things to interpret this poem.
A scientific proposition needs to be interpreted with more basic scientific propositions; the most basic scientific propositions need to be interpreted with certain philosophical propositions; philosophical propositions can be interpreted with still more basic philosophical propositions. The most basic philosophical propositions can be interpreted with the most general language. But how, in the end, is the most general language itself interpreted?
So according to my way of putting it, in general the level of “everyday language” is a most basic deck; everyday language is still interpreted by everyday language. But even within everyday language one can still discern certain layers: for example, some concepts or grammar are clearly more basic, while more complex vocabulary and refined logical structures can be further interpreted in more direct and intuitive ways. And once interpretation reaches the point where it can no longer be interpreted, that is, the point where words are directly connected to intuitive images. Generally speaking, these words are nouns defined by reference to objects and image-concepts directly perceived by the body. As for poetry, all that is meant is that in a certain sense it is the most originary: first, because it does not require further interpretation; second, because it can directly mobilize sensory images without deliberate semantic and grammatical analysis. In this sense, it is a most originary way of exercising reason.
What does the exercise of reason mean? What kind of capacity is reason?
In my view, reason is a capacity for establishing connections, and the most striking aspect of the human capacity to establish connections is the capacity for concepts: a concept is a medium for establishing connections, through which different sensations and impressions are linked together.
So the most fundamental link is the connection between sensation and words. And some forms of the exercise of reason are quite indirect, such as science, especially formalized science. What is called formalization is precisely the ability to detach symbols from actual sensations and to study the relations between symbols and symbols. But in order for these relations to be meaningful, one must ultimately still apprehend them through actual sensation. So when I say poetry is relatively the most direct relation between sensation and symbols, that is why I say it is more originary.
The issue lies in how one understands reason and how one understands the originary. Classical philosophy also regarded reason as a capacity for manipulating abstract symbols, but it often held that the farther one is from intuitive sensation, the more fundamental one is. Yet the “fundamental” in this sense is rather hollow. I regard the first step of “extracting concepts from sensation” as reason’s “originary” moment (or “genesis”), and that will necessarily lead to the conclusion that poetry is more original.
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- unic
2009-06-12 15:08:20 Anonymous 115.155.143.90
“Generally speaking, these words are nouns defined by reference to objects and image-concepts directly perceived by the body.”
Such nouns and image-concepts, because they are closer to the perceived world, may be less idealized and carry more of the nonpersonal character of the objective world itself. And words at a higher level of abstraction undergo a certain loss through repeated processes of abstraction.
“Classical philosophy also regarded reason as a capacity for manipulating abstract symbols, but it often held that the farther one is from intuitive sensation, the more fundamental one is.” Perhaps this only indicates one direction of pursuit in classical philosophy. What does “fundamental” mean here? Does it mean the source from which reason arises? If so, then understanding it this way means that moving from infinite abstraction toward abstractions directly linked to sensation undergoes another kind of loss. (Could that be the reason Plato disliked poetry…)
Perhaps this indicates one direction of pursuit in classical philosophy.
What does metaphysics in classical philosophy regard as ultimately real? - Gu Di
2009-06-12 17:05:50
The meanings of “root,” “source,” “origin,” “basis,” and so on all lie in expressing a certain direction of pursuit—where does philosophy take its stand, and where does it point?
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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