This was something I wrote two weeks ago when Ceiling initiated a group email discussion. Today I saw Fan’s new interview, so it counts as a hot topic too. I’ll just post my text to the blog; discussion is welcome — my position is roughly this: if you want to defend Fan, then I can criticize you; if you want to denounce Fan, then I’ll criticize you too.
As for Zhou Xiaozheng’s attitude in the interview, I rather agree with it, though I didn’t read it carefully. Some of Fan Meizhong’s remarks are in fact quite reasonable — at the very least, they are worth thinking about — and one absolutely must not dismiss his claims wholesale merely out of contempt for his character. I can defend him in front of most of those who curse Fan Runrun to the skies. Of course, I am even less in favor of most of the things said in support of and agreement with Fan Meizhong. For example, many people say that he was candid, that he refused to be a hypocrite, and so on; this is wrong. In my view, his biggest problem is precisely that he is not candid enough. On the other hand, a “gentleman” is bound to be “hypocritical” — I raised long ago the idea that it is better to “be a false gentleman than a true villain.”
Also, some people say that Fan Meizhong was “challenging the moral bottom line”; in fact, I have always questioned this notion of a “bottom-line ethics.” In the debates surrounding Fan Runrun, one can also see the confusion brought about by the concept of an “ethical bottom line”: the so-called highest standard and lowest standard of ethics are often all mixed up together. In my view, the term “ethical bottom line” ought to be abandoned. Or rather, each person should set his or her own “bottom line” — or better yet, one might say “principles” or “foundation” — and as for the “ethical bottom line” of society as a whole or of all humankind, what could that be? It can only be reason itself, something like Kant’s “categorical imperative,” but this categorical imperative is a negative constraint rather than a positive ethical rule; beyond that, any attempt to set a universal “ethical bottom line” is suspect. Only law possesses this kind of coercive force that can be universally extended within a community; ethics does not.
Below is the reply from the letters at the time. Since I did not understand this matter very well then (and I still don’t care all that much now), my comments on Fan Meizhong may well contain some biased or inappropriate points.
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I didn’t read the specific defenses and criticisms too carefully. Let me just say a few words:
First, a bit of ethics — if you don’t want to read it, you can skip it; if you want to discuss it further, you can refer to my undergraduate thesis: in my view, morality is not for condemning people; the essence of morality is “practical reason,” that is, human beings ought to “reason things out” with respect to their own practice. And reason is free: to be responsible to oneself, to legislate for oneself — this is the nature of reason. If one has a set of principles and can, by one’s own lights, legislate for oneself in a way that is internally consistent, then there is nothing to condemn in one’s morality. Of course, as Kant pointed out, given the universality of reason (that is, other people are rational too), the laws one makes for oneself should apply to rational beings in general, which is to say, they should apply to other people as well; this is a touchstone. Tested by this standard, the principle “in a life-and-death emergency, first preserve one’s own life by every possible means” can be extended to everyone, and thus it is a reasonable moral principle. Of course, the fact that it can be generalized does not mean it must be generalized. According to Kant, ethics is a constraint on reason itself rather than a constraint on others; whether it is “in an emergency, one should prioritize saving oneself” or “in an emergency, a teacher should prioritize protecting students,” such principles can on the one hand be reasonable, while on the other hand they need not be absolute,
My own ethical view does not fully coincide with Kant’s, but the greatest significance of Kant’s ethics (and of critical philosophy as a whole) lies in preventing the “hybris” of reason — that is, falling into dogmatism; in moral matters, this takes the form of the so-called “moral guardians.” But the key thing to note is this: those who oppose moral dogmatism are not opposing morality itself. There are many people — perhaps Fan is one of them, I’m not sure — who oppose moral guardians precisely because they simply disdain morality itself and glorify “instinct.” Moral nihilists cannot be condemned with words, because reason cannot persuade people who fundamentally despise reason. Such people can only be constrained by a “legal” system sustained by violence. If he does not accept the law and says the law is unreasonable, then once he returns to reasoned discussion, one can again speak to him about morality; the way moral criticism works is to use his own principles to criticize his statements and actions. If he accepts no principles at all, then there is nothing one can do.
What am I trying to say? — The key is that opposing “moral guardians who brandish the moral cudgel” (that is, people who use their own moral doctrines to attack others) does not necessarily mean one has a profound hatred of the concept of “morality”; on the contrary, it may well arise from respect for the concept of “morality.” For morality means practical reason, and reason means freedom, legislating for oneself; therefore, one should not impose one’s own law upon another independent and free individual — that, precisely, is respect for the concept of morality.
On the other hand, we may ask whether this kind of behavior can be condemned. Here it depends on what you use to condemn it with. If you use ready-made moral “principles” to condemn it and say he does not conform to morality, then such condemnation does not hold water. However, condemnation does not have to use external principles; there are all sorts of ways. For example, first, criticism: that is, criticizing him with his own principles, asking whether he can make himself self-consistent. For instance, he himself told students, “Don’t panic! Earthquake, it’s fine!” yet his own behavior failed to take responsibility for what he said; he panicked and ran helter-skelter, yet did not promptly correct himself to the students. Moreover, even if his principle is that saving his own life comes first, then when running away, shouting “Everyone follow me!” would not conflict with his principle, yet he did not do so. Even if this was because the situation was urgent and he was negligent, it is still something for which he ought to feel guilty; second, emotional condemnation: given the indifference to other people’s lives revealed in his actions and in his post-event remarks, this can be condemned. This is not a moral condemnation; what is condemned is not his behavior but his feelings; third, condemnation of motive: for example, a person may actually save someone, but if he pulled that person out out of kidnapping motives, then his motives can of course still be condemned. Here, perhaps his behavior conforms to his own moral principle, yet his behavior is merely instinctive and involves no motive at all; this of course leaves nothing directly to condemn, but at the same time there is even less to be proud of. Therefore, what can be condemned in terms of motive is not the act of escaping itself, but the act of justifying his escape, because his justification is not for the sake of reasoning but for the sake of “self-exoneration”; and the object of his defense is not his own principles but his own instincts. This reveals through his self-exculpation that he lacks confidence in himself, and reveals that his reason is not independent and free but subservient to his instincts and in service to his instincts; therefore this can be condemned.
Forgive me… for making this so complicated just to condemn him. But there’s no help for it. Philosophy was originally meant for self-criticism and self-examination, not for criticizing others. If one is to criticize others, one must also take equal standing and mutual respect for the other’s reason as a premise; unless the other person themselves has abandoned reason, one cannot show contempt for their independence. Therefore, to voice condemnation in a way that philosophy permits is always laborious and cautious. As for feeling disgusted, that is not philosophy’s concern. I myself now feel disgusted even looking at the long-winded text I wrote…
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For my part, my main irritation with Fan’s article lies in his casual treatment of other people’s lives and his sophistical self-excuse for his own instincts. I can completely identify with someone who, in a moment of crisis, puts preserving himself first; indeed, that is more or less what I myself would do as well (though with subtle but important differences). However, if one truly has confidence in one’s principles, one ought to be full of confidence and without hesitation, and even in a crisis one should still be able to remain calm and clear-headed, adopting a strategy that both preserves oneself and protects others as much as possible.
By the way, my own principles also include never sacrificing myself in ordinary circumstances, yet I would probably take some risk to save others. Taking risks and sacrificing oneself are subtly different. Taking a risk is a challenge, a struggle; it is fighting with the conviction that one will surely win — even if there is only a ten percent chance, I would only fight if I believed I would not die. I would never say: I sacrificed my life and gave it to someone else. Protecting people’s lives — both one’s own and others’ — is my duty. Although in practice this may perhaps result in someone else dying or in my own death, neither outcome is what I seek; I would have no motive for seeking death. That is to say, I would only think of saving people, not of sacrificing myself.
So how should one make a choice in a concrete dilemma? There is no ready-made standard for that; it depends on the impulse at the time and on what the conditions allow (which person is easier to save). Since both in terms of emotional impulse and in terms of ease of rescue, oneself has the advantage, in actual situations self-rescue is very likely to come first. Of course, whether A is myself or someone else, if I save A but fail to save B, I will certainly feel guilty emotionally.
Latest comments
- Bu Yan Kong Jing
2008-06-08 12:50:03 http://deleted
One’s conduct should make one a model. Teacher-training colleges are not only for transmitting culture. He graduated from Peking University; he did not come from a teacher-training background. He lacks the professional ethical sense of a teacher. However, from the standpoint of traditional Chinese xinxue, morality is an instinctive reaction. In that moment, many teachers chose self-sacrifice and chose to protect the children. We do not know whether they acted out of instinctive reaction or out of the spirit of self-sacrifice. But one thing can be certain: life is beautiful for everyone. And for children, even more so. As teachers, as adults, we should have the responsibility to protect children! This is the instinct of living beings, not a moral principle; it is the principle of biological evolution!
- Gu Cha
2008-06-08 13:15:18
The person above is somewhat incomprehensible… “professional ethics,” “xinxue,” “biological evolution”… all mixed together, yet it reads almost like incoherent babbling. Where, exactly, is the reasoning? It remains strangely unclear.
Do not turn ethics into a mere “tool.” For example, first harboring an undisguised hatred or contempt for someone, and then invoking various ethical formulations to launch an attack on them — even resorting to all means and indiscriminately mixing together all kinds of disconnected and unexamined reasons in a barrage — this is turning ethics into a prop, into a weapon.
“Candor” means this sort of honesty toward oneself: if you simply dislike some person or some behavior out of private emotions and feelings, then frankly express your feelings, and do not go looking for all sorts of specious theories to dress yourself up. But once you want to reason, you should be calm, rigorous, serious, and responsible. - Gu Cha
2008-06-08 20:55:32
http://hps.phil.pku.edu.cn/bbs/read.php?tid=653&page=1&toread=1
QUOTE:
Quoted from floor 1 by SCOTT on 2008-06-08 19:32:
We may not be any better than Teacher Fan!
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Whether one can do it or not is one thing; whether one pursues it or not, whether one aspires to it or not, is another.
Fan Runrun is right to oppose the dogmatism and dogma of morality, but he has completely abandoned any aspiration toward the good and instead taken refuge in feeling and instinct.
This reflects the confusion of certain postmodern relativisms: under the names of resisting dogma and dogmatism, they give up the pursuit, abandon reason. Because one cannot achieve perfect goodness, one altogether denies the aspiration to be good; because one cannot attain absolute truth, one altogether denies the resolve to seek truth; anyway, nobody is any better than anyone else, so there’s no real difference between people, and truth, goodness, and beauty and all that are meaningless, so don’t even mention them! — the frivolity of postmodernism lies precisely here.
Fan Runrun’s act of running away did not need to be censured; what is excessive is that he actually defended running away, as if he himself had become a heroic spearhead resisting traditional dogma, a revolutionary vanguard criticizing the classical, a free fighter emancipating thought… That is where the real crux lies. - Bu Yan Kong Jing
2008-06-08 23:25:51 http://deleted
I’m not someone with strong logical skills. My expression really is chaotic. What I want to emphasize is simply instinct. Protecting the next generation is an animal instinct. In that moment, ethics and morality, all of it, won’t work at all!
- Gu Cha
2008-06-09 11:09:59
Protecting one’s own offspring is an animal instinct; protecting a large group of other people’s children is not an animal instinct. And quite a few animals do not even protect their own offspring; in a crisis they may eat or kill some of them.
The instinct to survive is the animal instinct; sensitivity to danger, rapid flight response — that is the animal instinct. To jump out immediately when an earthquake strikes seems, after all, to be the most in keeping with animal instinct.
Even weak logic should not mean ignoring the facts. - Soul Pilgrimage
2008-06-24 17:39:02
Moral consciousness, especially in China — especially ethics — is regarded by the public with a degree of seriousness that can roughly be described by the word “severe.” Although moral consensus is established by common convention and does not possess the coercive force or enforcement power of law, some deeply rooted moral and ethical notions have already become, as it were, people’s “rules” for behavior and judgment. Moral compliance to a certain extent turns into a moral shackle and becomes another weapon with which to bind people. This is something that should be watched carefully. When public moral orientation to a certain extent becomes moral pressure or moral coercion, morality becomes no different from law.
Just my view, hehe — not specifically aimed at the Fan Runrun事件. Today in class the teacher mentioned the non-compulsory nature of morality, so I just improvised a bit.
There is another question that has been bothering me a little: if you see three yuan on the road, what would you do? Would you ignore it and walk past, or would you pick it up and use it for something else? - Gu Cha
2008-06-25 21:40:01
I don’t think there’s much distinction between right and wrong in picking up money or not picking it up. I’ll just pick it up if it’s convenient to do so; if it’s not convenient, I’ll leave it alone, depending on the amount of money and the difficulty of bending down. Of course, if it’s a lot of money, say an entire wallet, then I would of course hand it over to the police officer and the like~
If someone picks up money and uses it for themselves, but then launches into a whole pile of arguments to criticize those who don’t pick it up as hypocrites; or if someone walks past without noticing, but then launches into a whole pile of arguments to accuse those who pick it up of being greedy for petty gains — then I will criticize these arguments.
The vast majority of actions in human life can hardly be called good or evil, and to insist that only one kind of choice is the uniquely correct one is often, in fact, the source of evil. - Gu Cha
2008-06-26 12:31:08
I personally lean toward some sort of virtue-ethical approach, one that asks, “What kind of person should I be?” rather than “What should I do?” Of course, “What should I do?” is also an ethical question, but one must take care: “What should he do?” is not an ethical question at all!
Law, relying on the support of authority and violence, can be used to restrain and regulate others. So long as you cannot live apart from communal life, you must also strive to compromise with the laws jointly agreed upon by the community. But the essence of reason is freedom; the premise of ethics is free will, and free will means the existence of “I.” Law arises from shared life, and the aim of jurisprudence is to formulate norms so as to maintain the order of the community; ethics, by contrast, arises from free will, and the inquiry of ethics is meant to satisfy “my” reason.
As Kant said, the practical interest of reason is a natural endowment of humankind. Those who pretend not to care about this also find themselves, in certain situations, unable to shake off ethical demands. We often see that even the most heinous criminals, before death, still make feeble attempts to defend their actions; many times, people, even while deceiving themselves, insist on finding reasons to excuse themselves. This is the demand of reason. Of course, these are often abuses of reason. Unless a person completely gives up trying to justify his own actions with reason, he also loses the qualification to criticize others with reason.
What I want to say is that ethical inquiry is not for judging others, but arises from the demands of one’s own free will. Anyone who honestly faces himself cannot evade the demand of ethics—I hope my actions are reasonable. And the freedom of reason means that each person can have his own theory; in this sense, one cannot use one’s own morality to judge another person’s actions.
Of course, morality is not entirely private or arbitrary. Just as reason is free, yet still rests on public everyday language, it is therefore communicable and open to criticism. But what I can criticize is your “ethics,” that is, your reasons, rather than directly your actions. If you wrap up the act of picking up a coin in some plausible but false rationale, then I can question you; but if you have no reasons at all, then I cannot use ethics to judge whether your action was right or wrong. I have already said that judgments of “right and wrong” are based on legitimacy, not reasonableness.
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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