The 7th Beijing Forum on Philosophy of Technology and the 48th Lecture of the Peking University Forum on History and Philosophy of Science and Technology (January 8, 2008)
Time: Tuesday, January 8, 2008, 9:30–11:30 a.m.
Venue: Academic Lecture Hall, Center for Social Sciences, Chengze Garden
Speaker: Deng Bo (Professor, School of Humanities, Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology)
Topic: The Architect’s Original Ethical Responsibility
Commentator: Wu Guosheng
I listened to the recording. But listening to a recording really feels so much worse than listening in person; after listening, I found that it was hard to write a report like the ones I had written for the previous few sessions, so I’ll be a little lazy for once~
Professor Deng’s talk did not seem to match the title very well. In fact, he did not really discuss the issue of “the architect”; he mainly explained the basic positioning of architectural ethics and how to introduce Heidegger into architectural ethics. Of course, this topic is even more attractive. If the topic announced at the beginning had been “From Heidegger to Architectural Ethics,” I would probably have struggled to go along and attend…
Still, after listening, I felt it was not the most satisfying. As the teachers also said in their comments, there are still many missing links between Heidegger and architecture; the talk remained at the level of generalities. It did bring some inspiration, but how to go further and establish the connection seems not yet to have a clear path.
Professor Deng said that Heidegger’s so-called “poetic dwelling” does not refer to poetry in the literary or artistic sense, and I quite agree with that. But then Professor Deng linked it to architecture… I feel that probably does not hold together either. Of course, I have never really figured out what this “poetic dwelling” actually means. I remember that when I was taking Professor Wu’s introductory course in philosophy of technology, in Heidegger’s first lecture I asked what Heidegger meant here, and Professor Wu said that was a question for the next lecture. As it turned out, the next lecture still did not make it clear… Here Professor Wu said that as long as people exist, their dwelling is necessarily poetic. Of course Heidegger should have this meaning, just as Heidegger says that human beings are always “in truth”; but on the other hand it is also obvious that “poetic” and “truth” are “good words” for Heidegger. After all, most people most of the time are in an “inauthentic state,” so there should also be some distinction between “non-poetic” and “poetic,” but I still can’t figure out how to explain that distinction… (Fortunately, through a course paper this semester, I have at least become somewhat clear about the distinction between the “authentic” and the “inauthentic.”)
I heard some students saying that Heidegger was too “romantic” and the like, and even saying things about returning to nature. I think this is a misunderstanding of Heidegger. I do not see Heidegger as advocating a “romantic” way of life, and even less as promoting a “return to nature.” On the contrary, for Heidegger, fleeing the world of everyday affairs and returning to nature still remains part of “the They.” “Authentic existence” is not some concrete way of life; it does not require changing any behavior. If Heidegger does recommend any way of life after all, it would be the serious activity of “thinking,” and by no means a return to nature. If one were to speak of “returning to nature,” it would only be in nature’s original sense, that is, on the basis of “freedom,”
How to bring Heidegger into architectural ethics? The first problem to solve is: how to bring Heidegger into ethics. Because, as Professor Wu said, Heidegger completely negates “ethics” as such, believing that the very notion of “value judgment” is already wrong. Still, I think there is a route to be found. The first is what I often talk about (though I actually know very little about it): “virtue ethics.” This approach to ethics, like Heidegger, fundamentally opposes “value” as such; it does not ask “What should I do?” but rather “What kind of person should I become?” In fact, this latter question can be linked to what Heidegger calls “to exist,” “becoming what one is,” “decision,” and “projection,” and so on.
Heidegger’s ethics is obviously neither egoism nor altruism, because on the one hand he emphasizes that when one authentically faces oneself, one will discover that apart from oneself there is no thing and no other person that can “benefit oneself”; “I” have nothing to rely on and can only bear myself myself, project myself myself. On the other hand, one should also not “take over the tasks that have yet to be handled by others” in the traditional altruistic sense; Heidegger calls this “acting in another’s stead.” But Heidegger does still indicate that “there is also another possibility, opposite to this, of concern,” and this way of “concern,” that is, the way one treats others, is the best one: “Such concern need not be a taking over for the other; rather, it is [vorausspringen] anticipating the other in his potentiality-for-Being, not taking his ‘care’ away from him, but giving it back to him for the first time as care properly speaking. This kind of concern is essentially involved with authentic care, that is to say, with the other’s existence, and not with the ‘what’ the other is to be concerned with. Such concern helps the other to see himself in his care and frees him for it.” (Section 26, p. 150, p. 122)
Here Heidegger uses a word that in the first edition was translated as “striving ahead,” and in the revised edition was changed to “setting an example.” I do not know whether this distorts the original meaning, but if it really is “setting an example,” then this is a route into ethics.
Although Heidegger does not talk about “value,” “norms,” and the like, he does talk about “responsibility.” Heidegger emphasizes that one must bear oneself oneself, which is to say, one must be responsible for oneself. To take on oneself oneself, and to give back to others what ought to be borne by them, this is what Heidegger advocates. Applying this line of thought to the architect, we can at least obtain a basic principle: architects should give more freedom back to the users of architecture, that is, should, as far as possible, give back to others the things that others ought to bear. Put simply and concretely, a roughcast shell with more possibilities is better than a fully finished, all-ready, all-inclusive luxury interior decoration~~
But applying Heidegger in this way still seems too superficial; how one could dig further, I of course cannot think of any good idea. Personally, I do not think it is appropriate to move toward the direction of the unity of Heaven and humanity. If one wants to move more toward the unity of Heaven and humanity, or the unity of subject and object, and so on, it would be better to make use of our own Chinese philosophy and traditional Chinese architectural thought; there would be no need to start from Heidegger.
January 9, 2008
Latest Comments
2008-07-26 09:46:55 anonymous 125.45.229.80 [reply]
I intend to apply here for graduate study, and I would like to know whether there are the actual exam questions from the professional courses of previous years. I also have another question: for specific issues such as the cosmological models of the ancient Greek philosophers in 《World History of Science and Technology》, how would these be tested?
Suiyuan
2008-07-26 19:33:37 anonymous 124.205.77.136 [reply]
Hehe, Suixuan has already become the front desk reception station for Peking University philosophy of science and technology. First, welcome to huyang for your interest in applying to the philosophy of science and technology program at Peking University! To be frank, if one is sincerely interested in learning something or pursuing academic excellence, choosing Peking University philosophy of science and technology is indeed a wise move.
Back in the day, if I had accidentally applied to some other school’s philosophy of science and technology program, who knows how I would have turned out. If one learned a bit of superficial knowledge, nine times out of ten one would become parochial and self-righteous, not knowing how high the sky is or how thick the earth is. I do not mean to disparage any other school’s philosophy of science and technology program in the slightest; I am only speaking very objectively: although the philosophy programs at Peking University also seem to be at a low point in academic development at present, the accumulation and transmission of academic character, and the formation of academic atmosphere and philosophical character, are certainly not things that can be achieved overnight. At least from my personal experience, most teachers and students at Peking University tend to have one more degree of self-reflection in philosophy than their peers!
Suiyuan
2008-07-26 19:50:41 anonymous 124.205.77.136 [reply]
As for the graduate entrance exam, that was already several years ago, and at that time I took the combined exam for philosophy of science and history of science, so my exam experience probably has little reference value now. In previous years, the professional course questions were generally not provided, and the questions change every year, so there is no need to be too fixated on them. The Philosophy Department website seems to have the 2001 history of science exam questions, whose structure can be used as a reference; if possible, you can also ask older brothers and sisters you know from previous years to recall the style of the exam over the past three years.
I have not seriously read 《World History of Science and Technology》, so I do not know what it says about the cosmological models of ancient Greek philosophers. Regarding this topic, you can refer to Kuhn’s discussion of the Greek “two-sphere cosmological model” in The Copernican Revolution, and the relevant content in Professor Wu Guosheng’s Sina blog post 《It is the celestial sphere, not the heavenly bodies》 is also well worth studying carefully. In short, one should strive to grasp clearly the various characteristics of the Greek “two-sphere cosmological model”—the celestial sphere, celestial rotation, the earth, the earth’s center, the earth at rest, perfect circles, uniform motion, closure, finitude, and so on—and how, in the Scientific Revolution of modern times, these characteristics were modified one by one, by whom, and in what ways. In addition, the difference between the realist tradition of Aristotelian cosmology and the “saving the phenomena” tradition of Platonic cosmology (such as Ptolemy’s) is also worth paying attention to.
For other matters, please have Suixuan’s owner supplement them. And I also wish huyang success in the graduate entrance exam, and that you become our younger fellow student soon!
Gu Dī
2008-07-26 21:32:23 [reply]
Thank you, senior brother, for guest-answering questions~ I was fortunate enough to be recommended for admission, so I know almost nothing about the situation with the graduate entrance exam…
I also did not read 《World History of Science and Technology》 very carefully, and it was a long time ago, so I have little recollection. Senior brother has already said about as much as I could. Generally speaking, when reading history books, the advice is not to read them as a “chronological table of major events,” but to make more connections, compare modern and ancient concepts, Eastern and Western concepts, as well as the similarities and differences among different schools of thought, and the relationship between science, culture, and society.
wd
2008-08-06 16:09:40 anonymous 202.207.1.175 [reply]
Senior brother Gu Dī, I am also an undergraduate from another school, currently a third-year student, who wants to make Peking University philosophy of science and technology my direction, and the path I may take will be recommendation for admission. Moreover, my school is the kind of “commodity” that gets swallowed up as soon as it is casually thrown into the pile of universities. I am feeling anxious right now…
I would like to ask senior brother Gu Dī about the exam subjects and the design content for the differential reexamination in recommendation for admission.
Gu Dī
2008-08-06 16:50:26 [reply]
“Differential reexamination”? Does differential reexamination mean that the number of people taking the reexamination is greater than the number that can be admitted? I don’t know why people applying for philosophy of science and technology are always so few; often the number of people taking the reexamination is less than the number that can be admitted. For example, in 2008 the total quota for master’s admissions in history of science and philosophy of science and technology was 10; theoretically, the quota for recommendation for admission could be at least 5, but there were only 4 people in total who came for the interview, and of course all were admitted. In the end, there were probably only 9 people in total, which seems like the quota was not filled…
The school from which one can be recommended for admission is at least a 211, right? Our department’s requirement seems to be that the top three in the major have eligibility for recommendation for admission. I don’t know what your major is?
In the past, recommendation-for-admission had only an interview and no written test; in recent years a written test has been added, but of course the interview is still decisive, because in recent years the quota has not been filled, so the interview is very relaxed. Basically, they will ask you what books you have read, and then casually chat a few words based on your answers; basically everyone can pass. But if by some bad luck you really run into a differential reexamination, then I suppose the teachers will conduct the interview more seriously, and it is hard to say exactly how it would be tested. Still, they will probably ask what books you have read; honestly name a few good books you really have read and say a bit about your impressions—that’s enough; just don’t be unable to even say who the author is~~
wd
2008-08-06 17:57:58 anonymous 202.207.1.175 [reply]
Many thanks to senior brother Gu Dī for your generous guidance!
However, senior brother Gu Dī’s answer surprised me a little; how could it be so simple! But I am not doubting it, only…
Could it be that in the past only people from outside Peking University had to take the written test? So senior brother Gu Dī did not happen to catch that?
Moreover, all the information I had previously obtained said that Peking University’s philosophy of science and technology admissions were very hot! The elimination ratio should be relatively high, so how could there be such a big discrepancy from what senior brother Gu Dī said?
My undergraduate major is philosophy, so it should still be reasonably relevant.
wd
2008-08-06 18:06:12 anonymous 202.207.1.175 [reply]
Oh, let me ask senior brother Gu Dī for some real insider tips. If we assume that my qualification for recommendation for admission is not a problem, what should I be preparing during this period? I hope senior brother Gu Dī will guide me.
wd
2008-08-06 18:08:27 anonymous 202.207.1.175 [reply]
Sorry for turning your blog into a reception desk for Q&A. I’ll have a chance to thank you in person and make it up to you!
Gu Dī
2008-08-06 18:28:06 [reply]
See this for the 2008 recommended-admission students: http://hps.phil.pku.edu.cn/bbs/read.php?tid=120&fpage=1
See this for graduate entrance exam admission status (10th floor): http://hps.phil.pku.edu.cn/bbs/read.php?tid=434&fpage=1
See this for the 2008 recommended-admission status and scores: http://epr.ycool.com/post.2839747.html
You can observe this score table: although the written test and interview are nominally worth 50% each, there was no case of someone with a higher interview score being eliminated; this shows that the power of life and death is still in the hands of the teachers in the teaching and research office, especially the teachers in Western philosophy, who are the fiercest—they give a uniform 55 points to students they don’t want…
The written-test questions vary depending on the instructor who sets them. In earlier times, it was said there was only one question. In 2008, there were four questions: the first two were short-answer questions in Chinese, the third was English-to-Chinese translation, and the fourth was to comment in Chinese on an English passage.
Gu Dī
2008-08-06 18:42:52 [reply]
As for preparation, it is really hard to say. For the recommendation-for-admission written test, since it is a single exam for the whole Philosophy Department, what is tested should mainly be Western philosophy content. Read Western philosophy history again, look over philosophical English again, and that should handle the written test. As for the interview, I think there is no need to prepare too much; just be honest. To be frank, a fairly large proportion of the master’s students our philosophy of science and technology program admits had not had much contact with philosophy of science and technology before, and I think the teachers probably do not care too much about your academic foundation; what matters more is your enthusiasm and potential. Otherwise, perhaps you could go browse the blogs of Professor Wu Guosheng and Professor Liu Huajie and see whether you can first become a familiar face~~
wd
2008-08-06 18:43:59 anonymous 202.207.1.175 [reply]
After carefully studying the information listed by senior brother Gu Dī, I was suddenly enlightened!
The 7th Beijing Forum on Philosophy of Technology and the 48th Lecture of the Peking University Forum on History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Follow-up Discussion
Gu Dī 发表于 2008-01-15 19:51:15
http://hps.phil.pku.edu.cn/bbs/read.php?tid=284
The person who raised the question of Heidegger being overly romanticized to Old Deng was me. Old Deng did not agree that Heidegger belongs to the Romantic camp. I do not think so.
In fact, modernity itself contains contradictions within itself. The struggle between Enlightenment and Romanticism has by no means ended to this day, to the extent that Ricoeur classified the dispute between Habermas and Gadamer as belonging to this camp as well, which I think makes sense. The believers in Enlightenment revere reason and take reason itself as the means of overcoming reason’s problems; thus Habermas tries to use communicative reason to criticize instrumental reason, thereby re-founding modernity. The Romantics, by contrast, try to use categories outside reason—emotion, poetry, aesthetics, and the like—as means of overcoming reason’s problems, and thus there is the so-called aesthetic redemption. Both camps see the dangers brought by modern instrumental reason (technology manifests this most clearly), but their solutions are entirely different. To simplify a bit: Enlightenment seeks to reconstruct reason, while Romanticism seeks to go beyond reason; that is where the difference lies. Back in the day, Kant actually saw the contradiction and conflict in this as well. The Critique of Judgment was, to a large extent, meant to ground human aesthetics and taste and to argue for their legitimacy in the face of the modern mechanical worldview. Unfortunately, in real-life contexts, science, morality, and aesthetics are intertwined together, and do not, as Kant thought, coexist separately and peacefully.
Back to Heidegger. Faced with modern science and technology, Heidegger’s analytical and critical force is truly admirable. But in the end, he still returned to the poetic and the aesthetic, trying to use them as a way of overcoming modern instrumental reason. It is precisely for this reason that he kept moving closer to Hölderlin. In this sense, Heidegger really did follow the romantic route. What I mean is not that Romanticism is wrong; on the contrary, because it emphasizes humanity, freedom, and poetry, it exudes an intoxicating fragrance. But as a prescription for overcoming the problems of modern society, it seems somewhat pallid. Heidegger can be a poet, but one cannot demand that everyone be a poet. There is a vast gulf between the individualized nature of poetry and the socialization of the problem of science and technology. For my part, I do not believe Heidegger’s solution is an effective one. This is a question that must be kept in mind when discussing Heidegger: he can be a starting point, but by no means an end point.
To truly understand Heidegger is not to repeat the vocabulary and obscure language that have already been repeated by others a thousand times over, but to be able to step beyond Heidegger and make use of Heidegger. That is the greatest respect one can show him. Philosophy must never degenerate into the history of philosophy; the history of philosophy is meaningful only insofar as it is philosophy. (This paragraph is purely amateur talk from the standpoint of a working philosopher; in the first place, there was no need to say it.)
[8 楼] | IP：124.17.18.43 | Posted: 2008-01-11 09:59
Gu Cha
It’s not really wrong to classify Heidegger under the “romantic camp.” After all, for any particular philosopher, what matters is his thought, not the “label” pinned on him in the history of philosophy, just as Fish Brother said: philosophy must not degenerate into the history of philosophy, and philosophers must not degenerate into a collection of various “isms.”
But I seem to remember that in the recording Fish Brother went on to mention Heidegger… Romanticism… “returning to nature,” and so on. I have doubts about this “return to nature”; that is not what Heidegger meant.
Heidegger certainly stepped beyond traditional Enlightenment thought; that is beyond doubt. But did Heidegger “seek to use categories outside reason—such as feeling, poetry, aesthetics, and the like—as a means to overcome problems of reason”? I didn’t see that. I didn’t see Heidegger offering any “means” whatsoever for overcoming problems. The only method he truly recommended was still the activity in which he himself was engaged: thinking and questioning.
Of course Heidegger was influenced by the romantic line, but he was also deeply influenced by the traditional philosophical line. One cannot simply understand Heidegger like this: first, Heidegger is a romantic; second, romantics are “…”; therefore…. To truly understand Heidegger, one must bypass those words and ambiguous labels that are so often abused in the history of philosophy and go directly to Heidegger himself. That is the greatest respect one can show him.
[9 楼] | IP：123.112.68.13 | Posted: 2008-01-11 11:14
Yu Zhile
It seems that whenever you mention some “ism,” you think I’m pinning a label on things, hehe. Then aren’t all those engaged in philosophical research today using some kind of “ism”? Are they all just slapping labels on things? Not necessarily. There’s nothing wrong with pinning a label in itself; the key is whether the label is justified. A suggestion: “pinning labels” is典型的 Cultural Revolution language; better not to play around with it.
“Did Heidegger ‘seek to use categories outside reason—such as feeling, poetry, aesthetics, and the like—as a means to overcome problems of reason’? I didn’t see that.” If you didn’t see it, no matter; you can keep looking. I recommend that you read several of his articles on science and technology a few more times.
“The only method he truly recommended was still the activity in which he himself was engaged: thinking and questioning.” May I ask, which philosopher is not thinking and questioning? Merely recommending this mode, and Heidegger would no longer be Heidegger. Why think, what to think, and how to think—aren’t these perhaps more important?
Start directly from Heidegger? As though you could understand Heidegger straightaway, without any background—can you understand him that way? Without a problematic, why bother understanding at all? Why pay attention to Heidegger? Is it for the sake of worship? Worship is not philosophy; philosophy opposes worship.
[10 楼] | IP：124.17.18.43 | Posted: 2008-01-11 12:39
Gu Cha
Saying that “all those engaged in philosophical research today are using some kind of ‘ism’” is not right. Philosophers often do not wish to admit that they are adherents of some ism: Marx said he was not a Marxist, Heidegger said he was not an existentialist, Ellul said he was not a pessimist. When philosophers themselves expound their own thought, they usually refuse to identify themselves by some ism.
Of course I am not saying that one cannot pin labels on people or say someone is this or that ism, but this practice has meaning only in the study of the history of philosophy. When specifically expounding the thought of a particular philosopher, or when expounding one’s own thought, it has very little meaning. Philosophy must not degenerate into the history of philosophy.
If you approach Heidegger with the framework “Heidegger is a romantic” in advance, of course you will see exactly the things you want to see. But if I refuse this framework, then I simply won’t see it~ No need to look elsewhere; our forum happens to have a ready-made example: http://hps.phil.pku.edu.cn/bbs/read.php?tid=283
“The bottom line of the Der Spiegel interview is to get Heidegger to prescribe a remedy for the age, … Heidegger refused to let philosophy become embroiled in application, and refused philosophy’s direct functional value, … The Der Spiegel reporter tried by every means to drag Heidegger out from under the measure of thinking and the measure of philosophy, while Heidegger firmly held onto the measure of thinking and the purity of philosophy; this stalemate runs throughout the interview.”
“Heidegger: No! I do not know of any path that would directly change the present condition of the world—on the premise, of course, that such a change could be brought about by human means. But I think that tried thinking can awaken, clarify, and consolidate the aforementioned will.”
It is clear, then, that Heidegger did not offer any “means” for changing the present condition of the world, and indeed refused to offer any means. I’ve conveniently brought out the evidence; if you read Heidegger’s texts directly, you can find even more basis.
“Starting directly from Heidegger” does not mean that one can “understand Heidegger straightaway.” What I mean is that one should confront Heidegger’s texts directly, use Heidegger’s line of thought as a starting point, and then move toward the problems we care about. Of course, the real starting point is undoubtedly our own problems. But if we want to seek help from Heidegger, then we should not read Heidegger according to the line of thought “Heidegger is a romantic; and romantics are…; therefore….” We pay attention to Heidegger because we believe he can give us inspiration and help, because we are trying to seek inspiration and help; not because Heidegger is an XX-ist, and therefore we should pay attention to him or not pay attention to him.
[11 楼] | IP：123.112.68.13 | Posted: 2008-01-11 13:38
Xiulan
Just as Heidegger said he was not an “existentialist,” he was not a “romanticist” either!
In nineteenth-century Germany, in the face of the steel torrent of industrialization, there did indeed emerge a rationalism that approved of science and technology and a Romanticism that opposed science and technology, forming two opposed cultural traditions that continue to influence us today. But understanding Heidegger along the lines of the Romantic tradition is precisely not possible! It is true that in his later years Heidegger talked a great deal about “poetry,” and even drew on Hölderlin’s “poetically dwells man on this earth” to discuss the existence of mortals. But his “poetry” was no longer poetic in the sense of poetics, aesthetics, literature, or irrationality, emotion, and Romanticism! His “ambition” was much larger; he was by no means trying, within these two opposing traditions in Germany, to elevate one and denigrate the other, or to use the Romantic tradition to redeem the emptiness of modernity.
What he wanted to do was: transcend the historical destiny of Western metaphysical culture that has existed since Socrates! This destiny already rules humanity in modern technology’s Gestell, and likewise soaks humanity through and through in the many forms of modern art, hollowing humanity out!
These two cultural traditions, though different in path, both originate from the same historical destiny of tradition; they arrive by different routes at the same destination: emptiness! In his view, the metaphysical culture stubbornly fixated on beings will ultimately move toward emptiness and be unable to save itself! Only by turning toward Being itself, hidden by beings, can humanity hope to pass through the historical destiny of metaphysics and open up new possibilities of Being!
However, humanity cannot alter this historical destiny by immediately taking some kind of action. Only when humanity begins to think this destiny will the possibility of change dawn on the horizon! How, then, does one “think”? All kinds of XX “studies,” XX theories, and XX-isms signify the cage of metaphysics, and none of them can “think”! In the history of “Being,” Heidegger, by means of retrospection, returned to the lifeworld from which metaphysics arose, in order to तलाश the possibility of “thinking,” and discovered that plain, pre-metaphysical “poetry” (different from the literary, metaphysical poetry) and “thinking” share the same origin, both being the clearing of “Being” itself! In Heidegger’s own words, poetry is dwelling, the most originary building of existence, the gathering of heaven, earth, gods, and mortals! To measure heaven and earth by the scale of the gods is what “poetic” means!
Only a god can save us! What is a “god”? It cannot be “said”; it can only be “thought.” Heidegger tore open the barrier of metaphysics and merely glimpsed the fleeting brilliance of the “god,” waiting for the arrival, a thousand years hence, of those who truly “think”! Heidegger is dead—how are we to continue “thinking”?
[12 楼] | IP：117.22.179.65 | Posted: 2008-01-12 02:22
Yu Zhile
The expression above does indeed capture Heidegger’s own thinking, and it also uses Heidegger’s language, or perhaps is too Heideggerian. I remember that last time, when the phenomenology and philosophy of technology conference was held in Xi’an, I had a strong feeling: Heidegger’s Gestell, thinking, and so on were being repeated endlessly by almost everyone who discussed Heidegger. I remember Nietzsche once said that the best way to subvert truth is to repeat it over and over until it disgusts people (something like that; I’ve forgotten the exact wording). Now Heidegger’s fate in Chinese academia has truly become more and more disgusting. As a working philosopher, if one’s task is merely to repeat a great philosopher’s words a few times, then the meaning of the philosopher’s own labor is all but completely lost. Rather than listen to us, why not listen to Heidegger himself? Where lies our own value?
Any philosopher wants to transcend earlier history and earlier philosophy, and wants to break through the established “studies”; this is nothing to be surprised about, and it is certainly not unique to Heidegger. Before constructing his own philosophy, Kant also criticized all previous metaphysics as building towers on sand. In Logical Investigations, Husserl begins by directly targeting the psychologism of his time. What we need to look at is: after the criticism, what remains? What did he construct? Was his solution to the problem successful? Does it have value? Anyone can speak in radical and critical language, but what about after speaking? If someone says all previous philosophy is wrong, then I ask you to tell me what the correct philosophy is. If you can’t say it, then there is no need to pay attention.
Heidegger saw the problem and also gave his own way of overcoming it. It is precisely from such a way of overcoming that I believe Heidegger really is overly romanticized. By Romanticism, I do not mean that he advocated a return to nature (Gu was misunderstanding me; what I said then about returning to nature was merely an analogy), but rather that he sought to enlist poetry, aesthetics, and the like as means to overcome modern metaphysics. In response to the shortcomings of instrumental reason, Heidegger did not construct another viable rational alternative, but instead advocated returning to that somewhat vague, poetic, and mysterious realm of Being. Borrowing the language of “knowledge, feeling, and will,” it is a matter of using feeling to overcome knowledge, and aesthetics to overcome reason.
The other day, when Lao Deng was discussing Heidegger, I honestly was a bit unable to hold myself back. Poetry is dwelling, or dwelling is poetry—then let someone metaphysically compose a poem and show us; if it can be done, I’ll be deeply impressed. The gathering of heaven, earth, humans, and gods. How is it gathered? What are heaven, earth, humans, and gods? Measure heaven and earth by the scale of the gods. Then please measure it for us and let us have a look.
Perhaps what we need most right now is a de-Heideggerization, because everyone is far too Heideggerized. That is one of my views.
[13 楼] | IP：124.17.18.43 | Posted: 2008-01-12 09:26
epr
I understand Fish Brother’s point: always lingering around Heidegger, immersing oneself in Heidegger’s terminology, won’t do; this also goes against Heidegger’s own spirit. He declared that what he wrote was “paths, not works,” and he did not want later generations to read his writings as philosophical works, but rather hoped that readers would use them to “set out on the road.” Therefore, from any angle, one ought to “walk out” from Heidegger.
However, whether one can walk out is one thing; whether one can walk in is another. If one cannot first go deep into Heidegger’s thought and understand it sympathetically, then where is there any talk of inspiration, any talk of walking out? If one cannot start from Heidegger himself and still wants to obtain inspiration from Heidegger, then one can only remain stuck playing with empty terminology, without gaining any real harvest.
The same is true in dealing with any philosopher from history: one must walk out from them, but the premise is first to walk in. If one has never entered into a philosopher’s thinking and feeling it deeply, then there is no basis at all for speaking of walking out from them.
Whether Heidegger’s line of thought and claims are good or bad, workable or not, is one thing. But whether our understanding of Heidegger is good or bad, accurate or not, is another. I question whether reading Heidegger through the line of “Romanticism” is really correct or good. If someone feels that Heidegger has little significance and need not be paid too much attention, then they should not use “Heidegger is too romantic” and the like as a reason; I think that kind of statement is a misunderstanding of Heidegger. Heidegger certainly has been overused in China today, but in my view one key problem is that many people treat Heidegger as a “romanticist.” To improve the current situation in which Heidegger is being abused, one must first clarify the misunderstandings of Heidegger.
I have never been convinced by the claim that Heidegger “sought to use poetry, aesthetics, and the like as means of overcoming modern metaphysics.” Perhaps Heidegger “pointed toward” some mysterious and poetic “Being,” but that does not mean the “means” he offered were themselves mystical or poetic. Then if we say that Kant’s purpose in limiting knowledge was to leave room for faith, does that mean Kant thereby became a “fideist”?
[14 楼] | IP：123.112.83.200 | Posted: 2008-01-12 12:40
Xiulan
Just as Marx, Hegel, Kant, Bergson, Darwin, Sartre, Nietzsche, Freud, Popper, and others once “flooded” China, Heidegger is also quite “flooded” here today! This is not their problem; it is our own problem!
On the one hand, for various reasons, in the historical destiny of Chinese people learning “philosophy” over the past 100-plus years, we chose them and let them “flood” in. On the other hand, our own learning is still far from adequate; at best we are at a junior-high-school level, and can only adopt the mode of philosophical “studies” for so-called “research”! “Flooding” does not mean that we have already deeply understood these “flooded” philosophies; on the contrary, precisely because “flooding” may have brought about all kinds of misunderstandings (though misunderstandings also have their rationality), working philosophers have even more responsibility to calm down, immerse themselves in research, and get to the root of things, rather than, because something has “flooded,” because many people are playing with it, because it has become vulgar, trying to “decontaminate” it! Whether one personally likes it or not, Heidegger’s influence in China is still growing.
But amid this vast “sea tide,” our understanding of Heidegger is still at the stage of “the blind men feeling the elephant.” Heidegger’s thought is tied to the entire history of Western metaphysics; one could say that the depth of one’s understanding of metaphysics determines the depth of one’s understanding of Heidegger, and in turn affects the depth of one’s understanding of contemporary Western culture! In an age of the globalization of dominant Western culture, perhaps we can only first “learn to say,” then, after deep study, “say along with,” and only then “continue on,” until in the end we can “say for ourselves”!
[15 楼] | IP：219.144.202.228 | Posted: 2008-01-12 17:09
Gu Cha
The person above is right: — perhaps we can only first “learn to say,” then, after deep study, “say along with,” and only then “continue on,” until in the end we can “say for ourselves”!
Actually, this is not because of “the age of the globalization of dominant Western culture.” In any case, doing scholarship and doing philosophy should be done this way. Westerners themselves do philosophy this way too: learn to say, say along with, continue on, and finally say for oneself; only by such gradual progression is it possible to leave one’s own mark in the history of philosophy. It is just like a person learning to speak: at first one repeats after others, then imitates, and only at the end can one use language with ease. If a person cannot even read poetry, how can one expect him to compose poetry himself?
Doing philosophy, reading the classics, and commenting on the classics are basic skills. What philosophers create are philosophical classics, not various “isms.” When entering the history of philosophy with one’s own questions, what philosophical researchers first confront are those classics, not those isms. To reduce the history of philosophy to various isms—and preferably to reduce it to a “battle between two camps” of two isms, for example reducing the history of philosophy to a transition from idealism to materialism, or from representationalism to interventionism, while leaving philosophers aside and turning the rich possibilities and diversity of the history of philosophy into some monotonous Whig history, and then seeming to stand at the forefront oneself—this is, of course, merely an illusion. If one has never imitated philosophers, how could one possibly become a philosopher?
[16 楼] | IP：123.112.83.200 | Posted: 2008-01-12 17:46
Yu Zhile
What Xiulan says above is correct: the level of philosophical research in China really does have problems, and it is still far behind the pace of the West, still at the stage of learning to say. This is obvious to all.
I am not opposed to Heidegger’s influence in China; what I oppose is a scholar of Heidegger, right from the start, toying with a heap of obscure language and dazing people with it, only to lose himself in the ocean of obscurity in the end. If you can restate Heidegger in your own language, then I admire you very much. Don’t say, “I’m still at the elementary stage, so I should first learn to speak this way.” That is nothing but an excuse for lacking the ability to keep speaking, to speak for oneself. Of course, I am not opposed to learning to speak in that way; I only insist on this awareness: learning to speak in that way is by no means the goal itself. That’s all.
Xiao Gu has always been opposing me, as if all I know is some kind of -ism and I don’t read texts at all, hahaha—then I might as well stop hanging around. In fact, there are many ways to do philosophical research. You can do textual analysis and interpretation, or you can look at things more broadly and grasp the problems at a more macro level; either way is fine. As for simplification, everyone is simplifying. Heidegger’s reduction of the history of Western philosophy to a history of the decline of metaphysics is itself a simplification. Marx’s *Manifesto of the Communist Party* opens by saying that all human history is a history of class struggle, and this simplification is not nonsense. Why?
History is necessarily Whig history. Don’t say you know the original history, the original thought of some philosopher—unless you are God.
When I say Heidegger is too romanticized, that is just my personal feeling about Heidegger’s discussion of science and technology. Of course there can be different interpretations; that’s fine, it can be discussed.
I was very worried that the discussion would go off the rails, and indeed that happened. What had originally been a discussion of whether Heidegger is too romanticized finally degenerated into how to study philosophy and how to read texts; it shifted from a “professional issue” to a “layperson’s issue,” which is not very interesting, so let’s stop here.
[17 楼] | IP：124.17.18.43 | Posted: 2008-01-12 20:48
epr
Since Brother Yu has said so much, I also don’t want to continue discussing “layperson’s issues.” I’ll just say one last thing: a macro perspective cannot replace a micro perspective. Some broad trends and currents in the history of philosophy are of course obvious—who can deny that? But when it comes to a particular philosopher, one should not impose the framework of a macro perspective, as if every philosopher must have a “label.” The idea that “everyone engaged in philosophical research is using some kind of -ism” is wrong. “Some kind of -ism” is only something one says from a macro perspective, and it cannot be abused.
Let me finally return to the “professional issue” and say a few words.
Brother Yu mentioned: “Which philosopher isn’t thinking, isn’t questioning? To merely recommend this kind of approach means Heidegger would no longer be Heidegger.”
But. Heidegger really did merely recommend this kind of approach; and if “merely” is not quite accurate, then this is at least the main kind of approach he recommended.
First, “thinking,” as well as the “questioning” activity Heidegger carries out, is a road toward authenticity. For example, in *Being and Time* Heidegger says: “Where, then, is the existential interpretation to take from the characterizing of the authentic existence of the Dasein? … The existential interpretation takes over the task of cutting off the possibilities and constraints upon existence.” (§63, p. 371, p. 312) And elsewhere Heidegger puts it even more plainly: “How can an investigation, on the one hand, as with every investigation, itself be a mode of Being of a Dasein that is unfolding itself, and on the other hand, aim to shape into concepts the understanding of the being of existence belonging to existence, without involving the above-mentioned projective activity that is essential to Dasein?” (§63, p. 374, p. 315)
—One can see that, in Heidegger’s view, the existential analytic as an activity of research itself—rather than a research result pointing to some other activity—already contains a projective activity that is essential to Dasein.
When Heidegger speaks of the way to relate to the technological world, what he says is “a serene openness to things and a receptive openness to the mysterious.” (Heidegger *Selected Works*, p. 1240) This sounds as if it points toward “mystery and poetry.” But what does this really mean? Just earlier in the same essay, what Heidegger emphasizes is: “Today humanity is fleeing from thought.” (p. 1232) … “Man is the thinking, that is, the meditative, living being.” (p. 1233)
—One can see that the so-called openness to mystery and the like still comes down to “thinking.”
Of course, Heidegger must discuss what thinking is and how to think. But what is “thinking,” really?
Brother Yu said: “Any philosopher wants to surpass the history of the past, the philosophies of the past; everyone wants to break with the established ‘discipline’—there’s nothing surprising about that, and it is certainly not unique to Heidegger.”
But that is precisely Heidegger’s distinctiveness. Heidegger says quite explicitly: “The task of thinking should be to abandon the thinking that determines what has previously been said about thinking.” (p. 1261)
Why? Because Heidegger’s distinctive move is that he designates “truth” as “unconcealment,” and thereby negates the effort to construct truth in a positive sense. Heidegger believes that once those coverings are dismantled, truth reveals itself spontaneously; there is no need to construct a new doctrine of truth, only to seek the path to that clearing, that bright and open place (the open forest clearing, the unconcealed).
Heidegger’s saying that truth cannot be constructed by reason does not mean that he is anti-reason. In fact, the possibility of unconcealment still depends on reason, on thinking. Without rational reflection, without serious questioning, human beings cannot become aware of their condition as the they-self, cannot become aware of their non-authentic state, and even less can they get out of it.
Of course, whether Heidegger’s path can actually work, I am also deeply skeptical. But in any case, according to Heidegger’s text, I do not think Brother Yu is right when he says: “Heidegger saw the problem, and also came up with his own way of overcoming it, … he sought to use poetry, aesthetics, and so on as means of overcoming modern metaphysics.”
[18 楼] | IP：123.112.83.200 | Posted: 2008-01-12 22:00
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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