It is a great honor to have the opportunity to offer suggestions for the writing of primary school science textbooks. However, because my own level is limited and I have a habitual tendency to drag my feet, I may not be able to offer many constructive opinions; I can only jot down some very scattered thoughts. I will divide them into two parts: first, the overall significance of elements from the history of science; second, following the framework of the textbook, some ideas about how to interweave historical material into each grade. The original plan also had a third part, which would have selected some usable cases along the thread of the history of science, but it seems now that I won’t be able to get it done before the 25th.
I. On the general conception and approach
Let me begin with the overall line of thought: why should elements from the history of science be interwoven into primary school science textbooks? Of course, this is a distinctive feature of Hunan Science and Technology Press, but this distinctive element does in fact carry profound significance. Only by grasping the basic intention behind interweaving elements from the history of science can we ensure that such interweaving remains lively rather than stiff.
In the press’s revision report it is stated: “The process by which children explore nature actually has great consistency with the history of humankind’s exploration of nature; the evolution of human intelligence and the development of children’s intelligence are almost synchronous. The methods by which early humans explored nature were usually also the methods by which early children peered into nature. In this sense, the history of science and technology is both a history of human scientific exploration and a history of children’s scientific inquiry. Therefore, integrating the history of science and technology into primary school science education has special significance.”
This is clearly an interesting and insightful line of thought. I also believe that the idea of interweaving elements from the history of science and technology into primary school science textbooks is not merely a matter of gathering and borrowing from ready-made historical materials; it also requires a distinctive perspective on the history of science and technology. On the one hand, the history of science and technology is a tool for advancing primary education; on the other hand, primary education itself, in turn, must advance our understanding of the history of science and technology! The press’s report proposes seeing the history of science and technology as “a history of children’s scientific inquiry.” This is to open up a new historiographical perspective on the history of science and technology—for example, we have a history of science from the standpoint of social constructivism, a history of science from the standpoint of Orientalism, a history of science from the standpoint of feminism; now we also need a history of science from the standpoint of children’s education.
Of course, systematically developing an entire historiographical program is the task of historians of science. But since textbook editors have this breadth of vision, if they can expand it a little, it should also be able to open up a new style for textbook writing. Unfortunately, however, from the textbooks actually written earlier, this historical perspective does not seem to have been reflected. According to the “statistics on the use of the history of science and technology in textbooks,” the historical cases cited are either from ancient China or from the modern West. But since the history of science and technology is understood as a history of growth synchronized with children’s exploration, then the early childhood stage of science ought to be the focus; if we leave aside prehistory, the emphasis should really be on the history of science and technology in the ancient West. And the history of science and technology in ancient China cannot replace the ancient West, because modern science and technology did not grow out of ancient China.
In short, in the actual writing of the old version, the history of science was still treated as a ready-made pool of materials to draw from, rather than a perspective to be carried through consistently. So if one is to carry through one’s own perspective, then in my view the first step is to turn one’s gaze to the childhood of science and to give importance to the history of science and technology in the ancient West.
What I mean by the history of science and technology in the ancient West is, on the one hand, the history of technology before the industrial age, and on the other hand, mainly the history of scientific thought. These two parts are relatively independent. It was only in more recent times that the history of science and the history of technology came together, whereas in antiquity they had their own separate lines of development; this is something to pay attention to when selecting materials. This mode of development does in fact correspond to the growth process of children as well—on the one hand, as children grow they gradually become familiar with and develop various practical life skills; on the other hand, they gradually begin to think about the world and investigate the principles of things. On the one hand, children will, out of curiosity, ask all kinds of questions and acquire all kinds of conceptual knowledge, but at the beginning these explorations in the conceptual realm are not directly very closely tied to the child’s actual life. On the other hand, children are also gradually becoming familiar with their actual living environment, developing various practical skills, learning to use various tools, but this growth is not very much related to the knowledge-seeking relationship of “why.” Conceptual inquiry activity led by curiosity often points toward novel things or grand things that are farthest removed from the actual living environment.
In any case, curiosity and questioning are the source of science. In view of our perspective on the history of science and the history of technology, we find that, on the one hand, it is indeed necessary to educate children about the connection between scientific questioning and technological practice, but on the other hand, we also cannot deny the difference between the two; we should not ignore or erase the gulf between scientific theory and technological practice. One should pay attention to cultivating and protecting the “idle imagining” activities of childhood, and to fully bringing into play the unique curiosity and imagination of children. Although primary school science education requires children to “learn proactively,” such proactivity does not necessarily always have to be realized in practical exploration, does not necessarily always have to be carried out through operational, technical, or experimental activities, and does not necessarily always have to be realized through “doing it with one’s hands”; one should also fully preserve the child’s space for fantasy. In addition to guiding children to observe and explore nearby and concrete things, one should also encourage them to “uselessly” imagine distant and abstract things.
Ancient Western scientific thought, on the one hand, was far removed from technology and practice, and on the other hand, in the eyes of modern people it was erroneous and outdated. We should not evade these characteristics of science’s childhood; rather, we should precisely bring them fully into scientific education. We should fully recognize this fact: a child’s personality is still not fully developed. A state of being not yet fully developed means a stage in which all aspects of thought and life have not yet formed an integrated whole. An adult is not necessarily someone who has mastered vastly more knowledge or skills than a child; in fact, many of the things learned in primary school are by adulthood almost completely forgotten, and much of what adults have seen and heard has also already been seen by children. The key is that various concepts, understandings, ideas, and habits only ultimately settle in adults, become integrated, and form a stable structure. Children, by contrast, lack precisely this integration. It is like saying that children may have the most neurons, and yet during growth neurons only decrease and do not increase; the key to growth lies in these scattered units gradually establishing connections, ultimately forming a stable and mature whole.
Viewing the history of science and children’s education from such a perspective, we should realize that we should not expect the history of science to be integrated from the beginning in its childhood stage; activities such as observation, reasoning, imagination, and practice are not, and should not be, coherent and unified at the outset. The same is true for children’s education: we cannot, and should not, expect a young child to acquire too early a comprehensive, tightly linked knowledge structure. Nor need we be impatient; as minds mature, people naturally will always integrate the various elements obtained during their growth. Of course, we hope that children can ultimately form a comprehensive scientific literacy and gain a comprehensive understanding of science; then this can be reflected in the full consideration and presentation of the various aspects of science, but the aspects presented do not necessarily have to be comprehensive, and can instead be partial or even obsessive. For example, the “useless science” of ancient Greece, and even the idle imaginings of medieval scholastic philosophers, can play a positive role in teaching. As for a mind that is not yet mature, it may not be able to understand what is integrated and whole; instead, taking one aspect and pushing it to the extreme, just as fairy tales or animation do by presenting things in an extreme and idealized manner, may be more readily accepted by children. In this respect, materials from the ancient history of science can play a very positive role.
The curriculum standards also mention that children should “know the elements roughly involved in scientific inquiry: posing and focusing questions, designing research plans, collecting and obtaining evidence, analyzing data and drawing conclusions, and expressing and communicating. They should recognize that inquiry is not a patterned linear process, but a cyclical, interwoven process.” So how can the “nonlinearity” of scientific inquiry be demonstrated? The history of science in antiquity can provide abundant cases. For example, we will find that many people posed questions without designing research plans (such as whether the universe is infinite, whether time has a beginning, and so on); some drew conclusions without analyzing data (such as the theory of particles or atomism); some conducted research but did not participate in communication (such as Leonardo da Vinci); some greatly advanced scientific communication but did not focus on any particular question (such as Bacon).
The curriculum standards also mention that children should “know that scientific knowledge formed through scientific inquiry and consensus is correct at a certain stage, but that as new evidence increases, it will continuously be perfected, deepened, and developed.” This is precisely why cases from the history of science that now seem erroneous and outdated have an irreplaceable positive significance. Apart from showing the history of scientific error, how else can students come to appreciate the relative correctness of science and its developmental nature?
The “errors” in the history of science are often great errors as well; within these erroneous ideas we can not only feel the developmental nature of science, but also savor certain characteristics and elements of scientific inquiry. These elements are not easy to bring out in cases that seem self-evident, but are instead more noticeable in ideas that now seem strange and unfamiliar. For example, Thales said that water is the original principle of all things. We think this is of course wrong, but why did he make such a claim? We find that this view marks the Greeks’ beginning to explain the world with natural, internal, non-mystical, perceptible, and intelligible things, and marks the beginning of people’s attention to the “internal causes” of things. Or, for instance, Aristotle thought that force (actually, it should be the mover) is the cause of motion. This too is of course wrong, but such a formulation reflects concern with and inquiry into the phenomenon of “change.” Or again, the “phlogiston theory” is of course wrong, but its proposal embodies scientists’ faith in “conservation” and the demand for quantitative research. Even the question of “how many angels can stand on the point of a needle” is, of course, absurd by modern standards, but the emergence of such a question (medieval thought really did discuss the spatiality of angels) reflects precisely an obsession with reason and logic, as well as a way of thinking that idealizes and abstracts.
In short, the general policy for introducing elements from the history of science and technology is to attach special importance to the history of science in the ancient West, and especially not to ignore its erroneous and obsessive aspects, while also taking into account the history of technology, modern science, Chinese science and technology, and prehistoric science and technology as supplementary content (I will say more about that later).
II. Some possible historical elements, arranged according to the framework structure table of the Hunan version of the science textbook
First grade (sensory observation—comparison)
According to the idea of corresponding children’s growth history with the history of technological development, the first-grade stage of primary school is probably still in the prehistoric stage, or rather, precisely in the transition from prehistory to “history.” Before entering primary school, children have already learned to speak and acquired basic survival and social skills; the prehistoric age is roughly already more or less over. In first grade, they should enter the age of “history.” “History” means that there is now “record.” Even animals have sensory perception and can carry out certain acts of comparison or weighing, but the characteristic of human civilization is that humans not only perceive, but can also record sensory observations, “inscribe” them, and then only then can there be a quasi-scientific, theorized activity of “comparison”—not directly comparing sensuously in the immediate present through sensory observation, but first transforming observations into certain symbolic things, then detaching from actual sensory observation and turning one’s gaze to symbolic things, and “comparing” symbols. This “comparison” activity at the abstract level opens the prelude to knowledge.
Thus, in this stage, the curriculum should, in addition to guiding children to observe, further inspire them to record, and to experience the significance of symbolic activity. As for the explicit historical elements from the history of science and technology, one may insert at appropriate points the method of knotted cords used by primitive peoples to keep records, or display the earliest number symbols and “inscribed” marks first used in cultures such as ancient Babylon, ancient Egypt, and ancient China.
Second grade (classification—posing questions)
As an exploratory activity concerning nature, the origin of science roughly has two lines: natural history (natural studies) and natural philosophy. The former is concerned with “classification,” the latter with “questioning,” and these two second-grade themes correspond to them perfectly. It should be noted that the activity of classification has an intrinsic connection with the activities of recording and comparing: when people need to record a certain thing, obviously they cannot just write “this”; they always need to place it under some category and name it. How to classify and how to inscribe are mutually related, and the “comparison” activity based on symbolic behavior is simultaneously an activity of classification: first several things must be placed under a common broad category and a common standard of measurement found before comparison can be made; then, between different things, distinctions must be found, and qualitative comparison is also to carry out finer classification. On the other hand, classification is also related to the activity of questioning: when we ask “What is this?”, we are also seeking an appropriate category for the thing. Aristotle’s division of matter into the four elements of earth, water, air, and fire, or the four principles of cold, hot, dry, and wet, was precisely an attempt to answer questions about the essence of things and the nature of motion through classification. In addition, the establishment of classifications also gives rise to questions—for example, if there is a distinction between spring, summer, autumn, and winter, then there arises the question of why there are four seasons.
In short, classification activity is a hub-like, vitally important activity. Here one should not only guide children in classification, but also prompt them to notice the intrinsic connections between classification activity and other activities of inquiry and communication. As for historical materials, there should be many to choose from, such as Aristotle: his classification of fields of knowledge, the classifications in the doctrine of the four causes, the classification of “a human being is a two-footed, featherless animal,” and so on. Pythagoras’s classification of “number” can also be mentioned.
As for the activity of questioning, I think it can also be more open. There is no need to insist on guiding children to ask only those questions whose answers they can quickly find through their own active learning or easily understand. One can also guide them to ask big questions that they still find difficult to grasp at present, stimulating their curiosity and leaving room for imagination. One can combine this with the history of scientific development and give questions such as why there are four seasons, why the phases of the moon change, why water freezes, why wood burns, and so on; one can also provide historical or multiple answers, such as the phlogiston theory’s explanation of combustion. Standard scientific explanations of these questions are probably beyond the grasp of second graders, but that is precisely the point—it is not necessary to always want students to understand the knowledge. The key point of this “questioning” stage is not how to answer the questions, but to raise interesting, meaningful, imaginative questions, to leave suspense, to leave room for imagination, and to show the wondrous content of nature and the profound charm of science; these matters are more important.
Third and fourth grades (observation—doing experiments—collecting and organizing information—focusing questions)
After the transition of second grade, or rather after the groundwork laid by natural history and natural philosophy, the “observation” of third grade is already different from the “sensory observation” of first grade. Observation at this stage is more active; it is no longer merely passive recording and inscribing, but requires taking the initiative, using rational planning and technical assistance to carry it out. Of course, early scientific inquiry did not not use rational planning or technical assistance; it is just that by this stage—indeed around third grade—people’s self-consciousness begins to awaken, and in the history of science this means that methodological self-awareness begins. People not only observe, but are also self-aware and reflective about their own observing behavior. At this stage, the early modern period, or rather the period from third to fourth grade, is a period of “self-awareness,” so we repeat the themes of first and second grade: observation—measurement—organization—questioning. Third and fourth grade are a cycle of first and second grade, but with greater self-consciousness, more reflection, and more self-control.
Through reflection on observation, people discover that sensory observation is often not so reliable. The old version of the textbook gave the example of immersing one hand in hot water and the other in cold water, and then feeling lukewarm water with both hands at the same time; this indeed is an example that lets students experience the unreliability of sensation. Of course, one can also use more convenient examples, such as visual illusion images—for instance, observational tasks like which line is longer in “↔” and “＞—＜.” These sensory biases, illusions, and uncertainties mean that we need to observe more carefully and choose appropriate tools to assist us in observation and judgment (whether a thermometer or a ruler, a telescope or a mass spectrometer). The relationship between science and technology reveals itself for the first time.
With regard to the unreliability of observation, one should be able to find many historical materials to interweave (of course, here we are aiming at the history of scientific error). One can find comments on the reliability of observation, such as Bacon’s four idols; one can also find cases of observational bias, such as the fact that before the telescope, scientists generally believed that the differences in the sizes of stars could be seen from the earth, because this could be “measured” with the aid of a thin thread; yet the assistance of the telescope led people to realize that the sizes observed earlier were in fact visual illusions.
The “organizing information” and “focusing questions” of this stage are also different from “classification” and “questioning.” Primitive natural history and natural philosophy respectively transformed themselves into induction and deduction, and the key point in both is methodological self-awareness. Classification or questioning is no longer so subjective—earlier ways of classifying tended to emphasize a thing’s usefulness to oneself (for example, classificatory categories in natural studies based on food or medicine), and early questioning was driven only by personal curiosity. After methodological self-awareness emerges, people begin to view classification and questions themselves from an objective perspective, paying more attention to examining the “objective properties” and “internal logic” of things, and trying to reduce the influence of personal needs or preferences. There is also a great deal of historical material that can be interwoven here, mainly concentrated in the early modern period: one can talk about the formation of natural classification methods; one can mention how Tycho improved astronomical instruments and recorded celestial data in detail and objectively; one can discuss how Descartes developed the coordinate system so that people could use numerical symbols to organize information more and more conveniently.
In short, in this stage, although nominally there is such a series of themes, the core theme is actually “self-reflection.”
Fifth Grade (Conjecture and Hypothesis — Making a Plan)
What should follow immediately after methodological self-consciousness is the rise of experimental science, in which observation and imagination, induction and deduction, and other scientific methods are for the first time synthesized, forming the standardized experimental science of the modern era.
Clearly, experimental science is not merely practical operation; it still contains an element of empty speculation. Some metaphysical conjectures are still leading the development of science, such as mechanism, corpuscular theory, atomism, and so on—conjectures about the world-picture. Of course, more concrete, empirically oriented scientific conjectures can also be cited in abundance, such as the periodic law of the elements, the theory of continental drift, and so on. The conjecture about the unification of electromagnetism in the old edition of the textbook is also a good example.
In addition, experimental activity by no means necessarily has to include practical activity; a more basic kind of scientific experiment may perhaps be the thought experiment. One can draw conclusions or reveal problems simply by assuming a certain situation. For example, Stevin’s hypothetical experiment in statics (the condition for the balance of forces on two inclined planes), Galileo’s hypothetical experiment on falling bodies (tying a heavy object and a light object together and letting them fall), and so on can all be cited as examples, allowing students to appreciate the charm of abstract reasoning. Moreover, the formulation of scientific laws often has to be based on some hypothetical situation. For example, Newton’s First Law—“if an object is not acted on by an external force”—is undoubtedly only a hypothetical situation rather than a real state of affairs, yet the law expressed through a hypothetical situation can provide powerful explanations for real situations.
By the way, the case study on “making a plan” in the old edition of the fifth-grade second-volume textbook is rather problematic. Jenner merely chose a boy as the experimental subject; half a month after the boy was inoculated again with smallpox, he was perfectly unharmed. This result is simply incapable of proving any conclusion at all. The sample size is far too small—statistics wouldn’t really even be meaningful with 10 people, let alone when only 1 person was chosen—and the observation period was also far too short. The incubation period of smallpox is one to two weeks; to say, on the basis of one person being unharmed half a month later, that “Jenner finally proved through experiment that cowpox can prevent smallpox” is really rather laughable. There are plenty of more respectable experimental designs that could be found. For example, Newton’s experiment with the seven colors of light, Torricelli’s experiment on atmospheric pressure, Lavoisier’s oxidation experiment, and so on. Even if one wants to cite something from medicine, one might as well cite that fellow who solved puerperal fever.
Sixth Grade (Explaining Evidence, Synthesis)
I never quite understood the “explaining evidence” theme in the original textbook; the final Columbus column under “How Do We Make Judgments?” left me utterly baffled…… In any case, after the flourishing of experimental science, knowledge and experience of all kinds gradually became interconnected and integrated, a unified scientific world-picture gradually took shape, and humanity became full of confidence in science, moving forward with the courage of Columbus. These circumstances are indeed worth discussing. But after all, human knowledge and experience are limited. Columbus’s final judgment may have been correct in some respects, but he was still wrong to judge the place he had reached as India. Rather than guiding children to proclaim, “I can make accurate judgments……,” it would be better to sincerely remind them of the limitations of “judgment,” and to warn against blind arrogance—the idea that having enough experience and knowledge is sufficient to make accurate judgments. Science is limited, life is complex, and children in sixth grade should be able to understand this.
The final “synthesis” can, on the one hand, present the grand panorama of the era of Big Science and high technology since the Second Industrial Revolution, and review and summarize science’s journey. On the other hand, it can also present science’s limitations and perplexities, for example the invention of DDT winning the Nobel Prize, or the atomic bomb and the greenhouse effect, and so on, focusing on science and society, the ethics of science, and related topics.
It is worth noting that up through third and fourth grade, the correspondence between children’s history of growth and the history of technological development is still fairly well matched, but by fifth and sixth grade the transition is clearly too abrupt, as if everything were suddenly being pulled into something like the contemporary era. In fact, what ought to correspond here is a “rebellious phase.” Along with the rise of self-awareness and independent consciousness, along with the enrichment of knowledge and the strengthening of ability, by fifth and sixth grade—when children are eleven or twelve—they are precisely beginning to enter what is called the rebellious phase: self-important, independent, and full of resistance and suspicion. In terms of the history of technology, this is roughly the age of the Enlightenment and skepticism, and it is opening toward Romanticism and nihilism.
At this stage, education should go with the flow. Rather than trying by every possible means to prevent children’s rebellion and skepticism, it would be better to encourage and guide them properly. Therefore, this is exactly the right time to let children understand the one-sidedness and limitations of science.
After the age of Enlightenment and skepticism, by middle school children begin to receive systematic education in scientific disciplines, and this systematic model of science education did in fact gradually come into being after the Enlightenment. According to such a correspondence, we find that the development of the history of technology appears very precocious: by about middle school, it has already corresponded to the contemporary era. Of course, we can also adjust the scale; this depends on how we understand children’s history of growth. For example, if we take the middle-school stage as the period when self-consciousness awakens and the high-school stage as the main rebellious phase, then the contemporary era would only begin at university—such a correspondence may perhaps be somewhat more appropriate. But the correspondence in which middle school already enters the contemporary era can also explain some issues, because the development of the history of technology really does present a kind of precocious tendency. That is to say, before humanity’s mind had become mature enough, the development of technological history had already reached too high a level. Humanity acquired overly powerful technological forces too quickly, but the development of human ethics and will seems not yet sufficiently sound to govern the power of technology. This is why it is said that modern technology faces predicament and danger.
2011年1月23日
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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