Know Yourself, and Do Nothing in Excess—Reflections on Wang Yifang’s Lecture

Scientific development is proceeding at high speed, and humanity is forging ahead rapidly on the road to knowledge—but does such development need a braking mechanism? Does science need to be “negatively thought”? This is the question Teacher Wang raised. Does science need ethical constraints? Beyond what is “correct,” is there also a standard of “justice”?

When people discuss the ethical constraints or social responsibility of science, they are often referring to the personal conduct of scientists. Of course, scientists, as citizens and as members of society, are subject, like people in any other profession, to corresponding social and ethical constraints in their work and lives. Scientific ethics in this sense is only an accounting brought to bear on scientists; it does not bring “science” itself to account. And the ideal “science” is absolutely pure and noble—knowledge for knowledge’s sake. Such a pure curiosity in pursuit of truth is, of course, beyond reproach. If the scientific knowledge gained through this purely intellectual activity is later misused, that may produce terrible ethical consequences, but it is the users of that knowledge, not its pure seekers, who should be held to account.

Is it really so? The case Teacher Wang offered is thought-provoking. The Nazi scientists, like ideal scientists, possessed a vigorous thirst for knowledge. They were not necessarily driven by any evil intent or by a desire for fame and fortune; they too merely wanted to pursue knowledge, for example, to understand the mysteries of the human body. They simply wanted a looser, freer, and more favorable research environment. The Nazis provided them with precisely such excellent research conditions, along with abundant experimental material—Jews. Hitler wanted to massacre Jews, but the scientists did not; nor did they necessarily kill anyone themselves. They merely wanted to study the mysteries of the human body and to seek physiological knowledge. And they did in fact achieve important, undeniable scientific accomplishments. What, then, was there to blame? If those scientists did not join the Nazi laboratories in order to kill people, nor to get promoted or make money, but simply in order to have a research environment in which they could pursue truth more freely, what is there to condemn?

In fact, curiosity and the desire for knowledge are certainly both noble temperaments, beautiful virtues. But like any virtue, they must not be allowed to expand without limit. We are always fond of speaking of the ancient Greeks’ pure spirit of inquiry, yet in the Temple of Delphi, alongside the maxim “Know yourself,” there was another maxim: “[In all things] do not go too far.” Among the four virtues of ancient Greece, “temperance” is the most fundamental. Every other virtue is a kind of “temperance” in some respect; for example, excessive “courage” turns into rashness and is no longer a virtue. A person without curiosity is numb and vulgar, but pure curiosity, once it goes too far, will also become blind and out of control. As Teacher Wang said, we are not opposed to the development of science, nor are we asking for stagnation or a return to the past. The pursuit of knowledge and progress are both “good,” provided that they do not go too far.

October 15, 2010

最新评论

• i`m a joke

  2010-10-15 12:26:18

  Regarding the example of Nazi scientists, I think human rights possess the most sacred status and should not be violated for any motive whatsoever. Conducting scientific research by infringing upon Jews’ right to survival clearly violates normal ethical views. A reasonable motive for scientific research should be something that contributes to the course of human history, whereas this so-called scientific research is undoubtedly nothing more than satisfying the curiosity of a few scientists and tarnishing human history; this is in contradiction with normal motives. If the “good” of the pursuit of knowledge is premised on doing evil, then it cannot count as good either.

• unic

  2010-10-17 22:33:17 Anonymous 10.8.0.4

  Why does it feel unlike something you wrote?
  I feel that using only “excess” to describe behavior that pursues truth purely while disregarding human relations seems too one-dimensional. For instance, I think courage itself already contains this other layer of meaning, that of benevolence and righteousness, and pure pursuit of truth should itself also contain concern for the human world. Perhaps the problem lies here: in the modern definition of “truth,” something important is lacking.

• unic

  2010-10-17 22:34:46 Anonymous 10.8.0.4

  “And pure pursuit of truth should itself also contain concern for the human world.” — delete the word “pure”.

• Gu Che

  2010-10-18 11:56:18

  I think this sort of defense is even more “one-dimensional,” saying that courage must also contain benevolence and righteousness, that the pursuit of knowledge must also contain moral virtue, and so on. If every virtue is interpreted as broad and comprehensive, as if any one virtue ought to include all the others, then there would only be one virtue in the world, with truth, goodness, and beauty all fused into one. That sounds nice, but I think it is a one-sided and narrow understanding of virtue. I think virtue is plural: there are all kinds of virtues, and all kinds of exemplary people. Some people excel because they love wisdom and seek knowledge; others excel because they are brave and steadfast. Although a person of superior virtue should possess comprehensive virtue, what truly sets him apart is often only one aspect of virtue, or one particular form of virtue.
  Traditional scientists have defended themselves in just this way: the dark side of science is nothing more than their not being scientific enough, not being sufficiently committed to truth. The ideal scientist is a unity of truth, goodness, and beauty, fully capable of restraining himself, and in no need of any external restraint or criticism. But the path of science is ultimately only one direction in which human beings can cultivate and display their own qualities. Scientific excellence is not the only excellence; the pursuit of truth does not represent all virtues. Of course, you may say that the scientist’s pursuit of truth is only a partial pursuit of truth, and that there is also a genuine pursuit of truth that understands truth as a unity of truth, goodness, and beauty. But if one simply erases the diversity of virtues in reality and looks only at an ideal, abstract virtue that is omnipotent and omnibenevolent, then such ethics is probably hollow.

• Gu Che

  2010-10-18 17:33:21 [Reply]

  To pin the problem on excess in pursuit means that I am neither saying this kind of pursuit is wrong or bad, nor saying that the problem is simply a deficiency in some other respect and unrelated to this activity of pursuit. For example, when we say that a person is physically strong and brave and steadfast, but not very smart or nimble, and is relatively slow to react; or when we say that a person is very intelligent, quick-witted, and perceptive, but a little weak in body, and so on, we consider these people all excellent, and their physical shortcomings do not affect their intellectual excellence. Excellence and deficiency are independent of one another. Applied to scientists, we also often say that his pursuit of truth is completely good, but that he is somewhat lacking in social and moral cultivation. But when I raise the issue of “excess,” I mean to say that those scientists’ problems are not merely a matter of some deficiency, and that “pursuit” itself is not absolutely good. It is precisely excessive pursuit that causes numbness and callousness in other respects; this is not the same as the case of the wise person who is weak in body. Of course, if a person becomes deficient in intellect precisely because he pursues bodily strength excessively, or if he ruins his body because he pursues intellectual development excessively, then that kind of “pursuit” has also become excessive.

• Gu Che

  2010-10-18 17:48:00 [Reply]

  I emphasize that the aims of pursuit are plural, and that there is no absolutely good thing. Even if, in the sense that different roads lead to the same destination, truth, goodness, and beauty are ultimately unified, the paths each person pursues diverge, and no one mode of pursuit can be absolutely complete. I pursue beauty in music; you pursue excellence in literature; he pursues beauty in mathematics. Each person is, in different ways, pursuing his own thing. If I say that you should not be pursuing only the beauty of music, that you must pursue that supreme beauty which includes music, painting, literature, science, and so on, and that otherwise you are not truly pursuing beauty—then what would you say? Would a person who pursues the abstract and empty concept of “perfection” necessarily be more qualified than a musician who concentrates on the beauty of music to be called someone who pursues beauty? Not necessarily. You can say that the truth pursued by scientists is only one aspect, not complete truth—but should the problem be pinned on the one-sidedness of this pursuit? I do not agree.

Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.