Xinzhai Lao Jiang
Quotations from Feyerabend
I’m a fanatical admirer of Feyerabend, so from now on I’ll post some of the old gentleman’s quotations whenever I have nothing better to do:
A free society is one in which all traditions have equal rights and equal opportunities to enter the centers of power (this differs from the usual definition: that everyone has equal rights to enter the positions defined by one special tradition—namely, the tradition of Western science and rationalism). A tradition acquires these rights not because it is important to outsiders, but because it is meaningful in the lives of those who participate in that tradition.
Science in a Free Society (Chinese translation), p. 4.
[ This post was edited by Xinzhai Lao Jiang at 2008-01-21 14:44 ]
[Main poster] | IP: 221.219.14.151 | Posted: 2008-01-21 12:00
GuChi
[1st floor] | IP: 123.112.74.52 | Posted: 2008-01-21 12:36
GuChi
I only have the 2007 edition of Against Method at hand, and after flipping through it I don’t seem to have found this passage…
[2nd floor] | IP: 123.112.74.52 | Posted: 2008-01-21 13:04
GuChi
I have so many doubts about this passage that I don’t even know where to begin.
Feyerabend is an anarchist. Under anarchism, where does a “center of power” come from? If there isn’t even a “center,” how can one speak of “equal opportunities to enter the center”? There simply are no opportunities at all! Everyone has no opportunities, and so the opportunities are equal—do I have that right?
[3rd floor] | IP: 123.112.74.52 | Posted: 2008-01-21 13:09
GuChi
QUOTE:
Quoted from Floor 1 Gu Chi posted at 2008-01-21 12:36:
What does “equality” mean?
The understanding and judgment of “equality” itself also differ radically under different “traditions”; which understanding should be taken as the standard? Feyerabend’s answer, of course, is: “Anything goes.” But this is precisely something that almost all “traditions” cannot agree with.
Is “anarchism” itself also one “tradition,” standing on equal footing with totalitarianism, democracy, and the like? If so, how is it to communicate with other traditions? How is it to declare its stance when interests conflict? Or should it be that whatever others do is all right? Even if others want to isolate anarchists and cut off all contact and supplies between anarchists and the outside world, would anarchists still have no complaint?
The highest stage of communism is also anarchism, but that is only a utopian “promise”; what Feyerabend seems to be devoted to is not providing anything of that sort. So what exactly is it?
[4th floor] | IP: 123.112.74.52 | Posted: 2008-01-21 13:48
GuChi
Politics is not some pure technique that can be summoned at will and then cast aside, standing outside cultural tradition. A political system is an inseparable element of any “tradition.” If every tradition is equal, then those political systems are equal too: you may pursue anarchism, we may insist on totalitarianism—anything goes.
Of course, other things are likewise inseparable from “tradition,” such as the homeland and land inhabited by generations.
But how do we define the boundaries of “tradition”? How big is a “tradition”? For example, does all of China, all Chinese people, belong to one and the same tradition? China’s political system, and the homeland and land of the Chinese people, of course are also part of tradition. So if one says that the autonomy of “tradition” should be preserved, the result is always this: the existing system is always justified.
But if one says that there are also all kinds of different “traditions” within China, then how are they to be distinguished? How are we to define: who is an “outsider”? Who is “one of us”? Which people are “participants in that tradition”?
All these boundaries are fuzzy—the coexistence of different traditions is unavoidable, and coexistence means that we must accommodate one another, meaning that there will inevitably be intertwined relations of interest. How to deal with these relations of interest? To say merely “anything goes” is utterly meaningless.
[5 楼] | IP：123.112.74.52 | Posted: 2008-01-21 14:05
XinZhaiLaoJiang
Sorry, I’ve been successfully “debunked”: it is the 1990 first edition of the Chinese translation of Science in a Free Society.
I have not seen how the elder Fei precisely defines “equality” and “tradition”; there are of course many problems here, worth discussing slowly.
However: Feyerabend was not a political anarchist; moreover, he himself never advocated, in any positive sense, “anything goes.”
[6 楼] | IP：221.219.14.151 | Posted: 2008-01-21 14:42
GuChi
Just as science and knowledge cannot be “stripped away” from cultural tradition, neither can “politics.” In fact, topics in political philosophy have always been linked with topics in philosophy of science; this is especially clear in the dispute between Popper and Kuhn.
“Order” is a suppression of freedom, but at the same time it is also a safeguard of freedom. Just as air is both a drag on flight and a condition of flight. If “order” is overemphasized, that is bad, but eliminating order entirely is equally bad. “A necessary tension.”
On a whim, let me give an example, relevant or not:
Near some mountain, the A, B, and C tribes have lived there for generations. They have different languages, different customs, different religious beliefs, and different systems of knowledge; clearly they are three relatively independent cultural “traditions.” But their living areas overlap, and through translation they can roughly understand one another’s languages. There is more or less some trade among them, even some exchange of knowledge; occasionally there are also some intermarriages, and from time to time there are inevitably small or large frictions, but in the end they manage to coexist peacefully and live in harmony.
One day, in this mountain—this common region of their activities—a large coal mine is discovered.
In the tradition of the A tribe, this mysterious coal mine is regarded as sacred and inviolable, so they must preserve the coal mine in its original state intact; protecting it from destruction is the sacred mission of the A tribespeople. If they fail to accomplish this mission, they believe, the gods will punish them, and of course will punish the other two tribes as well; the consequences would be unimaginable.
In the tradition of the B tribe, this mysterious coal mine is regarded as the dwelling place of demons, so they must burn it up as quickly as possible. They believe that if even a little coal remains and is not destroyed, disaster will descend in the near future, and both they and the other two tribes will suffer; the consequences would be unimaginable.
In the tradition of the C tribe, this coal mine is regarded as a fortune bestowed by Heaven, one that can replace firewood and provide abundant energy, so they ought to set about developing the coal mine for everyone’s benefit. Of course, they are also willing to share these resources with their neighbors.
Any tribe’s idea is well-intentioned, and all of them want their neighbors to share in the benefits or avoid disaster together. But the problem is that, as seen by the other two tribes, any one tribe’s demand is catastrophic and absolutely unacceptable.
What to do?
How can “equality” be achieved?
—All three tribes have the desire for “equality,” but the question is, what should be done? By the way, the three tribes’ conceptions of “equality” are also different: the A tribe thinks equality should be decided by drawing lots; the B tribe thinks that hearing the gods’ will through some mysterious ritual is the most equal way; the C tribe thinks that separating victory and defeat through a martial duel is what equality truly is……
Someone steps forward and declares forcefully, “Anything goes!” The crowd says: “Saying that is the same as saying nothing—go cool off somewhere!”
The situation in the present age is this: contact and collision among different traditions has become reality, and problems like the coal-mine dilemma above are not uncommon. Every scholar stands on the basis of his or her own tradition, but must transcend tradition, seek consensus, and strive to compromise and understand one another. This is the scholar’s mission. Moreover, in reality, finding a way to have the best of both worlds is no easy matter. Before that, conflicts may already have escalated; the gods have not brought down disaster, yet people have already been manufacturing disaster themselves.
[7 楼] | IP：123.112.74.52 | Posted: 2008-01-21 15:16
XinZhaiLaoJiang
Excerpt no. 2 from Elder Fei’s sayings:
“Anything goes” does not express any belief of mine; it is my humorous summary of the embarrassed predicament of the rationalists: I say, if you need universal standards, if you cannot live without principles that hold independently of circumstances, independently of the world, independently of forms, independently of research turning points, independently of changeable peculiarities, then I can give you such a principle, one that will be empty, useless, and rather ridiculous—but it is a “principle.” It is the “principle” that “anything goes.”
Science in a Free Society, pp. 214–5
[8 楼] | IP：221.218.19.94 | Posted: 2008-01-21 16:51
Gu Chu
Feyerabend’s “summary” can only apply to extreme rationalists, but Feyerabend himself was trying to move toward the other extreme. If seeking an absolutely universal “principle” that transcends everything is unworkable, why must one then “bid farewell to reason” and “oppose method”? Since Feyerabend tended toward the other extreme, this “summary” is still applicable to what he offered. My understanding is this: Feyerabend did not offer anything at all; the moment we demand that he offer something, he gives this ridiculous principle: “Anything goes.” Therefore, the slogan “anything goes” should still be regarded as what Feyerabend offered.
The problem is that our advocacy of “reason” and our pursuit of “method” do not necessarily amount to demanding that absolute, transcendent, all-surpassing thing. Feyerabend pushed rationalism as a whole to the extreme and caricatured it, but he still evaded the issue; “anything goes” is indeed the answer Feyerabend gave on behalf of those rationalists. — In the mining dilemma I mentioned, what advice would Feyerabend give?
But now even if I give up the “absolute,” I can still insist on reason. I do not need to transcend everything; right now I only need to transcend the three tribes A, B, and C, to pursue some sort of consensus that everyone can accept, to find an effective method, and to defend the rationality and legitimacy of that method, and so on. You tell me that “anything goes” is utterly meaningless. We know that, here, our pursuit of a broader consensus and a more rational method—these efforts are meaningful. In the predicament faced by the three tribes A, B, and C, we should not “bid farewell to reason”; rather, we should keep insisting: let us try our best to resolve the problem through negotiation, through “reasoning with one another,” that is to say, continue the pursuit of reason.
[9 楼] | IP：123.112.74.52 | Posted: 2008-01-21 17:33
Gu Chu
I’ll also cite a bit of a “quotable saying”:
The lack of “objective” standards does not mean there is less work to do; it mainly means that scientists have to examine all the factors in their profession, not just those characteristic of scientific research as philosophers and constructive scientists understand it. Scientists can no longer say: we already have the right methods and standards, and all we need to do is apply them. … Scientists are responsible not only for the proper application of standards from elsewhere, but also for the standards themselves.
Chinese translation, 2nd ed. of Farewell to Reason, p. 293
Here, Feyerabend’s basic claim is consistent with what I have emphasized—“responsibility,” to take responsibility for oneself.
And yet where is the problem? I want to ask: do the sorts of work involved in “characterizing” the “philosophers and constructive scientists” really have any meaning?
Should “scientists” here be plural? Scientific research is a collective human undertaking, and since it is collective, division of labor and cooperation are inevitable. Although science as a whole cannot study only physics and not biology, we can and should allow a physicist not to be proficient in biology, and a mathematician not to understand physics. If every scientist were required to shoulder responsibility for “science as a whole,” that would surely be excessive, and such science could not develop healthily.
Just as some scientists specialize in biology and do not necessarily need to think deeply about physics, every scientist does not necessarily have to bear the responsibility of reflecting on science’s “methods” and “standards.” And the mission of the philosopher of science is precisely to shoulder this responsibility on behalf of the entire scientific enterprise.
Therefore, to say that philosophers of science must strive to ask about scientific methods is precisely to make scientific activity “responsible” to those standards themselves. Yet in Feyerabend’s eyes, this very enterprise of taking responsibility is precisely what needs to be abolished; this is my chief criticism of Feyerabend. Feyerabend asks every scientist to shoulder the entire responsibility of science as a collective activity; that is exacting. Philosophers of science cannot contribute to actual scientific research, that is, the practical “application” of scientific standards; yet philosophers consciously undertake the mission of taking responsibility for those standards themselves. This ought to be consistent with Feyerabend’s thought, but Feyerabend instead wants to oppose such an enterprise.
[10 楼] | IP：123.112.74.52 | Posted: 2008-01-21 18:08
Xinzhai Lao Jiang
Feyerabend is an old prankster; his ideas cannot be taken at face value. Farewell to Reason, opposition to method, anything goes, and so on—all the same.
[11 楼] | IP：61.49.125.171 | Posted: 2008-01-22 07:00
Gu Chu
My understanding of Old Feyer is still at the literal level; I have only flipped through a few scattered passages in his books, and if I am not careful, I end up interpreting him through the prejudices of some XX-ism as well. I hope Teacher Jiang will criticize and instruct me more.
However, Feyerabend is somewhat different from Heidegger with respect to “anarchism,” just as Heidegger was to Romanticism. Heidegger did not proclaim himself an XX-ist, but Old Feyer himself explicitly flew the banner of “anarchism,” so I believe that understanding Old Feyer according to anarchism should not be considered out of bounds.
[12 楼] | IP：123.112.85.44 | Posted: 2008-01-22 10:41
Old Jiang of Xinzhai
Little Gu, no need to be so polite. I still like your sharp questioning and refutation; they often leave me breaking out in a cold sweat…
Old Feyer likes to set traps when he speaks, so one has to be extremely careful.
For example: Feyerabend recalled that when _Against Method_ was about to go to press, he had carefully discussed with Lakatos, his main opponent in the debate, all the possibilities for dedications. He had considered a dedication such as: “To Imre Lakatos, friend and comrade of rationalism.” He said, “This is a satirical allusion to Lakatos’s often-advanced conjecture that I am essentially a rationalist, and that if someone were to turn anarchist, I would recoil in fright (he was right).” _Science in a Free Society_, p. 210
[13 楼] | IP：61.48.222.146 | Posted: 2008-01-22 13:21
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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