A Tentative Discussion of Schopenhauer’s Spirit of Rationalism

The epigraph to the first part of *The World as Will and Representation* quotes Rousseau: “Step out of childhood, my friend, awaken!” What did Schopenhauer want to express by this line? We might as well compare it with a fable he wrote late in life:

“A mother, with the hope of educating and cultivating her children’s minds, lets them read Aesop’s fables; but they soon send the book back, and the eldest, precocious child says: this is not the sort of book we read; it is too childish, too silly; you cannot make us believe that foxes and wolves can talk, and we shall read nothing of the kind again!

From these promising young people, you can see the future enlightened rationalists.”[①]

So the so-called stepping out of childhood and awakening means coming out of the world of fairy tales and becoming enlightened “rationalists.”

But isn’t Schopenhauer the founder of “irrationalism”? Why then is he so plainly praising “rationalism”?

In terms of philosophical influence, Schopenhauer is rightly called the founder of irrationalism, but that does not mean we should classify Schopenhauer himself as an “irrationalist.” In fact, from Schopenhauer’s own standpoint, it may be more appropriate to call his philosophy “(enlightened) rationalism.”

The theme of this essay is precisely Schopenhauer’s rationalist spirit of stepping out of childhood: in what sense, after all, is Schopenhauer a “rationalist”?

Where there is enlightened rationalism, there is also narrow rationalism. Schopenhauer believed that traditional Western philosophy was all a misunderstanding or misuse of reason, to the point that it went astray, deviated from truth, and yet remained entangled in pointless questions, such as “the question of the reality of the external world, which has always arisen through the delusion of reason, indeed through a delusion born from misunderstanding reason itself;” (§5, p. 43, p. 48[②])

Schopenhauer believed that traditional philosophers had never clarified the exact meaning of “reason.” He said: “The philosophers of all ages… their statements about the true essence of reason remain wavering, ill-defined, and drifting; they have neither unity nor center…” (§8, p. 72, p. 75) “Up to the present, no philosopher has strictly reduced all those manifold manifestations of reason to a single function.” (§8, p. 73, p. 76)

In Schopenhauer’s view, Kant made this already ambiguous concept of “reason” even more confused, and the function of “reason” was treated by Kant as the function of “understanding (intellect).” For Schopenhauer, the understanding’s sole function is “to recognize causal relations,” while reason’s sole function is “to form concepts” (§8, p. 74, p. 77)

Although he criticized the conceptual confusion caused by Kant, Schopenhauer directly inherited Kant’s claim to “set limits to knowledge.” What Schopenhauer opposed was “absolute reason”: unlimited, omnipotent “reason” as the source from which knowledge springs. For Schopenhauer, reason’s function is to preserve and transmit; it does not itself produce anything. In this respect, its position is similar to that of “understanding” in Kant.

Schopenhauer believed that, as compared with abstract cognition by means of concepts, “intuitive, immediately present, self-representing, self-guaranteeing” cognition (§8, pp. 68–69, p. 72) is original and reliable; in the end, people always grasp things through intuition rather than through concepts. “Abstract concepts belonging to reason can only serve to receive, fix, and connect what is directly understood; they never directly produce ‘understanding’ itself.” (§6, p. 50, p. 55) “The function of the chain of inference is to make direct, understanding cognition secure for reason by letting it settle in abstract concepts. That is to say, to give understanding cognition conceptual clarity, that is, to enable oneself to point out and explain to others the meaning of this cognition.” (§6, p. 50, p. 56)

Therefore Schopenhauer opposed the efforts of traditional rationalists to seek the basis of knowledge in reason; in this respect, he was closer to empiricism, emphasizing that the ultimate source of knowledge is always intuitive, individual experience rather than abstract, universal concepts. He noted: “No science can be proved from beginning to end, just as a building cannot be hoisted up out of nothing. All proofs in science must be reduced to something intuitive, that is, something that can no longer be proved.” (§14, p. 109, p. 109) “… this intuition is pure in the aforementioned few a priori sciences (translator’s note: mainly mathematics and logic), otherwise it is always empirical, and only by means of induction can it be raised to the universal. So in the empirical sciences one may also prove the particular from the universal, but this universal derives its truth from the individual; it is a warehouse for stored materials, not a soil that can produce by itself.” (§15, p. 126, p. 125)

To take sensibility and intuition, rather than reason and logic, as the source of knowledge is by no means some fanciful absurdity; in fact, this way of thinking has also been fully acknowledged by many other philosophers and scientists, especially in the later intuitionist school, phenomenology, and late Wittgenstein. Of course, all of these currents were influenced by Schopenhauer.

Schopenhauer said: “People had already known that sensible intuition is not absolutely reliable, and so they drew a premature conclusion: that only rational, logical thinking can establish truth; in fact… inference and concepts also lead to error, even to absurd inferences and sophistry, … these things are easier to generate than the illusions in sensible intuition, yet harder to explain.” (§15, p. 116, p. 116) After a series of logical paradoxes were discovered one after another in the early twentieth century, Schopenhauer’s reminder appeared even more eloquent. For Schopenhauer, the so-called crisis of foundations in mathematics had never existed from the start; the problem was that people mistakenly placed mathematics’ “foundation” inside mathematics and logic themselves, fantasizing that mathematics could provide its own foundation, which is equivalent to trying to suspend a building in midair. This is what produced the so-called “crisis of foundations.”

In fact, the knowledge of any science is conveyed through concepts, that is, through language. So how can people possibly attain understanding? “Concepts can only be thought, not intuited.” (§9, p. 74, p. 77) That is to say, we can think from some concepts to other concepts, but unless a concept ultimately enters into relation with intuitive cognition, that is, unless it awakens certain intuitive impressions, we cannot obtain any understanding. It is like a person who has never encountered English: if he only leafs through an English-English dictionary, forever explaining unknown concepts by means of other unknown concepts, he will never understand even a single concept.

This person who learns English solely by studying an English-English dictionary is, in Schopenhauer’s eyes, probably a portrait of the development of modern philosophy and modern science. We know that this English learner who cannot understand a single word can still carry out “in-depth,” systematic, rigorous research; he can calculate precisely the occasions and frequencies of each symbol’s appearance, summarize the rules of certain fixed collocations and grammar, and so on, and may even master these matters more precisely than the English themselves. Yet in the end, he has not understood a single word!

Schopenhauer pointed out that the approach of modern natural science “determines only the ‘how’ of phenomena, not the ‘what’ of phenomena, concerns itself only with form, not with content.” (§24, p. 180, p. 177) Schopenhauer repeatedly emphasized (for example in the metaphor on §17, p. 149, p. 149) that by means of such an approach, we cannot truly “understand” any phenomenon; even if we can describe the how of a phenomenon with precision, we still never understand why it is so. Schopenhauer mentioned that “the claim that the most frequent, the most universal, and the simplest phenomena are the ones we understand best is a huge yet common error; for these phenomena are merely the ones we encounter most often, and though we are ignorant of them, we have become so accustomed to them that we no longer seek to understand them. [In fact] a stone falling to the ground is just as inexplicable as the movement of an animal.” (§24, p. 184, p. 181)

Modern science reduces all proofs ultimately to the mysterious concept of “force” (perhaps one could add to it another mysterious concept that accompanies force: “atom”), thinking that it has explained all phenomena in one stroke. But in fact, whether “force” or “atom,” these are concepts furthest from intuition, the most abstract concepts; people have never understood what “force” “is,” but only know how to describe how “force” acts.

In fact, when those “forces” were first introduced to the center of science, people were also amazed and perplexed, unable to make sense of them. For example, Newton had the famous saying “I frame no hypotheses,” which was directed at the essence of “gravity.” He felt incomparably confused about the source of “force,” and in the end had to appeal to the power of God. But modern people seem no longer to be confused; they not only no longer attempt to frame any hypotheses, but also take the concept of “force” entirely for granted, no longer trying to understand it. Yet in fact, as Schopenhauer pointed out, this is nothing but “becoming accustomed”; human understanding of the essence of this world has never made the slightest progress.

So how is it possible to go beyond form and thereby touch the essence of the world? Schopenhauer noted that only from the body, in this immediate objectivity of the will, can one “experience” the power of the will. (See §18, p. 150, p. 150) From this one may further recognize that the essence of one’s own phenomenon is one’s own will, which is “the key to the innermost essence of the whole of nature” (§21, p. 164, p. 162)

Then how, further, can we understand the essence of the world, namely “will”? Since Schopenhauer’s specific discussion of “will” is not the theme of this essay, let us simply present Schopenhauer’s conclusion here: “The will’s only self-knowledge, generally speaking, is the total representation, that is, the whole intuitive world. The intuitive world is the objectivity of the will, its manifestation, the mirror of the will.” (§29, p. 236, p. 229)

Schopenhauer then discussed art as the way of knowing and communicating the whole intuitive world. So, since intuition and abstraction, art and reason, are opposed, does this mean that Schopenhauer places intuition or art above reason and philosophy? We will see that what Schopenhauer places above reason, from beginning to end, is only “will.” In Schopenhauer, reason no longer stands above everything as an absolute, but it still occupies an extremely important position.

As mentioned above, just as abstract cognition is not always reliable, intuitive cognition is also often deceived by illusion. Now that Schopenhauer wants to establish intuitive cognition as the foundation, the question is: how can intuitive cognition be ensured against deception?

Schopenhauer said: “So long as we act purely intuitively, everything is clear, fixed, and definite. Then there is neither problem, nor doubt, nor error, … in intuition one is already at peace, and one has satisfaction in the present. Intuition is self-sufficient, so whatever arises purely from intuition and remains faithful to intuition, as a true work of art does, can never be wrong, nor overturned by any age, because it does not state an opinion but only presents the thing itself.” (§8, pp. 68–69, p. 72)

That is to say, what pure intuition provides is the thing itself, immediately present; cognition at this point is clear and beyond doubt. So how is it possible to attain “pure” intuition? Pure intuition also means reaching a state of “self-forgetting,” allowing oneself to be completely immersed in the object and become wholly one with it; only then is it possible to attain this. Schopenhauer believed that this capacity for pure contemplation, transcending all the constraints of individuality, belongs to “genius.”

He said: “Only through … pure contemplation, in which one becomes wholly immersed in the object, can Ideas be grasped, and the essence of genius lies in the outstanding capacity for this kind of contemplation. Since this contemplation requires completely forgetting one’s own person and one’s own relation, the ability of genius is nothing other than the most perfect objectivity, that is, the objective direction of the spirit, opposed to the subjective direction, which points to the person and thereby to the will. Accordingly, the ability of genius is the power to stand in the position of pure intuition, to forget oneself in intuition, and thus to free the cognition that originally served the will from this servitude, that is to say, to take no account at all of one’s own interests, desires, and purposes, thereby temporarily suspending one’s own personality entirely, …” (§36, p. 259, p. 252)

Here Schopenhauer borrows Plato’s term “Idea” to designate such a most special representation: one independent of the principle of sufficient reason (that is, outside relations of time, space, causality, and the like, and eternally unchanging), which can be represented by appropriate concepts but can only be understood and grasped by pure intuition, the fixed degree to which the will objectifies itself, that is, to which the will enters into representation and appears.

“Idea” is by no means the same as “concept”: “A concept can be understood and grasped by anyone who has reason; it can be communicated to others through words without any other medium, and its definition says it all. An Idea, by contrast, though it can be defined by taking a concept as its appropriate representative, remains intuitive throughout. Moreover, although an Idea represents countless individual things, it is always determinate; it can never be recognized by the individual, but only by the person who has risen above all desire and all individuality and become merely the pure subject of cognition; that is, it can be recognized only by genius and by those who, because they have heightened their capacity for pure cognition—mostly thanks to the works of genius—have come to share in the mood of genius.” (§48, p. 324, p. 311)

But “Idea” is not something in conflict with concept, that is, with reason. Schopenhauer also mentioned: “Plato’s ideal type is possible only through the unity of imagination and reason.” (§9, p. 76, p. 78)

Limited by the theme of this essay, there is no need here to make a more detailed analysis of Schopenhauer’s theory of “Ideas”; it is enough to understand that Schopenhauer regards “art” as the mode of activity for knowing and communicating “Ideas” — “Art reproduces the eternal Ideas grasped through pure contemplation, reproduces the essential and abiding things in all the phenomena of the world… The only source of art is knowledge of the Idea, and its only goal is to communicate that knowledge.” (§36, p. 258, p. 251)

So does turning toward art mean turning toward “irrationality”? It can indeed be said so. For Schopenhauer, so-called “practical reason” means determining one’s actions by means of abstract concepts, guiding and regulating oneself by motives; “and the extremely strong impression produced on genius by intuitive things obscures the dim, colorless concepts so much that it is no longer concepts but that impression that guides conduct, and [genius’s] conduct therefore becomes irrational.” (§36, p. 265, p. 258)

Yet in Schopenhauer, “art” is not the end. Since intuitive cognition can grasp only the true that is “immediately present” but cannot preserve truth, it can only offer temporary consolation and cannot achieve eternal liberation — “The enjoyment derived from all beauty, the consolation offered by art… is not a sedative for the will, not an eternal deliverance from it, but only a release from life for certain moments. So this knowledge does not enable one to escape the path of life, but merely offers a temporary consolation in life, until the experience strengthened by aesthetic enjoyment grows weary of this play and returns to seriousness.” (§52, p. 370, p. 352)

And if one truly wants to obtain “truth,” or obtain liberation, one must transcend intuition and return to reason, step out of art and return to philosophy. This is also the activity Schopenhauer himself pursued.

Schopenhauer said: “At any time, one will always find me standing on the standpoint of reflective thought, that is, the standpoint of rational reflection and honest reporting.” (Second Edition Preface, p. 73, p. 19) Schopenhauer also said: “Only truth is my North Star” (Second Edition Preface, p. 14, p. 20), and “what reason correctly recognizes is truth” (§6, p. 53, p. 58)

That is to say, Schopenhauer’s philosophical activity has always taken rational reflection as its duty and truth as its direction.

In fact, when Schopenhauer speaks of works of art, what he really has in mind may well be his own philosophical masterpiece — “Concepts can never impart inner life to a work. The age itself, that is, the benighted masses of an epoch, know only concepts and cling to concepts, so they are willing to receive showy works with loud applause. But within a few years these works have no more aesthetic value; for the spirit of the age, that is, the fashionable concepts, has changed of itself, and those works were precisely rooted only in those concepts. Only true masterpieces, drawn directly from nature and life, can, like nature itself, endure forever and always retain their original power of moving us. For these works do not belong to any age, but to humanity. It is precisely for this reason that they disdain to cater to their own age, which in turn receives them half-heartedly. And because such works often indirectly and negatively expose the errors of the present, people, even when they acknowledge them, still hesitate and do not wholeheartedly wish to do so.” (§49, p. 327, p. 314)

And in the opening of the preface to the second edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer declared: “Not for my contemporaries, not for my fellow countrymen, but for humanity, do I now dedicate this book, completed at last today.” (Second Edition Preface, p. 8, p. 16) It is clear, then, that in Schopenhauer’s view, his philosophical work is precisely that timeless masterpiece which transcends the age.

Schopenhauer’s entire emphasis on intuition is nothing more than the claim that this is the most fundamental “starting point.” Whether it is the system of the natural sciences or the grasp of the essence of the world, all of it takes intuitive cognition as its source. Yet a starting point is by no means at the same time an endpoint. To step out of the satisfaction of the present instant and obtain eternal truth, one must pass through reason; only then is it possible. In this sense, reason is more important than immediate intuition: “Reason takes intuitive, concretely cognized representations and abstracts them into universal cognition. One could say that this is far more important than first glance would casually suggest, because all reliable preservation, all possibility of transmission, and all proper, far-reaching application of cognition to practice depend on this cognition being a knowing, on its having already become abstract cognition. Intuitive cognition can always be useful only for individual cases; it extends only to, and ends with, the nearest things before one’s eyes.” (§12, p. 93, p.94)

Schopenhauer further points out: “People may well say that the world is what everyone knows without needing any other help…. This statement is also right within certain limits. However, this cognition is an intuitive cognition, a cognition in the concrete; and to reproduce these cognitions in the abstract, to elevate the successively appearing, ever-changing intuitions, … into a kind of abstract, clear, enduring knowledge, that is the task of philosophy. … Philosophy will be a complete reproduction of the world in abstract concepts, as though by reflection in a mirror.” (§15, pp. 130~131, p.130) “Apart from explaining and clarifying what is already there, apart from bringing the essence of the world, in the concrete, that is, as the world experienced by everyone as perception, into the distinct and abstract cognition of reason, philosophy can have no further purpose.” (§53, p. 372, p.356)

In Schopenhauer’s view, philosophy, like art and another inward feeling that leads toward the sacred and detachment (that is, the way of those religious saints), is also a way of directly examining the essence of the world beyond the principle of sufficient reason. (See §53, p. 376, p.359) And compared with the artistic or religious way, only philosophy can transmit truth to human beings of all ages in the clearest and most enduring manner; only philosophy is the bridge that spans the gulf between intuitive cognition and abstract cognition (see §68, p. 525, p.491).

The rational capacity is the sole distinction that enables human beings to stand above animals both in power and in suffering (see §8, p. 70, p.73; §9, p. 75, p.78), and so on; through human beings, the highest level of the objectification of the will, the will has acquired “knowledge,” this “auxiliary tool” (see §27, p. 217, p.212), thereby kindling a lamp for itself (see §27, p. 218, p.212).

Through this, the will “is able to recognize clearly and thoroughly its own essence and how this essence is reflected in the entire world.” Although this “high cognition” “originates in art,” it still needs reason so that “the will applies this cognition to itself,” and ultimately, at the most perfect stage, “there appears the possibility of the will’s cancellation and self-denial.” (§55, p. 395, p.375)

Because the will is the “thing-in-itself,” beyond all principle of sufficient reason, the will itself cannot be changed by human beings—“all abstract cognition provides only motives, and motives … merely change the direction of the will, never the will itself.” (§66, p. 505, p.473) “What can act upon the will from outside are only motives, and motives again only alter the way the will expresses itself, never the will itself.” (§66, p. 506, p.474)

However, Schopenhauer points out that human beings still possess the possibility of “freedom,” because although the will (or a person’s character) can “never undergo a partial alteration,” it may “be canceled altogether” (§70, p. 553, p.517). And this becomes possible only through the rational contemplation that surveys an entire life, thus transcending the immediate, momentary satisfaction supplied by intuition, recognizing the eternal suffering that is the essence of life, and thereby being able to make decisions and plans, and to discover possibilities by which the will may negate itself, such as asceticism and even consciously starving oneself to death. “Therefore, the possibility of freely manifesting oneself is humanity’s greatest advantage; animals can never have this advantage, because the rational power of thought is not confined by immediate impressions and can survey the whole of life, and this is the condition of that possibility. Animals are not free; they have no possibility of freedom.” (§70, p. 554, p.517)

We can see that, in every sense, Schopenhauer’s philosophy from beginning to end still centers on and returns to “reason”; philosophy is, from first to last, a rational activity, and this rational activity is also the necessary path to cognizing truth or attaining deliverance.

References

Schopenhauer: The World as Will and Representation, trans. Shi Chongbai, ed. Yang Yizhi, Commercial Press, 1982

Schopenhauer Essays, trans. Fan Jinke, Ji Honghua, Qin Dianhua, Meng Qingshi, Commercial Press, 1999

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[①] Schopenhauer Essays, trans. Fan Jin, Ji Honghua, Qin Dianhua, Meng Qingshi, Commercial Press, 1999, p. 500.

[②] The original text cited in this article mainly comes from Schopenhauer: The World as Will and Representation, trans. Shi Chongbai, ed. Yang Yizhi, Commercial Press, 1982. For brevity, sources are indicated directly in the body of the text in the form “(§5, p. 43, p.48),” meaning Section 5, Chinese translation p. 43, marginal page 48.