[Eng.]John Hick: Rainbow of Faith — A Dialogue with Critics of Religious Pluralism, translated by Wang Zhicheng and Sizhu, Jiangsu People’s Publishing House2000, February2.
Pages2~3. The purpose of dialogue between theology and philosophy is not necessarily to reach agreement—though that is what the interlocutors hope for, and sometimes agreement really is reached—but rather, more precisely, to find out where they differ from one another, and to look at the issues from both the affirmative and the negative sides,////—I very much appreciate Hick’s view of dialogue.
Page32. Kant held that perception is not a passive recording of perceived objects, but is always an active process of selection, grouping, association, inference, and the conferring of meaning according to our human concepts. This led Kant to distinguish between the world of essence and the world of phenomena: the world of essence cannot be known, whereas the world of phenomena is the world known to human beings, bearing all the differences brought about by perceptual activity. I propose applying this insight to our awareness of substances, and thereby distinguishing between the essential substance, that is, substance itself, and substance as understood in various ways by human beings as a series of divine phenomena. Kant believed that our mind applies certain categories to the form of our conscious experience, enabling us to become aware of the natural environment; such categories include essence, reality, and causality. By analogy, our mind applies certain categories to the form of our conscious experience, enabling us to become aware of the supernatural environment. The two basic categories are God (as a personal substance) and the Absolute (as an impersonal substance). Each category is concretized, or in Kant’s terms, “schematized”—yet the various religious traditions experience substance as God and the Absolute not on the basis of abstract time (as in Kant’s philosophical system), but on the basis of historical time fully occupied by life.////—Hick’s use of Kantian epistemology is creative; he extends the scope of Kant’s epistemology and applies it to religious objects, which Kant had posited as postulates of practical reason. But this creative “development” requires an important premise, namely, the existence of “religious experience.” We generally believe that “experience” of the ordinary object-world exists; philosophers only debate how to regard those “experiences,” and where the reliability of experience comes from, and so on. But to say that we can have experience of the transcendent—of God—is something that is not universally accepted, even within theology. And Hick’s entire discussion of religious epistemology must rest on the foundation that “experience of the transcendent is possible” (rather than being mere fantasy). Hick thinks this is a basic belief of any religious believer, but that is probably not the case; believing in the existence of the transcendent and believing that human experience of the transcendent exists are two different things. On this question, perhaps Hick will discuss it in his book The Fifth Dimension, which I have not yet read.
Page48 Phil: But your metatheory, that is, the pluralist hypothesis, brings different doctrinal systems down from a universal and absolute conception of truth that stands in conflict with one another to a merely local truth valid only within established traditions. John: Yes.……////—Indeed, a bona fide metatheory of pluralism.
Page53 All in all, I regard Kant as the modern philosopher of greatest depth, the most inspiring, and the most influential.////—Heh heh~
Page57 …I have always maintained that the reason for advancing this hypothesis is that, on the basis of the facts of the histories of the various religions, it provides the “best explanation” from a religious point of view—that is, the most comprehensive and most economical explanation. A “best explanation” offered is not a proof, because it is always open to others and willing to accept explanations they regard as better. So the proper response of those who do not like the explanation I have put forward should not be to complain that my hypothesis has not been proven, but to propose a new alternative hypothesis.////—I agree with Hick’s understanding of “explanation.” In fact, I previously had a similar view of “scientific explanation,” that is, “scientific account”: I do not agree with some philosophers of science who stipulate that scientific explanation must at the same time also be a “proof.” Explanation is different from proof; a system of explanation should certainly be logical, but it is not the sole final verdict. The best scientific explanation is to construct a description of the object being explained by using the most economical and concise premises and presuppositions. The demand that “explanation = proof = prediction” is truly unrealistic.
pp.57~58. Phil: What does “corresponds in the mythic sense” mean? John: “Mythic” means that it is not literally a true story, but that it has a power to evoke in the listener a temporal response to the object to which the myth refers—a true myth can naturally evoke a fitting response. Thus, the truth of myth is practical truth: it lies in its ability to guide us rightly in our lives. So long as the Heavenly Father is the true manifestation of the substance, imagining the substance as the ideal father means thinking in a way that can guide us toward the substance rightly, evoking among us a faith that can run through our lives and allow us to love our neighbors freely. Of course, I would give a parallel interpretation of the language of the Ultimate used by the major religions as well. Phil: I think this is similar to Tillich’s doctrine that religious language has a symbolic character.……////——Here Hick hints at an inversion of doctrine and revelation (similar to Kant’s inversion of morality and religion): in the traditional view, because revelation is true, people ought to follow the teachings of revelation; whereas for Hick, because revelation can teach people to do good, those revelations possess “practical truth.” But why should people follow those good deeds? Perhaps Hick is again using “induction”—because the major religions all urge people to follow the “Golden Rule”……
p.60. But all the major faiths of the world believe that the whole world is an ordered and law-governed process…… p.61. So, you don’t credit the rise of modern science to Christianity? John: Yes.……////——Here I cannot agree with Hick’s claim. To say that all major faiths believe the world to be ordered and regular is arbitrary. Although Eastern religions also have concepts such as “law” and “the Way,” which seem to correspond to order and regularity, the understanding in the Eastern traditions is indeed very different from Christianity. It should be said that the rise of modern science is to a large extent attributable to Christianity, but I do not think this can prove Christianity’s superiority. As Hick also mentions, comparison can be made on certain specific issues, but not between religions as wholes. We may acknowledge Christianity’s special role in promoting the rise of modern science, but science is by no means everything, and Eastern religions excel in many other respects.
Page71~72 It is not personal. But to deny that the entity is personal does not mean that it is impersonal; rather, it means that the personal/impersonal binary does not apply here. To keep asking whether the entity is personal or impersonal will only lead us in circles, because that question already presupposes that this is a real thing, which may be personal or impersonal. The same is true of other binaries as well.
Page73~74 Well, you know, I did not describe the entity itself as good or benevolent. But in relation to us—namely, in terms of the difference it makes to us—the entity is good as the ground of transformation, which is our highest good. So to say that the entity is good and benevolent is similar to saying, from our point of view, that the sun is good, friendly, and life-giving. The life-giving warmth of the sun is the foundation of, or indispensable condition for, our survival and flourishing. Likewise, the entity is the indispensable condition for our survival and our highest good. It is in this sense that we can say the entity is good and benevolent. But when we use these terms to describe the entity itself, we are speaking in a mythic sense rather than a literal one.
Page80 Yes. I apply this epistemological and logical principle to religious experience. To borrow St. Thomas’s words: “According to the mode of the knower, the thing known is in the knower.” This comes close to critical realism. Critical realism differs from naïve realism, which holds that the world is just as it appears to us, whereas critical realism holds that there is a real world, but that we can know only what is disclosed to us through particular sense organs and concepts. Thus, taking into account the difference brought about by perception itself, critical realism, when applied to religion, holds that there is a transcendent reality, which is most deeply within us and also outside us, above us and also beneath us, but which we can know only in a limited way.……////——In philosophy of science, I too tend toward this kind of “critical realism.” Under critical realism, “there is a real world” is not something that can be proven, but rather a presupposition. What makes this presupposition reasonable and necessary is that it can explain our experience most economically.
Page63 But isn’t insisting on the uniqueness of the ultimate somewhat dogmatic? John: Strictly speaking, we should not say the uniqueness of the ultimate. Because even “number” is part of our concepts. What is unspeakable or without form cannot be counted. But that is just how our language is…………The entity still transcends the scope of our concepts, including the concept of number.
Page90 John: … We call them saints, liberated souls, arhats, bodhisattvas, and mahatmas. In affirming them, we rely mainly on ethical standards in a broad sense. Phil: “Ethical (standards) in a broad sense?” John: Well, some people like to use the word “spirituality,” while others prefer the word “ethics,” as I call it. The people I regard as saints clearly do not care about themselves; rather, they focus on serving God or on practicing the Dharma, the Way, or the universal Buddhahood of awakening in life. In their lives we see a selfless love and compassion, which we regard as intrinsically valuable and, in fact, often awe-inspiring. Phil: Yes, but how do you know that love and compassion (to use your own words) are both appropriate responses to reality? John: Because the world’s major religious traditions all teach this; I regard them as genuine responses to reality. They all teach the idea of “To wish to establish oneself, establish others as well.”////——Heh heh, it looks like my guess on pages 57–58 was right: Hick is indeed answering this question by induction.
Page91 Phil: Good. But aren’t you now arguing in a circle? You start from the assumption that these different traditions are responses to reality, and then you use their moral teachings as a criterion, by which you in turn judge them all to be genuine responses to reality? That is obviously a flawed circular argument, isn’t it? John: I agree that this is a circular argument, and such circularity is unavoidable for any comprehensive view. For example, if you hold a naturalistic view of the universe, you must use naturalistic assumptions to support it. If you insist that Christianity is the only true faith, you will certainly have to establish it by its own particular standards. If we want to build a foundational view, we cannot avoid circular reasoning.////——Indeed, circular reasoning is unavoidable. The scientific system is likewise, in a sense, circular reasoning: each theoretical paradigm has its assumptions, and the rich conclusions drawn from those assumptions in turn support the assumptions. A smoother way of saying “circular reasoning” is “self-consistency.”
Page 103 Because the modern concept of religion—that is, taking religion as an independent social religious entity, opposed to other such entities—had not yet developed, as Wilfred Cantwell Smith shows in his classic work The Meaning and End of Religion, …////—So at last I know who the legendary Smith was referring to. That book really is a classic, but it is rather hard going; I once read a few pages and then set it aside…
Page 110 There is a saying attributed to Jesus that goes: “Why do you call me good? No one is good except God alone.” (“The Gospel of Matthew” 10:18) He was most likely to have regarded himself as the last prophet, sent by God to proclaim the news that the Kingdom of Heaven was imminent and to prepare Israel for it.
Page 111 John: In my view, Jesus was unquestionably a person, but he was a person who was extraordinarily open to the presence of God and maintained a powerful sense of God. It was precisely this consciousness that made God real for others and changed the many lives that encountered him, calling them to live in such a way as naturally to dwell in the presence of God, to live a life of faith and love, to heal wounds in a broken world, and to bring peace. If you and I had seen Jesus in Galilee in the first century CE, what would have impressed us most would surely have been his astonishing spiritual authority and his astonishingly accessible love; they challenged us and called to us, enabling us to enter the new life that Jesus required.
Page 113 Any outstanding and devout Israelite, from ancient times through the time of Jesus and thereafter, can be described metaphorically as a child of God. So Jesus naturally became the Son of God in a familiar metaphorical sense; this kind of idea was current in Jesus’ time.
Page116: We should not attribute the founding of Christianity to Jesus, but rather to the spiritual needs and habits of those whose souls were driven and transformed by Jesus’ influence. This charismatic figure was filled with the divine Holy Spirit, gradually exalted by human piety, and magnified into the currently existing Christ, the eternal Logos, through whom all things were made and through whom all things are governed. But once we discover that Jesus himself taught nothing of the kind, we then need other reasons to support it, so that in our day we can continue to believe in and uphold this as humanity’s final, and most complete, truth.////——The above few paragraphs basically summarize Hick’s view of Jesus. However, to understand his view of Jesus more fully, we still need to investigate what expressions such as “open to the presence of God” and “filled with the divine Holy Spirit” mean; perhaps these also require consulting Hick’s The Fifth Dimension.
Page147: Grace: So, you want us to give up conversion-oriented mission, but you also encourage the translation and dissemination of each tradition’s canonical and some non-canonical works, the acquisition of accurate knowledge about them, and peaceful dialogue with people of different faiths. John: Exactly.
Page152: Although there may come a day when, perhaps even in some distant but foreseeable future, a single world religion takes shape, what this really means is that the traditions that continue to exist can begin to regard one another as different responses to the same transcendent reality.
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Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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