My own view is that Kant’s philosophy has great heuristic significance for the philosophy of science, but among the group of philosophers of science who continue empiricism in the contemporary era, it has been widely neglected.
Of course, Kant’s exalted place in the history of philosophy is something very few philosophers would dare to deny, and philosophers of science are no exception. In writings on the philosophy of science, Kant is still often mentioned. But the problem is this: nine times out of ten, when philosophers of science mention Kant, they refer only to his “transcendental theory.” It seems as though Kant’s contribution to the philosophy of science amounted to nothing more than a transcendental theory. Very well, then let us first look at just what Kant’s transcendental theory amounts to:
Kant’s transcendental theory is a failure—this seems like a simple, clear, self-evident matter, needing hardly any analysis. The logic for explaining the failure of transcendental theory is quite simple: Kant’s transcendental theory was intended to provide a metaphysical foundation for the natural sciences of his day, whose core was Newtonian mechanics; but Newton’s scientific system itself has already been surpassed by modern science; so Kant’s effort, in any case, could not possibly have been realized… Is it really that simple?
Granted, Kant did indeed attempt to provide Newtonian mechanics with a solid metaphysical foundation, but what Kant actually did was not primarily to defend some specific scientific theory—that sort of concrete business could be left to later scientists. Kant’s task was to write an “introduction” to that “future metaphysics,” providing theoretical foundations and guidelines. What the Critique of Pure Reason investigates more is, in fact, the nature of science, rather than the question of how specific scientific theories can be established.
And the problems faced by contemporary philosophy of science are not things like defending specific scientific theories either; they are precisely questions about the nature of science. What is being challenged is not such topics as “how relativity is established” or “how the philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics can be secured,” but rather whether the object science confronts is “real,” whether science is “committed to objectivity,” “progressing toward truth,” “unique among the other cultural constructions of human beings,” “noble,” and so on. Does transcendental theory have anything to offer on these questions? For example, is it possible to find transcendental support for why science possesses truth?
In addition, Poincaré’s conventionalism is in essence a continuation of Kant’s transcendental theory. Although there are obvious differences between the two, Poincaré’s conventionalism is also quite different from the various conventionalisms that later moved toward relativism or anti-realism. By comparison, Poincaré’s doctrine seems closer to Kant. Poincaré was also a great scientist and philosopher who has long not received the attention he deserved.
Apart from “transcendental theory,” Kant’s philosophy has a very rich content. For example, right in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant created the concept of “thing in itself,” which is a kind of agnostic realism and is very interesting. Although Kant’s philosophy strove to defend science, Kant’s own “science” is a very humble one: it emphasizes the limits of human cognitive power, emphasizes the profundity of nature, and especially emphasizes the sentiment of “reverence.”
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant also made a threefold distinction among “reason/understanding/sensibility,” which is quite thought-provoking. I do not know whether modern philosophy of science simply dismisses such distinctions out of hand; almost no one mentions this distinction anymore, and the binary distinction “reason/sensibility” is still the one people habitually use.
When one comes to the Critique of Practical Reason, even without reading the content, one can already see from the titles of the first two Critiques Kant’s distinction between “pure reason/practical reason,” yet this very obvious piece of work by Kant is also rarely mentioned by philosophers of science. Contemporary empiricist philosophers of science have gone to every possible length to try to establish the logical structure of science and to provide science with a solid defense, but judged by Kant’s distinction, their efforts have always amounted to trying to provide support for science only within pure reason. The rise of historicism, postmodernism, sociology of scientific knowledge, and so on shows that those efforts have not been very successful. However, even if pure reason is insufficient to provide science with a strong defense, does that mean science is bound to fall into irrationality? If it is not pure reason that determines the development of science, must it be nonrational factors? Kant himself, although he also tried to support science with pure reason, further offered practical reason as another line of thought, and that is very interesting.
Kant’s aesthetics and philosophy of history also contain rich content, but unfortunately I currently lack the knowledge to say much about them. Still, I once noticed that some scholars have pointed out a direct genealogical connection between Kant’s aesthetics and Husserl’s phenomenology. The unique line of thought Husserl offered to the philosophy of science has likewise long been neglected.
Only when one gets to the philosophy of religion does Kant’s entire philosophical system become complete. Personally, I believe that if one leaves Kant’s philosophy of religion out of view, it is impossible to apprehend the basic spirit of Kant’s whole philosophical system. Seeking inspiration for the philosophy of science in the philosophy of religion—this is one line of thought of mine, which I mentioned previously in the article “Using Religion to Defend Science”.
July 4, 2006
Latest comments
- Zhiwei
2006-07-04 19:42:44 http://blog.sina.com.cn/u/1239870330
Positive science and philosophy can be unified; the opposition between science and philosophy, or their mutual sheltering, are all the result of the underdevelopment of the human system of knowledge.
- Gu
2006-07-04 21:16:08
The human system of knowledge will always be imperfect. The pursuit of perfection, the pursuit of “unity,” are both healthy, but one must never fantasize that one is the great figure who has already grasped a unified and perfect system. Doing philosophy requires a certain audacity, but however audacious one is, there must still be some restraint; humility and solidity are even more necessary for doing philosophy.
From my pluralist line of thought, I advocate paying attention to constructing one’s own theoretical system; being able to make it internally coherent is the first priority. But in any case, one’s own theory should never be closed; one must always “believe” this—my current views are certainly still very shallow and certainly still have many faults. Thus one should sincerely welcome criticism from others. At the same time, when commenting on others, one should not sit there with eyes shut talking to oneself. On my own blog I of course have the right to “talk to myself,” but when one runs over to someone else’s turf to exchange views, how can one still only care about “talking to oneself”? In that case one is merely trying to show off and flaunt one’s theory, with no sincere intention of genuine exchange or discussion.
My post is about Kant’s philosophy and contemporary philosophy of science; the comment above has almost nothing to do with what I am discussing, as if merely shouting a slogan. Shouting slogans is not very meaningful.
If the commenter above has some understanding of Kant’s philosophy and wants to offer some remarks here, I would be most welcome.
There is a somewhat exaggeratedly simple criterion for distinguishing academic philosophy from popular philosophy—just see whether he values Kant. However arrogant contemporary philosophers may be, very few would ignore Kant. Some popular philosophy enthusiasts, after reading a book like A Brief History of Time or three to five popular science books, seem as though they understand many cosmic truths; some, after reading two books by Nietzsche, seem as though they have completely seen through philosophy; some still have a philosophy in their heads that is dialectics plus materialism… In short, I have seen popular philosophers who have read A Brief History of Time, popular philosophers who have read Nietzsche, and popular philosophers who have read traditional philosophy textbooks, but I really have never seen a popular philosopher who has read the Critique of Pure Reason. It is truly not easy to grind one’s way through the whole of the Critique of Pure Reason, but this tells people that philosophy is not such an easy and simple discipline. It does not matter if one opposes Kant; being able to explain clearly why Kant is wrong is a real achievement. If one does not want to tackle the Critique of Pure Reason for the time being, that is fine too—at least first find some acknowledged classics and patiently work through them. Criticism is fine, but do not criticize in an off-the-wall way. Understanding what those philosophers are discussing and grasping the key points of the problem is basic philosophical training. If one has not diligently trained this basic skill, then going off to pursue “unity” will at most be nothing more than self-entertainment. - Diao Xiaozhitiao
2007-01-27 17:35:47 http://blog.sina.com.cn/u/1262632163
Comment / unrelated to the blog content
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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