Preface
As a loyal Marxist, I hope that one day we can take Marxist philosophy as the core and human liberation as our pursuit, and establish a complete “great unified philosophy,” thereby truly “abolishing” philosophy.
Of course I do not have the ability to establish such a “great unified philosophy,” but I hope that from my thesis I can reveal some things that orthodox Chinese philosophy lacks, and look ahead to the direction in which the great unification of philosophy may develop.
So what exactly does Marxism still lack? Let me first summarize it briefly:
1． Natural philosophy
In the area of natural philosophy, orthodox Marxism is still stuck at the stage of a hundred years ago, or perhaps Marxism never intended to include natural philosophy at all: although Marx drew on the latest scientific achievements of his time, his thinking and research on nature and the cosmos were still relatively superficial; Engels’s “dialectics of nature” was also not successful. Their achievements and breakthroughs in natural science and natural philosophy can hardly even be compared with those of idealist masters such as Kant, Berkeley, and Mach. While the natural sciences advanced by leaps and bounds in the twentieth century, Marxism fell far behind.
2． Philosophy of mind
Although Marx and others conducted in-depth analyses of social development and evolution, they lacked discussion of mental phenomena, the essence of consciousness, psychoanalysis, human nature, eros, and so on. Their later followers, who only knew how to proceed along the prescribed path, naturally did not take these fields seriously either. And ever since Freud founded psychoanalysis, precisely these fields have become very hot topics within philosophy.
3． Aesthetics
From ancient times to the present, aesthetics has always been an important link in philosophy, and many great scientists also often mention “beauty” and speak of it with relish. But Marxism seems not to have made much of a mark in aesthetics; it seems to focus only on society’s ugliness and expose it: contradictions, conflicts, oppression, exploitation, struggle, violence… In Marxist aesthetics, beauty is given a strong class coloring. But this is by no means the whole story. Beauty is also universally present and bears the character of all humanity; aesthetics should be a necessary part of a complete philosophy!
4． Logic
Mathematical logic has gradually separated from philosophy as an independent discipline, but logic has always been an important link running through all parts of philosophy; one might say it is the pillar of philosophy, and once the pillar is unstable, the whole edifice of philosophy can hardly avoid collapsing! And logical rigor is precisely what orthodox Marxism lacks. You might as well take a look at the political textbook for the first year of high school: circular reasoning, self-contradiction, and “definition” arguments are everywhere. I do not know what professional textbooks are like, but at the very least this shows the Chinese philosophical circle’s neglect of logic!
5． Humanistic spirit
Marxism was originally centered on human beings, but as it has been passed down to the present, Marxists have kept emphasizing things like material primacy, iron laws, absolute necessity, and so on, while the human factor, human agency, and humanity’s creative nature have increasingly been ignored. This has lost Marxism’s original face and purpose.
How can these shortcomings of Marxist philosophy be improved? Apart from self-development, actively absorbing the ready-made achievements of various philosophical schools is the quickest and least laborious method. All kinds of philosophical schools, whether ancient or modern, materialist or idealist, bourgeois or proletarian, have their own rational aspects. Toward these theories, we must not only know how to criticize, but also know how to accept!
Criticism is a theoretical and intellectual weapon; it makes us adept at discovering errors. But extremes reverse into their opposites. In criticizing any theory, one should keep a sense of proportion, because in this world there is no theory that is entirely wrong, nor any that is absolutely correct. When one’s own theory is still incomplete and may even have loopholes, then being busy vigorously criticizing others will certainly affect the development of one’s own theory.
Since Reform and Opening Up, China’s industry, economy, education, and so on have all begun to come into line with the world, but the development of Chinese philosophy still remains in a state of “standing still,” and is almost isolated from the outside world. The reason, in the final analysis, is the Chinese philosophical circle’s own “seclusion.” Are we really going to stand by and watch great Marxist philosophy step by step descend into degeneration? （* If you are working in philosophy, you may feel that I am being too alarmist, because the Chinese theoretical world nowadays should be said to be relatively open. But from the perspective of a middle school student, I think our theoretical world is still very backward. Those new, non-orthodox theories cannot be transmitted to us through channels such as classrooms, textbooks, and the media; the “philosophy” we come into contact with is highly politicized. It goes without saying what kind of impact dry, outdated, unsound, and dogmatic “Marxism” will have on students who are gradually forming their worldview. Students often develop an aversion to philosophy, and in this way Chinese philosophy finds it hard to keep pace with the times.）
I do not mean at all that “Marxism is outdated” or anything of the sort. Rather, unlike many official figures (such as textbook authors), I do not accept Marxism as a “dogma.” I see many comrades worshipping Marxism as a kind of faith; Marxism has practically become China’s “state religion,” and this worship is often blind! I believe that for Marxist philosophy, we need to use the standpoint of “development”: a hundred years ago, now, and in the limited future, human beings cannot exhaust their knowledge of nature, and the “philosophy” based on a worldview certainly cannot reach an end point, so any philosophical theory needs continuous development and refinement. And for those Western philosophical theories, we need to use the standpoint of “unity of opposites”: before Marx, dialectics and materialism seemed as incompatible as fire and water, and Marx and a generation of great philosophers unified them, opening up the epoch-making dialectical materialism （* Many people say this, so I am writing it this way too; in fact it is controversial. Later you will see that Marxism may not be materialism at all. What is most important is that Marx founded “practical philosophy”!）. And now, certain philosophical ideas (such as metaphysics, idealism, and neo-Marxism) seem to oppose orthodox Marxist philosophy, but if they are opposed, cannot they also be unified? Those comrades who criticize “non-Marxist” philosophy as utterly worthless have obviously forgotten the basic spirit of “unity of opposites” in Marxist philosophy.
In the new period of Reform and Opening Up, the Party Central Committee proposed the spirit of “emancipating the mind,” but some comrades have distorted the meaning of “emancipating the mind” and put forward the view that “only by unifying thought can thought be liberated.” In fact, “unifying thought” is a completely different aspect: I believe that unifying thought is the goal of emancipating the mind. In order to unify thought, one absolutely cannot rely on dogmatism, and even less can one rely on “silencing” other ideas; rather, one must continually improve one’s own theory, absorb and develop the rational parts of other theories, and make one’s own theory the most perfect theory, a “great unified theory.” In this way people will naturally unify their thought. And emancipating the mind and broadening one’s horizons is precisely the necessary path for improving Marxist philosophy.
I long for a “great unified philosophy,” but one absolutely must not rush for quick success! A “great unification” in philosophy is even more difficult than a “great unification” in physics. The range of human cognition is still too small now; moreover, the more one knows, the more one may come to feel one’s own ignorance. Therefore, establishing any “great unified” theory is difficult to realize in the foreseeable future. Do not at any time imagine that one has obtained some kind of great unity; that will instead hinder one’s own development—Marxist philosophy at one stage was precisely elevating itself to the superior position of a “great unification,” imagining that it had ended all old philosophy, and as a result it affected its further development. I think that “great unified philosophy” should be treated as a pursuit, and the great unification of philosophy as an unremitting effort. The result is not important; what matters is the process. I do not know whether there will be a day when “philosophical great unification” is completed, but that is not important. The significance of philosophy lies in promoting the development of natural science and social systems, thereby promoting the evolution and liberation of humankind. Once “great unified philosophy” is truly realized, it means that philosophy has completed its mission, and it will gradually move toward decline. Yet philosophy’s contribution to human development is precisely manifested in the process of “philosophical great unification.”
It is precisely in the spirit of “emancipating the mind,” and with the pursuit of the great unification of philosophical theory, that I undertook this study. Because the author’s level is limited and the writing time was hurried, this article inevitably contains omissions and errors; readers are welcome to criticize and correct them. In addition, I hope this article can serve as “the proverbial brick to attract jade,” and inspire more people to pay attention to and pursue the “great unification” of philosophy.
“Great Unified Philosophy” Part 1: The Meaning of Metaphysics
EPR Posted on 2005-07-31 14:50:36
Preface
Metaphysics? An isolated, static, one-sided worldview opposed to dialectics! That is what we learned in politics class.
High school philosophy class (politics class) portrays metaphysics as a “trash can” philosophy standing opposite Marxism and alongside idealism, meaning that all erroneous, partial, even childish philosophical ideas can be dumped onto it—sometimes they are not even bothered to be “sorted” as trash. Thus metaphysics seems to contain almost every imaginable kind of fallacy.
It was simply childish and laughable to the extreme—that was my judgment when I first encountered metaphysics. But as teachers and textbooks kept stuffing more and more “trash” into metaphysics, I began to reflect: how could such a poor theory have so many philosophers studying it? How could it have such great influence and vitality? Thus, driven by curiosity, I began to search for the true meaning of metaphysics: I discovered that metaphysics had been completely distorted by the textbooks—they tied together the various shortcomings of metaphysics from all schools and traditions, ancient and modern, Chinese and foreign, while ignoring any of its merits, and even ignoring its original meaning and instead defining it by its fallacies. Metaphysics was torn to pieces!
The driving force of philosophical development is debate, and what is the core issue in today’s philosophical world? Whether matter comes first or spirit comes first? No. The struggle between materialism and idealism reached its climax hundreds of years ago, and nowadays fewer and fewer people bring it up: in China, so-called dialectical materialism dominates the world of thought, and idealism has long been attacked until it has no power to fight back, so there is no debate to speak of; Western modern philosophy is divided into two major trends, humanism and scientism, among which scientism rejects metaphysics, while materialism and idealism cannot be empirically verified and are metaphysical issues, so scientism does not debate materialism and idealism; humanism, taking the human being as its core, seeks to reconstruct metaphysics, and it often holds the view of the unity of subject and object, not caring about materialism and idealism. Therefore, the core of debate in modern philosophy had long since shifted, and in summary it is the question of whether metaphysics is possible and how it is possible.
True gold fears no fire. If Marxism really were already flawless and could truly discard metaphysics, then there would be nothing to fear in allowing others to understand the true meaning of metaphysics; there would be absolutely no need to distort it beyond recognition. If not, then one might as well listen to more opinions, both for and against. This is the origin of my writing this article.
Introduction
In China of the new century, Reform and Opening Up has gradually brought China into alignment with the international community in politics, economics, science and technology, culture, and other fields, keeping pace with the times. By comparison, progress in philosophy has lagged half a beat behind.
Chinese philosophy had flourished for a long time beginning in the pre-Qin era, but later, because of “banning the hundred schools and honoring only Confucianism,” Confucian learning stood alone and towered above the crowd. Although Confucianism later developed greatly and formed a situation in which Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism stood in “three-legged balance,” the situation of a hundred schools contending never reappeared. For thousands of years, Confucianism has ruled Chinese thought; lacking struggle, it inevitably became self-satisfied and conservative, and in the end, after prosperity, it declined and stopped moving forward. Added to this was modern China’s “seclusion from the world,” and the lack of exchange and innovation left Chinese philosophy far behind Western philosophy.
The introduction of Marxism injected fresh blood into Chinese philosophy, but the good times did not last long. From the birth of New China to the Cultural Revolution, for that quite long period, China’s intellectual world once again returned to “seclusion from the world,” except that “honoring only Confucianism” was replaced by “honoring only ‘Marxist’ technique.” Even today this shadow has not yet dispersed, hindering the progress of Chinese philosophy.
A hundred years ago, now, and in the foreseeable future, human beings cannot exhaust their knowledge of nature, and “philosophy,” being based on a worldview, of course cannot reach an end point either. So any philosophical theory, just like scientific theory, needs continual development and refinement. And to summarize and absorb the strengths of other theories is a shortcut to self-transcendence.
Criticism is better than praise: if you hear a hundred people praise you, even if everything they say is objective and true, it will do you no good at all; it will only make you smug and conceited. But if a hundred people criticize you, even if ninety-nine of them are fabricated and subjective, as long as one person hits your sore spot, points out a flaw you had not noticed, and you accept him and improve accordingly, that is a leap forward for you. Therefore, criticizing others in a benevolent way is a good thing; it makes you better able to distinguish right from wrong, and the other side, “if there is any fault, correct it; if there is none, take it as encouragement,” will make progress on both sides. But if one blindly attacks others while never criticizing oneself, lording it over others and thinking oneself superior, then that is far too “selfless.”
As the successors of Marxism, should we still keep praising Marxism without end?
Blindly elevating the status of one theory, especially among modern students whose worldview and outlook on life are still taking shape, will not achieve the aim of ideological rule; on the contrary, it may trigger psychological resistance.
The author has absolutely no intention of saying that “Marxism is outdated” or anything like that; he simply does not accept Marxism as a “dogma.” Many comrades worship Marxism as a kind of faith; Marxism has practically become China’s state religion, and such worship is often blind! Has human wisdom now already reached the highest realm? No theory is perfect, and Marxism is undoubtedly very imperfect! But the author believes that Marxism is the best. The purpose of writing this article is not to negate Marxist philosophy, but to hope that Marxist philosophy can continuously improve and become a truly all-encompassing “science of wisdom.”
I do not expect every one of my arguments to be correct. As I said earlier, if readers can find one or two sentences in the paper that trigger your thinking and seem somewhat interesting, I will be very satisfied.
I. The Origins of Metaphysics
The term metaphysics originates in ancient Greece as the title given to Aristotle’s book *Metaphysics*. Aristotle wrote a work on motion and change in nature, and on questions such as time and space, dealing with the principles of concrete things; this was called *Physics*. At the same time, he also wrote a work on the basic principles of the world—its essence, attributes, and elements—dealing with the abstract principles of the world’s highest order, but it had no title. After Aristotle’s death, when his students compiled this work, they placed it after the work *Physics*, and so it was given the title *Metaphysics*.
The Chinese term “metaphysics” comes from the line in the *Zhouyi • Xici*: “What is above form is called the Way; what is below form is called implements” (形而上者谓之道，形而下者谓之器). This means that what lies above tangible forms, what cannot be perceived by the senses, is called the “Way”; what has tangible form and can be perceived by the senses is called “implements.” As for the “Way,” Laozi gave a deeper account: “There was something chaotic yet complete, born before Heaven and Earth. Silent! Desolate! It stands alone and does not change; it circulates everywhere and does not weary. It can be regarded as the mother of the world. I do not know its name; I style it ‘the Way.’” And again: “The Way gives birth to one; one gives birth to two; two gives birth to three; three gives birth to the myriad things.” It can be seen that Laozi regarded the “Way” as the source of all things: the Way generates all things and forever cycles on, independent and unchanging. Moreover, Laozi held that “the Way can be spoken,” that is, nature can be known, and laws can be used.
Looking at the origins of these two Western and Chinese forms of “metaphysics,” metaphysics studies the essence behind the various phenomena and laws in the “real world,” that is, it explores the “world of essence”—where “essence” here does not mean an “essence” synthesized and inferred from appearances, but rather an essence that lies above sensory experience, beyond experience and non-empirical.
Metaphysics is an important part of philosophy; from antiquity to the present it has always remained at the core of philosophy, and is also called “pure philosophy.”
By Hegel’s time, metaphysics had been given a new meaning: “a general term for doctrines that deny development in opposition to dialectics.” Later Marx and Engels gave metaphysics a more precise definition—“a worldview and method of thinking opposed to dialectics, characterized by viewing the world with isolated, static, one-sided perspectives, regarding all things as mutually isolated and eternally unchanging; and if there is change, it is only an increase or decrease in quantity and a change of place, while the causes of such increase, decrease, and change do not lie within things themselves but outside them.” This is the definition of “metaphysics” in today’s textbooks. I believe that such a “definition” is merely Marx and Engels’ understanding of metaphysics, and not a newly created definition. Moreover, Marx only said that metaphysics is opposed to dialectics; he did not say that the two are as incompatible as water and fire, incapable of being unified. In fact, “there is not an unbridgeable gulf between metaphysics and dialectics; rather, they can, and in practice often do, transform into one another.” However, in reality, any thought opposed to materialist dialectics can be labeled “idealism and metaphysics.” And the boundary between idealism and metaphysics begins to blur—apparently idealism is metaphysics, and metaphysics is idealism—so that no one bothers to care about the true meaning of metaphysics anymore.
I believe that Marx’s understanding—an isolated, static, one-sided worldview and method of thinking—and the original meaning—an experiential discipline that explores the world of essence—are essentially connected: if it is “essence,” then it should be independent, unconstrained by external things and changes in appearances, and therefore “isolated”; if it is essential, then of course it should not be constrained by time, region, or surface form; observing statically helps eliminate interference and see the essence clearly, and thus it is “static”; and if one is exploring a non-empirical “world of essence,” then one can of course only make a priori conjectures, while what things are really like must await later verification; metaphysics only provides inspiration and approaches truth, rather than truth itself, and therefore metaphysics is bound to be “one-sided.” But this does not prove that metaphysics is trash. These characteristics are at once its shortcomings and its strengths, and thus metaphysics exhibits a promoting effect upon the study of what is below form and a complementary relationship with dialectics; this will be discussed in detail below.
In Europe after Hegel, metaphysics was combined with materialism, making the materialist philosophy of this period mechanically and metaphysically inclined, and replacing naive dialectics so that it occupied a dominant position in people’s minds. The bourgeoisie viewed social and historical phenomena through metaphysical perspectives and methods, denied social contradictions, denied development, and negated the role of social revolution, regarding the capitalist world as something eternal. Thus reactionary classes always took metaphysical modes of thinking as an ideological tool for maintaining their rule. Hence revolutionaries such as Marx and Engels carried out a thorough critique of metaphysical modes of thinking. But one must note that those bourgeois reactionaries in fact did not understand true “metaphysics”; what they called “metaphysics” was a distortion, and one that went to extremes. Just as with the collapse of the Soviet Union and during China’s Cultural Revolution: because the government distorted Marxism and went to extremes, yet if one says Marxism is unworkable simply because one stage took a wrong turn, that would be to generalize from a partial view! The same applies to “metaphysics”: one should understand it comprehensively and restore it to the status it deserves.
II. Dialectics and Metaphysics
Dialectics is said to be “connection, development, and comprehensiveness,” while metaphysics is said to be “isolation, stasis, and one-sidedness.” Leaving aside whether this way of putting it is apt, many people have tried to use it to draw a clear line between dialectics and metaphysics. Unfortunately, they have not studied dialectics well, and have not grasped the principle of “unity of opposites”: a strength in some contexts may become a weakness, and a weakness in some contexts may become a strength; opposing sides may complement one another, and there are no mutually incompatible contradictions! Dialectics or metaphysics are both ways of thinking for observing the world and reflecting on problems—philosophy itself is also methodology; it merely brings people wisdom, enlightens their thinking, and plays a role of guidance and inspiration—unlike scientific truth. Truth takes only one form, whereas methods of thinking can be endlessly varied. Different modes of thought are like looking at things through different lenses: you have myopia glasses, magnifying glasses, sunglasses, telescopes, microscopes, and so on. Wise you would of course not insist on using only one lens; you would change lenses according to differences in region, environment, and object of observation. Each kind of lens has its own strengths and weaknesses, and there is a certain range within which it is applicable. Philosophy is the same: to this day there is no philosophy that covers everything. So why not learn more, and think from multiple angles? Wouldn’t that be better?
I believe that the essence of dialectics is “grasping truth in the debate of opposing opinions”; it is a method for grasping truth, not truth itself. Metaphysics is another method; even if in many situations it is not as effective as dialectics, that does not mean it must be eliminated. It is like a tunnel and a ferry both being ways to reach the opposite shore: a tunnel is of course more advanced and faster than a ferry, but no one would build a tunnel and then smash up the ferry, because tunnels and ferries each have their own advantages and disadvantages and their own suitable ranges. For example, tunnels are expensive to build and prone to traffic jams, while ferries are cheaper and do not get jammed; motor vehicles are suited to tunnels, while pedestrians and bicycles are suited to ferries. Likewise, dialectics and metaphysics do not conflict; rather, each has its own strengths and weaknesses and its own range of applicability. When researching practical problems, one can absolutely use both dialectical and metaphysical philosophy at the same time, and no conflict will arise. Any imperfect theory has its range of applicability. Just as quantum mechanics applies to the microscopic world while classical mechanics applies to the macroscopic world, I believe that when studying social problems one should place greater emphasis on dialectics, whereas when studying problems in the natural sciences one should place greater emphasis on metaphysics.
The isolated, static, one-sided metaphysical mode of thinking is precisely what scientific research commonly uses: although no object can possibly be completely isolated and static, and connection and development necessarily exist, for the object of scientific research it must be isolated, because the researcher is active and can therefore reduce the external factors connected to the object to a minimum and ultimately ignore them; and once the connection between another thing and the research object cannot be ignored, then the only option is to place them together as the object of study, and in the end the object of study must necessarily be in an isolated state. As for “static,” this means that within all things there is always something that never changes. In the previous chapter I wrote about *A Little Encyclopedia*’s explanation of metaphysics: “…if there is change, it is only an increase or decrease in quantity and a change of place, while the causes of such increase, decrease, and change do not lie within things themselves but outside them.” This is precisely the characteristic of metaphysics—namely, that although the appearances of things change and develop, the most essential thing is unchanging and static. This is exactly the most basic belief indispensable to scientific research—conservation! For example, changes of state are, in essence, changes in interatomic distance; chemical changes are, in essence, changes in the positions of atoms and electrons; changes in elementary particles are, in essence, changes in the positions of quarks… And changes in things have internal causes and external causes: internal causes determine whether a thing can undergo a certain change, while external causes are the direct reason why, when, where, and in what way a thing undergoes what kind of change, hence the statement that “the causes of such increase, decrease, and change do not lie within things themselves but outside them.” However, for an object of study, whether from within or from without, there are always many factors that cannot be controlled or foreseen. Scientific research cannot demand “everything covered”; only relative “comprehensiveness” is possible. All theories are always one-sided, and doing scientific research requires facing up to the one-sidedness of existing theories in order to keep breaking through and innovating.
Of course, dialectics is even more a good way of thinking, especially when studying social problems or thinking about problems in daily life and work, where one often needs a dialectical mind even more. For although human society is born of “nature,” its meaning is entirely different from “nature”: human beings are like infants babbling in the arms of “nature,” unable to break free from their mother’s embrace, yet already independent individuals, and thus they display differences from “nature” in many respects. For example, entropy increase is a universal law of nature, meaning that nature as a whole is always developing in the direction of greater and greater disorder; human society, however, is exactly the opposite. Can one say that human society is always tending toward chaos? Therefore one cannot simply transplant natural laws onto human society. In nature, the two sides of a contradiction always present a harmonious symmetry; in human society, because there are concepts of good and evil, right and wrong, the two sides of a contradiction often present disharmony such as opposition, conflict, and struggle. In addition, in the natural sciences, contradiction is often merely the appearance of motion in things rather than their essence—for example positive and negative electricity, gravity and repulsion, matter and antimatter, fission and fusion, decomposition and combination, and so on. These “contradictions” are in essence symmetrical, equal, or inverse to one another; they are merely two aspects or two forms of one thing, and cannot be said to be in mutual struggle. In human society, however, “contradictions” are often the fundamental driving force of development—for example productive forces and relations of production, the economic base and the superstructure, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and so on. These contradictions are often asymmetrical, unequal, and involve conflict and struggle, thereby driving social development through struggle. Therefore, compared with the natural sciences, contradictions in human society deserve greater attention; this is why dialectics is more suitable for the social sciences.
Of course, this range of applicability only means when one should emphasize what. There is no clear boundary between dialectics and metaphysics. They are philosophy, not science or religion, and there is no need to fight to the death over them. Whether in scientific research, social research, or daily life, one can completely use these two opposing yet complementary methods of thinking at the same time.
**III. Science and Metaphysics**
The “metaphysics” referred to in the previous chapter was only a worldview and a method of thinking, a narrow sense of the term. At the same time, from the literal meaning of “metaphysics,” it can be understood as “the study of what is ‘beyond the physical,’” and in that way “metaphysics” becomes an academic discipline or a field of research; this is the broad sense of the term. In this case, the counterpart to “metaphysics” is no longer “dialectics,” but “physics,” in the sense of inquiry into what is “within the physical.”
Physics is the empirical study of tangible, perceptible entities; metaphysics is the a priori exploration of the essences within entities that cannot be directly perceived. In ancient times, physics was simply “natural philosophy,” and by today it has developed into the general name for all empirical sciences such as physics, chemistry, and biology. Metaphysics is ontology, or pure philosophy; for a very long time it was the core content of philosophy, and in many contexts it was virtually synonymous with philosophy.
In antiquity, metaphysics and physics came into being at the same time, and their birth marked a leap of human thought to a new height. Yet at the same time, it was precisely humanity’s ignorance of nature that gave rise to metaphysics. Physics studies empirical laws, that is, things that can be perceived and verified; but because of the limitations of technology, what human beings can perceive and empirically establish is always finite, whereas thought can remain unconstrained by technology. Thus philosophers used thought (rather than experiment) to explore the essence within appearances, the super-empirical beyond experience itself; this is metaphysics.
Up to the present day, this kind of metaphysics, and even philosophy itself, has begun to come under challenge—for example, the “scientific faction” in China’s “Science–Metaphysics Debate”; and in the West, the scientistic current among the two major new trends of thought (science and humanism); as well as Marxism of the Second International, and so on. These new currents have all turned their spearhead toward the ancient metaphysics, advocating the omnipotence of science and the elimination of metaphysics, or even the elimination of philosophy.
The emergence of these currents had much to do with their historical background: the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were precisely the time when science had reached a peak. Chemistry had the periodic table; biology had evolutionary theory; geography had the theory of continental drift; and physics, the very foundation of science, had “only two clouds left.” Scientific progress brought tremendous changes to humanity’s material and spiritual worlds. As a result, many people began to believe that science was omnipotent, that science would solve all difficulties, including those of nature, society, and life itself, thereby pushing metaphysics aside. I believe they failed to grasp correctly the relation between science and philosophy (metaphysics), and therefore could not understand the significance of philosophy (metaphysics).
The traditional textbook Marxist system holds that the difference between science and philosophy lies in this: philosophy takes the world as a whole as its object, while science takes a part of the world as its object. Philosophy seeks to grasp the most universal laws of all phenomena in the world, whereas science studies laws within special fields and special forms. Thus the difference between philosophy and science lies in the difference between whole and part, universal and particular, while their connection lies in the fact that philosophy is the generalization and summary of science, and that philosophical research also has guiding significance for the various specific sciences. I think this explanation is quite reasonable, yet still flawed. For it only explains the relation between science and philosophy, without clarifying their respective distinctive features. In the view of traditional textbooks, the distinction between philosophy and science lies merely in the size and scope of the field studied; in fact, the two differ essentially:
Compared with science, philosophy is more like religion, literature, morality, and politics. Beyond reason, it is more a kind of consciousness, a kind of culture. For example, in China, “Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism” are not only three traditional philosophical schools, but also the pillars of traditional Chinese culture. Such consciousness and culture do not, like science, bring earth-shaking changes to people’s material lives, but they are indispensable to the progress of civilization.
Methodologically speaking, science and philosophy also differ in principle: scientific research is objective and empirical, and must exclude subjective factors; its conclusions are not governed by the researcher’s subjective intentions, and are scientific laws valid everywhere. Philosophical research, by contrast, is the subjective seen in the objective; its conclusions are closely related to the researcher’s own culture and beliefs. Philosophical theory is a method of thinking or a guide to practice, not a law; so long as its scientific basis is correct, there is no distinction of right and wrong in the strict sense. Take materialism and idealism, for example. Many people think materialism is truth and idealism is error; I myself believe this too, but that can only be a belief. Materialism and idealism are not science, but philosophy, and they cannot be empirically verified—although many facts seem to “prove” materialism, that requires first assuming those facts are objective, that is, assuming materialism to be correct. If one first assumes idealism to be correct, then “matter arises from mind”; those “evidences” are also born from the mind, not objective, so how could they prove materialism?
One may regard a certain metaphysics as correct or absurd, but one cannot prove it correct or absurd. Once a metaphysics is shown to be false, it becomes “outdated”; once it is empirically verified, it is no different from science. In fact, the development of metaphysics toward science drives the development of human technology, science, and civilization. The earliest examples were the ancients’ reflections on the origin of the world, such as the doctrine of “fire” (Heraclitus), the doctrine of “water” (Thales), the doctrine of “atoms” (Democritus), the doctrine of the “four elements,” the doctrine of the “five phases” (Shangshu • Hongfan), the doctrine of “the ultimate particles” (Mozi), the doctrine of “the Dao” (Laozi), and so on. At the time, these theories were all without basis, yet they inspired the ancients’ thinking about the origin of all things. With the development of science and technology, most of these views were discarded, while the doctrine of atoms was verified and became science (Laozi’s “Dao” remains metaphysics). There were also the particle theory of light (Newton) and the wave theory of light (Huygens); both had some basis, yet both had flaws. For hundreds of years they struggled back and forth, rising and falling without either gaining the upper hand, until it was finally discovered that both were right. There are also theories in modern physics such as Mach’s principle, higher-dimensional universe theories, string theory, quantum chromodynamics, the Copenhagen interpretation, hidden-variable interpretations, many-worlds interpretations, and so on. Because they contain a large number of assumptions that cannot currently be verified, they are all marked by metaphysics, super-empirical and non-empirical. As science and technology develop, some of them will be discarded, some will be verified and enter the realm of empirical science, and some theories may never be testable. And whether verified, discarded, or untestable, most metaphysical ideas play an inspiring and driving role in the development of science and culture. Figuratively speaking, metaphysics is the “catalyst” of physics.
Those positivists will not agree with my view. They think that theories and ideas that cannot be tested by experiment and cannot create practical value are useless; only theories that come from practice and can create practical value are useful. In fact, from the facts above one can clearly see the shortsightedness of positivists, just as in a famous saying by a certain scientist: “It is better to debate a question without settling it than to settle a question without debating it!” (Joseph Joubert). Looking at the development of modern physics, the very top physicists were often passionately interested in metaphysical discussion, and their disputes indeed drove the rapid development of modern physics, especially quantum theory and string theory. Although these theories have not yet created much practical value at present, they will, like the discovery of electricity and the invention of the computer, gradually reveal their enormous value as science and technology develop!
Someone once asked me, “Isn’t the goal of debate to solve problems? Is it really just to argue for the sake of arguing?” In fact, the goal of debate should indeed be to solve problems, but that does not mean that failing to solve a problem means no result has been achieved. The value of doing something lies not only in accomplishing the thing, but also in the doing itself. To use an analogy, debate is like climbing Mount Everest; of course the goal is the summit—who would be aiming for the mountainside? But the value of climbing lies in the “climbing,” not in the peak. So long as one makes the effort to climb, even if one does not reach the summit, one can still proudly say: I was only one step away from my goal; along the way I made many friends, saw many wonders of nature, trained my courage and physical strength, and so on. But if you take a plane up to Mount Everest, what have you gained? Likewise, in mathematics, the three great problems, the Goldbach conjecture, the four-color conjecture, Fermat’s Last Theorem, the continuum hypothesis, and so on—all of these have no practical value in their conclusions themselves, yet in the process of pursuing them, one new theory, one new method, and one new branch after another were born. The same is true of metaphysical debate: whether or not a result is obtained, whether or not it can be obtained, the debate itself brings great value! Equating purpose with value is precisely the idea of those positivists (pragmatists).
In sum, science and culture are the foundation of metaphysics, while metaphysics in turn drives the development of science and culture; they complement and reinforce each other. Although science today is vastly more developed than in ancient times, in the face of nature humanity remains profoundly ignorant. Moreover, while the development of science enriches human material life, it also brings emptiness in people’s spiritual and religious lives: when people view society through scientific rationality, they become more and more utilitarian and mechanical, and the meaning of human existence itself is being diluted by reason. Thus metaphysics still has its reason for existing.
**Conclusion**
At last, I’ve finished writing it! In my own view, this article’s shortcomings are a lack of continuity and fluency, and a lack of “quoting the classics and citing the authorities”; its strengths are that it is entirely independently thought out, independently written, and sincere. In fact, philosophy is something everyone can study and think about, because philosophy is ultimately a systematic method of thinking; other people’s philosophies can only be used for inspiration and reference, and one need not be confined by books.
To sum up, my views are actually very simple:
1. I appreciate and believe in some essential, quintessential things in Marxism, but I think that some of the concretized theories in today’s orthodox Marxism have many flaws. Compared with modern Western philosophy, Marxist philosophy is very backward and incomplete. The way to improve this incompleteness is to absorb the experience of Western philosophy and carry out internal debate.
2. Philosophy is a discipline concerning methods of thinking. It takes as its object all the objects of human thought, but it does not obtain truth; its conclusions are methods of thinking. Often, philosophy reflects on old methods of thinking by using new ones, and thereby generalizes still newer ones. The development of philosophy is the development of human wisdom and the depth of thought; it influences and promotes culture and science mutually.
3. The essence of dialectics is “grasping truth in argument among opposing views,” not truth itself. Metaphysics is also a method of grasping truth. Likewise, there are systems theory, reductionism, and so on. They are like various lenses used to observe the world: if you buy a high-precision microscope, there is no need to throw away your magnifying glass; if you have a telescope for celestial bodies, there is no need to smash your ordinary telescope. Likewise, dialectics and metaphysics have no need for a life-or-death struggle.
4. Metaphysics is a discipline that takes the unknown noumenon as its object and tries a priori to derive the eternal, unchanging essence hidden behind appearances. What it yields is likewise thought, not truth. It can transcend technical limitations and fully unleash human creativity; it usually plays an inspiring role in the development of science. So long as human beings remain ignorant, metaphysics will certainly exist and will have a reason for existing.
As I said before, I do not expect readers to accept every one of my words. For me, so long as even one sentence strikes you as interesting and can spark your thinking, I will be fully satisfied.
**References**
《中国小百科全书》
• Of course, the electronic edition; compared with 《大百科全书》, it is much smaller. Its advantage is brevity, but the program is terribly written, requires Acrobat Reader to read it, and even produces garbled text.
《Finding Schrodinger’s Cat》 John Gribbin
• A rare popular-science work on quantum theory. The author is the famously renowned popular science master; this may be the most vivid, most detailed, most in-depth, and most accessible introduction to quantum theory currently available. Very much worth reading!
《The Emperor’s New Mind》 Roger Penrose
• Roger Penrose is a very famous mathematician, physicist, thinker, and philosopher. This book attempts to answer, from a metaphysical standpoint, questions such as how human beings think and whether artificial intelligence can have consciousness. It involves knowledge from many areas, including mathematics, computers, physics, and philosophy.
《New Marxism in the 20th Century》 Yi Junqing, Ding Liqun, Li Xiaojuan, Wang Xiaodong
• Funded by a National Social Science Foundation project, this book, with its 520,000-word scope, offers a comprehensive, objective introduction and commentary on the various new Marxist currents of thought in twentieth-century the West. These new Marxist currents are of great help to the development of Marxism and are very much worth reading!
《Political Studies in Senior High School, Grade One》
• Although the argumentation is extremely loose, the sentences are full of flaws, and it has a certain tendency toward “stupifying” the people, most of the views in it are still good and positive.
《Philosophy and Science》 Yang Xiangkui
• There are both complex formula calculations and the old philosophers’ long-winded “zhi, hu, zhe, ye” talk; it feels rather odd, but it is somewhat inspiring.
《Thinking of Metaphysics》 Zhu Desheng
• A very good book! Just reading two chapters already gave me great inspiration. The author’s views are similar to mine, and I am still reading it.
《How Is Metaphysical Wisdom Possible》 Yu Zhenhua
• There is a discussion of the “science-vs.-metaphysics debate,” focusing on modern Chinese philosophy, attempting to explain whether the scientific age still needs metaphysics and, if so, how. A very good book; I am reading it now.
Part Four of “The Great Unification of Philosophy”: New Marxist Currents
EPR posted on 2005-07-31 14:56:14
1. Introduction
For quite a long period in the past, a very influential view circulated in the theoretical circles of socialist countries: the emergence of Marxist philosophy represented the greatest revolution in human history; it brought an end to all old philosophy, and made it impossible for any philosophy produced after it to be creative or progressive, leaving it only the essence of conservatism, backwardness, decay, and reaction. (Such statements can be found in many older textbooks.) Thus people took Marxism to be a closed theoretical system that had exhausted all truth. Even now, this conservative thinking is still deeply rooted in the hearts of quite a number of comrades!
Take history as a warning: in history, after every epoch-making theory is born, quite a few people have developed thoughts similar to these, and such people often become obstacles to the theory’s development.
We must recognize that Marxist philosophy is nothing more than a milestone in the history of philosophy; the road ahead is very, very long! Marxism is revolutionary, but that does not mean one revolution is enough—it means revolution must be upheld at all times! Moreover, revolution must not be understood in a superficial way as the “violent revolution” that seizes political power; more importantly, it is revolution in politics, economy, culture, ideology, and all other fields. Otherwise, Marxists will turn from “revolutionaries” who dare to innovate and fight into “conservatives” whose thinking is stale, dogmatic, and formalistic!
In order not to let Marxism “degenerate,” we must emancipate the mind, be good at innovation, and continuously develop and perfect Marxism—and those New Marxists already opened up the road for us:
In the 20th century, Marxism also underwent major development and differentiation: besides the “orthodox Marxism” of socialist countries, many “New Marxist” schools also emerged in Europe. These schools all take Marx’s doctrine as their point of departure and uphold the purpose of Marxism—to revolutionize the existing world and realize human liberation. But because they interpret Marx’s theory differently, their doctrines are mutually incompatible with orthodox Marxism. For a long period, these new doctrines were regarded as heresies by the theoretical circles of socialist countries; only now has China’s theoretical community begun to treat these new doctrines in a more fair-minded way.
What is called “orthodox Marxism” refers to the theoretical system that held orthodox status in socialist countries, based on dialectical materialism and historical materialism, and developed by the philosophical circles of the former Soviet Union. It is usually also called the “Soviet textbook philosophical system.” This theoretical system mainly inherited Marx and Engels’ “theory of socio-economic formations,” with its contradictions between productive forces and relations of production, economic base and superstructure, and the economic necessity that serves as its main content—that is, the classic historical materialist view. Yet it did not understand Marx’s early writings, that is, it did not understand the humanist philosophical vision of the young Marx. Because it did not fully and deeply reflect the ideological essence of Marxism, in the course of its development it displayed certain limitations and caused several major historical mistakes.
“Orthodox Marxism” overemphasized objective necessity, ignored human subjectivity, overlooked the differences in actual conditions among different regions and different cultures, and regarded its own theory as an “iron law” valid everywhere, which easily led to extreme errors such as the Soviet Union’s “purge campaigns,” China’s “Great Leap Forward,” and the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, for a long period in the former Soviet Union and China (until very recently, and only slightly in China has there been some change), “orthodox Marxism” did not acknowledge the diversity of historical development and revolutionary paths, denied the plurality of human thought, called its own theory and practice the “only correct” one, and denounced all differing views as “reactionary,” thereby severely obstructing the exchange of Marxism with other theories and cultures and producing the present consequence of “self-enclosure.”
In the 20th century, “orthodox Marxism” encountered challenges and criticism from all sides, including the New Marxist currents that were, after all, born of the same root. Since the reform and opening-up of the 1980s, China’s theoretical circles have gradually begun to reflect on the loopholes and limitations in “orthodox Marxism”; those theories once regarded as “heresies” have begun to draw the attention of Chinese theorists. Let me give everyone a brief introduction to those theories:
2. Concepts
What is Marxism? Orthodox textbooks tell me: dialectical materialism and historical materialism. But this is inaccurate! Dialectical materialism is based on Engels’ dialectics of nature; I have already mentioned earlier that he simply equated the laws of society with the laws of nature, which, as a philosophy of nature, was not successful. Traditional historical materialism—that is, the materialist conception of history—mechanizes the historical process, overemphasizes objectivity and necessity, and does not pay attention to human beings as the subjects of society and history; to understand some of Marx’s visions of future society as iron laws actually falls into historical determinism, which is also incomplete.
In fact, there are many interpretations of Marxism. Petrovic, of the Yugoslav Praxis School, pointed out that there are four interpretations of Marxism that have been the most influential: first, the scientific socialism and economic determinism articulated by Second International theorists; second, dialectical materialism plus historical materialism as explained by Plekhanov and Lenin—this second interpretation, in fact, adds a philosophical dimension to the first. Petrovic noted that both of these interpretations derive from Engels’ views. The third is the praxis philosophy and humanist socialist interpretation of New Marxists such as Labriola, Gramsci, Bloch, the young Lukács, Marcuse, Lefebvre, Goldman, and Kosík; the fourth is the revolutionary thought and revolutionary humanism developed by the Praxis School on the basis of the preceding interpretation. Revolution here is not political change in the ordinary sense, but a human being’s essential mode of existence. The latter two interpretations derive directly from Marx himself. Among these four interpretations, the first advocates the abolition of philosophy, the second is the present orthodox interpretation, and the latter two belong to humanist Marxism.
In fact, New Marxism did not stop there; everyone’s views are different. The most influential include Lukács’ dialectic of the unity of subject and object, Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis, Bloch’s philosophy of hope, the Frankfurt School’s theory of social critique, Sartre’s existentialist Marxism, Lefebvre’s critique of everyday life, the Praxis School’s philosophy of praxis, the Budapest School’s radical philosophy, Kołakowski’s critique of ideology, Kosík’s concrete dialectic, Della Volpe’s positivist Marxism, Althusser’s structuralist Marxism, and so on. Of course I cannot possibly summarize them one by one; below I will make some overall arrangements of these theories:
3. Developmental history
New Marxism is merely a flash in the pan in the history of world philosophy—it arose in the early 20th century, reached its peak in the middle and late 20th century, and declined by the end of the 20th century.
Early Marxism was born in opposition to the economic determinist Marxism of the Second International, yet it was also different from orthodox Marxism represented by Lenin. Its representative figures include the young Lukács, Bloch, Korsch, and Gramsci. Owing to the tragic fate of the proletarian revolutions in Western Europe, they began to re-examine and reinterpret Marxism. They all belonged to humanist Marxism, and their views often converged: all opposed the mechanical materialist conception of history and the dialectics of nature; held the view of the unity of subject and object; affirmed the diversity of historical development and the development of human subjectivity; re-examined the proletarian revolution, pointing out that because of the differences between East and West, the Western proletarian revolution was merely a violent revolution that seizes political power and not a “total” revolution……
After the Second World War, owing to the scientific-technological revolution and the West’s conscious or compelled self-transformation, Western society entered a relatively stable stage of development, and the proletarian revolutionary movement fell into a trough. For Marxists at this time, it was neither urgent nor meaningful to continue developing a theory of economic crises and their eruption, nor to formulate strategies for proletarian violent revolution. But the modernization of society does not mean perfection; while modern people enjoy material comforts, they have paid a huge price in terms of humanity and have lost themselves. In keeping with the fundamental starting point of Marxism—sublating alienation and liberating human beings—New Marxism (mainly referring to humanist Marxism) reached its peak. It had many branches, with the main representatives including the Frankfurt School, existentialist Marxism, and the Yugoslav Praxis School, among others. They were directly influenced or guided by the early Marxists Lukács and Bloch, and took the young Marx as their theoretical basis. They emphasized all-round social critique and the theory of alienation. Of course, this was also the time when scientific Marxism came into being, but its influence was far less than that of humanist Marxism, and it does not quite resonate with me either, so I will not discuss it.
By the end of the 20th century, with the successive deaths of the older generation of New Marxist representatives, New Marxism as a whole had already disappeared, leaving only scattered activities centered on individuals such as Habermas.
Some people believe that the fact that New Marxism moved from prosperity to decline in such a short period proves defects in its theoretical system, and there is some truth in that; but to use this as a reason to deny the great value of New Marxism is not acceptable. No theory is without defects; so long as it has even one advantage you do not possess, even if all the rest are defects, it is still of great value. New Marxism indeed had many extreme or radical aspects, but on the whole, their attempts opened up one new road after another for Marxism. In the new era, if we want Marxism to continue to maintain its advanced character, New Marxism is a ready-made theoretical treasure trove.
Part Five of “The Great Unification of Philosophy”: Materialism and Idealism
EPR posted on 2005-07-31 14:58:43
As was already said in the previous chapter, Marxism itself does not emphasize “materialism”; what is called “dialectical materialism” is only an understanding of later generations and of Engels. On the contrary, the young Marx explicitly pointed out: “Thoroughgoing naturalism or humanism is distinct from both idealism and materialism, while at the same time being the truth that unites the two.” This sentence prompted me to think about the limitations of the traditional worldview that sets materialism and idealism in binary opposition (*Even now textbooks still tell us this: there are two basic camps in philosophy—materialism and idealism. In fact this is not correct; this is really the situation of more than a hundred years ago. Since the 20th century, pure idealists have decreased, and so have those who constantly speak of materialism and idealism. More philosophers have already begun to transcend the traditional binary opposition. If we are to look for the two major camps in philosophy today, “humanism” and “scientism” would seem more apt; and the “humanism” here is no longer the traditional materialism or idealism.), and I realized that the subjective and the objective can also and must be unified; neither subject nor object stands above the other—they act upon each other and influence each other. The human being (the subject) is not merely the powerless so-called “reaction” to nature (the object), but an “active reflection”:
Newton’s third law tells us that action and reaction are relative; they occupy equal status, arising and vanishing simultaneously, with no distinction of cause and effect, before and after, or primary and secondary. The relation between human beings and nature is likewise so: nature’s reflection in human consciousness and human influence on nature are equal “action and reaction”; nature’s reflection in human consciousness is by no means dispensable, but at the same time it also exerts influence on the development of nature! Below I will demonstrate from both nature and society the necessity of the unity of subject and object. (*In fact the “unity of subject and object” has long been quite natural, but orthodox Marxism, even when claiming the unity of subject and object, often still places the object in a position of supremacy; thus in history, when interpreting Marxism, it often led to deviations. What I want to say is one step further: subject and object are “equal”—that is the true “unity of subject and object.”)
2. The unity of subject and object in natural laws
This was something Marx’s era could not have foreseen. In the nineteenth century, Newtonian mechanics was dominant; at that time, all the basic laws of nature seemed to have been uncovered, and in people’s eyes nature was mechanical and would not be changed by human will, while everything had only one correct answer. But now things are different: people have realized that human beings cannot step outside nature to observe nature; what we can perceive is only “humanized nature,” and nature detached from humanity is unknowable and meaningless.
The establishment of quantum mechanics in the early 20th century brought about a major transformation in humanity’s worldview, and the shock it dealt to traditional human thinking will by no means be inferior to the heliocentric theory, the theory of evolution, or the discovery of the unconscious.
The traditional view held that nature exists “in itself”; whether or not humans observe it, what happens in nature does not change, and nature is of course “objective.” But now this view has faced unprecedented challenges: a particle can be in different places at the same moment; a particle may be a wave or a particle, depending on whether it is observed……
In the double-slit diffraction experiment, when a wave passes through the two slits, the slits form coherent wave sources, producing a diffraction pattern on the screen; this is the result of one beam of waves splitting into two coherent beams. But every time the experiment is performed with a single quantum, each quantum passing through the two slits forms a spot on the screen, and when the results of N trials are superimposed, what is obtained is also a diffraction pattern rather than the simple superposition of two beams of waves. This shows that when the particle passes through the two slits it splits in half and interferes with itself! But if one wants to examine the particle’s specific state as it passes through the two slits—for instance, by installing a detector on the slit—one will find that the particle does not split in half, but instead passes through either one slit or the other, and at the same time the diffraction pattern on the screen disappears; one can only obtain the result of the simple superposition of two beams of waves. In other words, the particle’s behavior depends on whether it is observed! The matter is not that simple, because the propagation of waves has speed, so it seems that one can decide whether or not to observe only after the wave has already been emitted—that is to say, even past events can depend on our present decision! And apparently such experiments have already been achieved! Such mysterious phenomena are common in the quantum world, and I will not list them one by one.
Why is this? In fact, when we observe nature we cannot step outside nature and view things from a completely objective standpoint; in observation it is impossible to eliminate our influence on nature. Therefore, when talking about nature, we cannot exclude human beings; a system without an observer is meaningless. Here we see that human beings and nature are equal: human beings cannot be detached from nature, and likewise nature is meaningless without human beings, or rather, the objective without a subject will enter into a chaotic, unknowable, meaningless state. So one cannot speak of subject and object in isolation; one must unite subject and object in one consideration! This makes it necessary to transcend the traditional philosophical opposition between materialism and idealism.
Berkeley’s line, “to be is to be perceived,” has been widely attacked by materialists. Yet if we consider only this sentence, it is not without reason: the key lies in how one defines the word “existence.” If what is meant is “existence in itself,” then of course it does not depend on whether it is “perceived.” But as I said earlier, when human beings “perceive,” they must inevitably exert an effect on the object, so everything that is “perceived” cannot be “in itself”; only “humanized” things are “perceived.” As for those so-called things “in themselves,” since they cannot be “perceived,” how can one determine whether they exist or not? Perhaps they may reveal to us some faint traces of their existence through more superficial things, but after all they have not been directly perceived; to say that they “exist” in this case can only rely on a metaphysical, a priori inference. In other words, the so-called “existence” that is not perceived can only be metaphysical. Therefore, if “existence” is defined as “existence” in the vulgar sense—that is, as something mundane rather than metaphysical—then “to be is to be perceived” is not unreasonable!
3. The Unity of Subject and Object in Social Development
In English, materialism, pragmatism, and materialistic hedonism are all one word; there is some rationale to that, for this is an extreme manifestation of materialism. Likewise, when idealism goes to extremes, it too will show tendencies harmful to social development, such as voluntarism. Here materialism does not seem to be superior at all: ordinary materialism or idealism will not have much effect on social development, but once either goes to an extreme, it becomes an obstacle to social development.
Perhaps for a philosopher and for people of discernment and intellectuals, there should be no idealist thoughts, because they do not accord with objective facts and also affect scientific research; but for the vast masses of ignorant common people, thoroughgoing materialism will not bring benefits either—since objective nature does not change according to human will; the necessity of social history will not change because of human effort; spirit will die together with the flesh; there is no heaven or hell, no immortality, and even the universe will perish…… All this may not affect a philosopher’s values, but for a plain and ignorant common person, these things are very likely to make him lose the meaning of life, lose the spiritual anchor of his existence, and thus pursue “enjoying life while one can.” Comrade Lei Feng was considered noble; he entrusted his finite life to the “infinite” cause of serving the people. But if you told him that nothing is infinite, that space-time of the universe will ultimately perish, what would he think? On the contrary, some idealism, metaphysics, and especially religious theology, instead help common people form outlooks on life and values conducive to social development, even if this may be on the premise of bringing an incorrect worldview.
This is actually a kind of aftereffect brought about by scientific development—the more scientific knowledge people have, the more they tend to lose sight of human essence. This is also a manifestation of the “alienation” problem uniquely faced by developed modern society. When people discover that the object of their labor and the object of their practice already exist self-sufficiently and have unchanging laws, they gradually lose creativity and subjectivity, and can only be forced to work mechanically, becoming slaves of the object. Orthodox Marxists also tried to resolve these contradictions, but they did not draw much attention; they still held to the traditional dualistic mode of thinking and refused to set aside the stance of thoroughgoing materialism. Humanism, however, took the first step in resolving these problems.
Of course, the unity of subject and object in social philosophy is not only a need of social development; more importantly, it accords with the laws of society: certainly, both the human body and spirit are made of matter, and this is objective existence, but human behavior cannot be described by the laws of nature. The smallest unit constituting society is human beings, not objective matter; therefore, when examining social laws, one cannot simply explain them by material primacy. More attention must be paid to the multiple creativity of human beings. Social existence is the material conditions of society, and social consciousness is the ideology of society. Traditional historical materialism holds that social existence determines social consciousness, thereby overemphasizing the status of matter. Although social consciousness is constrained by the material conditions of society and the “economic base,” the material conditions and economic base of society are likewise constrained by social consciousness, because existence as the material conditions of society must necessarily be “humanized,” that is, excavated or created by human beings, the product of human practical activity. Thus, with different social consciousness, social existence will also change accordingly. Therefore social consciousness and social existence mutually constrain each other, and their development is gradual in every case. If one insists on distinguishing priority and sequence, and on arguing “who determines whom,” that would be like trying to figure out whether the chicken came first or the egg came first: one gets no conclusion and no meaning.
In sum, whether one is discussing nature or society, subject and object should both be equal, and “practice” closely connects them. Historically, the earliest philosophy did not distinguish clearly between materialism and idealism (or perhaps did not emphasize them); later, the split between materialism and idealism, and then their conflict and struggle, provided tremendous impetus to philosophical development; and now, as humanity’s understanding continues to advance, these two great philosophical camps will again be unified—that is only natural.
Conclusion to “The Great Unity of Philosophy” — The Purpose and Destination of Philosophy
EPR 发表于 2005-07-31 14:49:18
Many people have this question: what exactly is philosophy for? Why study philosophy, and why do some people research philosophy? In many people’s eyes, philosophy is a dry, tedious subject that has no practical use, and this is not unrelated to the current way philosophy is taught in China: the philosophical education I received merely required rote memorization; when the time came, it was enough if you could apply the principles by formula. This formalized, dogmatic method of education turned the “science of wisdom,” which most needs intelligence and creativity, into the subject least requiring flexible thinking and rich imagination, thereby losing philosophy’s original face. Moreover, the politicization of philosophy was also a major blunder, causing students during their formative years, while growing tired of philosophy, also to develop a rebellious psychology toward their motherland’s politics.
In fact, in the historical process, philosophy is indispensable. As said earlier, metaphysics plays the role of a “catalyst” in the development of natural science; now let us go one step further: philosophy’s role in the course of human history is also a kind of “catalytic” function. In ancient times, philosophy was the all-encompassing science of wisdom; ancient thinkers’ reflections on the universe and human society directly promoted humanity’s passage from ignorance into civilization. Later, as disciplines became more specialized, philosophy’s role was gradually replaced by many other natural and social sciences, but this did not change philosophy’s essence—the science of wisdom. It simply moved to the second line, indirectly promoting human development by advancing science and the humanities. Philosophers need keen insight and rich imagination and creativity, so that their thinking and insight can always go one step beyond ordinary people, leading the development of history.
By now, philosophy seems to have a renewed momentum of stepping back into the front line, and what has restored philosophy’s youth is Marxism. Marx put it well: “Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” “Interpreting the world” has always been philosophers’ primary task, but that is not enough. If philosophy does not set its goal at changing the world, and merely remains at disputes over the origin, then it will inevitably become increasingly detached from reality and distant from the masses. Thus, Marx innovatively introduced “practice” into the traditional academic philosophical model, infused it with revolutionary spirit, and made philosophy once again ascend to the crest of the times! This is in fact the essence of Marxism.
It is worth mentioning that criticism of what exists is also the core of social philosophy, especially as practical philosophy. Here criticism does not mean wildly bombarding others’ alien or foreign things; more importantly, it means self-criticism! If you hear a hundred words of criticism, even if ninety-nine of them are unobjective and one-sided, so long as one of them hits your vital point and you accept it and improve, that is a self-transcendence; and if you hear a hundred words of praise, even if all of them are objective and fair, they will not bring you any help at all, and will only make you complacent and arrogant! As philosophy, praising existing society and defending what already exists bring no benefit; only critical philosophy is meaningful! The task of social philosophy lies in three aspects—analyzing the past, criticizing the present, and looking to the future. Praising existing society is the work of politicians or rulers; politicians of course must make everyone believe that the existing system is the best one, that is what they have to do, but using philosophy as ideology to maintain existing society is shameful. The work of the social philosopher is to criticize the present!
What I am saying does not contradict the preface: I once said criticism must keep to a degree; this was directed at heterodox theories of others. Every theory has its reasonableness, so for other people’s theories, being good at accepting and unifying is much better than being busy criticizing. But for one’s own theory, and for the society one inhabits, only criticism will promote its development and help perfect it; too much praise will only become a stumbling block. And the problem now is that many people have reversed the two!
So what use does my so-called “Great Unity of Philosophy” have? I have already mentioned that the result (the philosophy of great unity) is not important; what matters is the process (the great unity of philosophy). Perhaps the philosophy of great unity is a utopia, but the process of pursuing it will have a huge effect on humanity—just like the grand unified theory in physics, the three major problems in mathematics, the Goldbach conjecture, Fermat’s Last Theorem, the continuum hypothesis, and so on. Although these are theories that are difficult to reach, or even if reached would be of little use, in the course of people’s efforts to break through them, people have created and discovered many useful theories and methods of thought. The great unity of philosophy is the same: in the fusion of various thoughts, in the unification of various theories, in the continual refinement of thought, people’s thinking will keep innovating and reforming, and human wisdom will keep transcending itself—that is the role of the great unity of philosophy.
Of course, great unity is not a miscellaneous stew; simply piling various theories on top of one another brings no benefit. The premise of great unity is to liberate the mind and seek truth from facts; in contention, to merge, and in criticism, to accept—this is the necessary path to the great unity of philosophy. In fact, the great unity of philosophy is a gradual wave-like movement; the development of philosophy and many disciplines always advances toward the final great unity along the process of unification, differentiation, re-unification, and re-differentiation—for example, metaphysics and physics, metaphysics and dialectics, materialism and idealism, Marxism and neo-Marxism, humanism and scientism, and so on. All of these underwent differentiation from an originally unified state and became opposing camps, yet they are now, and will inevitably, move toward unity. Every process of differentiation followed by unity is a sublimation of philosophical development.
If one day there really were a completed, genuine philosophy of great unity (which should be impossible), then where would philosophy go? I have said that monopoly leads to self-enclosure, obstructing development and perfection. Indeed, a genuine philosophy of great unity would no longer need perfection; it would already have completed philosophy’s mission and would be heading toward decline. This decline is natural: things that have lost their function will inevitably be gradually forgotten, just like the ideal communist society. By then the state will disappear, classes will be abolished, including the working class that created communism, because they will have completed their mission and lost the meaning of continued existence. Some people doubt whether such a society can exist; in fact, that is not important. The ideal communist society is like the philosophy of great unity: whether it can be reached is not important; what matters is the process of pursuit and struggle!
“Great Unity” Is Not “Great Unification”
EPR 发表于 2005-12-12 13:30:50
The grand unified theory aims to unify the strong force with the weak-electromagnetic interaction (electricity and magnetism were unified long ago, and the unification of the electromagnetic force and the weak force has also been confirmed). If speaking in Einstein’s sense, it would mean unifying all four fundamental forces, including gravity; that is even more difficult. At present, strings, superstrings, M-theory, and so on are making efforts in this direction.
The grand unified theory is extremely difficult to verify; bringing gravity into it makes experimentation even harder (because the required energy is too great), so it is also a matter of a certain belief—firmly believing that “the fundamental order of the universe is harmonious and simple.” The manifestations of the four fundamental forces are so different—for example, the weak nuclear force is responsible only for weak decay over a very short range at microscopic scales, while the electromagnetic force seems completely different—but they have already been proven to be unified at their source. Likewise, our various philosophical schools and claims, philosophy and the various sciences, art, religion, and so on, also differ so greatly in manifestation, with different and even conflicting viewpoints and methods; yet I also believe that these are unified at their source and destination. My “great unity” is precisely an exploration of this path of seeking common ground while reserving differences, of different routes leading to the same destination.
Although the high-school-era article is indeed childish when read now, I have said that the bold and arrogant spirit and faith of “great unity” still continue.
Grand unified theory
grand unified theory
A gauge theory that gives a unified description of the weak interaction, electromagnetic interaction, and strong interaction. The success of the Weinberg-Salam electroweak unification theory encouraged physicists to explore new attempts to unify the strong interaction, electromagnetic interaction, and weak interaction. A variety of theoretical schemes have been proposed, among which the SU(5) model is the most representative, based on quantum chromodynamics of the strong interaction and the electroweak unified model. According to this model, when particle energy exceeds 10^15 giga-electron volts (GeV), the strong interaction, electromagnetic interaction, and weak interaction are unified, with a single unified coupling constant; quarks and leptons are on equal footing, and there are 24 gauge particles mediating the interactions. As energy decreases, symmetry spontaneously breaks in stages. In the first stage, 12 of the 24 gluons acquire mass and are called superheavy gluons, with masses 10^14 times greater than the proton. In the second stage, spontaneous symmetry breaking of the remaining 12 gluons produces three massive W± and Z particles, while the remaining nine are photons and eight color gluons. The grand unified theory can explain problems that the electroweak unified theory cannot. The existence of superheavy gluons is an important feature of grand unified theories. It can cause transformations between quarks and leptons, leading to nonconservation of baryon number and lepton number; an important consequence is that protons can decay, p→π0＋e+, with a decay lifetime of 10^31 years. Experimental measurements show that the proton lifetime is greater than 10^32 years. Grand unified theories still have many issues awaiting exploration and study. (Jinshan Encyclopedia)
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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