The Same Starry Sky—Kant’s View of Science and Religion: The Origins
Xingding posted on 2005-12-26 14:48:15
I have no choice but to suspend knowledge…
1
So as to make room for faith…
5
The limits of speculative reason…
5
On a clear night, gazing up at the starry sky…
10
Kant occupies a special position in the history of Western philosophy, bridging the past and the future. As the Japanese scholar Abe Yoshinari put it, “Kant is a reservoir: all philosophy before him flows into him, and all philosophy after him flows out from him.” This assessment is by no means excessive. In fact, “even today, more than two hundred years after the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason, we cannot regard someone who has never heard of Kant’s philosophy as studying philosophy, nor even consider him qualified to speak about philosophy.”[1] Almost everything that contemporary philosophy—and indeed contemporary natural science, social science, art, religion, and so on—concerns itself with, including of course the topic of “science and religion” to be discussed in this article, cannot avoid Kant. And Kant’s significance is by no means only the monumental greatness of a summator and a pioneer. The profundity of Kant’s philosophy has not become obsolete with the passing of these two centuries. On the contrary, with the continuous development of modern natural science, social science, and philosophy, and with the constant emergence of new problems and new predicaments in science, ecology, culture, religion, and so on in modern society, the profundity of Kant’s philosophy has in fact come to be increasingly valued. Even today Kant remains “a treasury of thought waiting to be mined by us”[2].
Yet Kant’s landmark significance also includes the transformation of Western philosophy toward professionalization and academicization. Kant himself was the first to live out his entire life as a pure philosopher, and his writings also embody the characteristics of this turning point—after Kant, “people felt that the problems suddenly became acutely more complex; the thinker’s views were no longer so plain, clear, and persuasive, but became obscure, abstract, and profoundly unfathomable…”[3] Such a drastic shift in style makes philosophical research daunting. This turn was certainly regrettable, but it was also necessary: it was the price that had to be paid as philosophical thinking penetrated to a new level. So philosophers today, too, need to pay this price—that is, they must sacrifice a considerable amount of energy and, with great patience and perseverance, seriously read Kant. Fortunately, what we gain from this exertion is also sufficiently immense.
At my present level of ability, I am far from being able to grasp Kant’s philosophy comprehensively. Therefore, my understanding of Kant depends mainly on secondary literature. Among these, Professor Pang Sifen’s Philosophy’s Tree, an introduction to philosophy, has had the greatest influence on me; this book first acquainted me with Kant’s philosophy and filled me with admiration for its richness and profundity. Subsequently, related books by Garrett Thomson, Yang Zutao, Deng Xiaomang, and others gave me further help. Still, reading the original texts remains the most fundamental thing. Before writing this article, I devoted most of my energy to Kant on God and Religion, edited and translated by Li Qiuling. This volume includes Kant’s “On the Failure of All Philosophical Attempts in Theodicy,” “Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason,” and other monographs on religion, and it also excerpts relevant chapters from the three Critiques. In addition, I also consulted the relevant sections in Deng Xiaomang’s complete translations of the three Critiques. Since Li Qiuling’s abridged translation does not indicate the original page numbers, for the convenience of reference, all quotations below from the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason are taken from Deng Xiaomang’s translation. In any case, I would like to express here my heartfelt respect to Professor Deng Xiaomang, Professor Li Qiuling, and other scholars who devote themselves to such dry and arduous translation work!
Because of my limited ability, I still cannot have a sufficiently mature understanding of the original text. Kant’s arguments are always extremely rigorous, whereas my discussion below will inevitably be less than rigorous. Therefore, the following will mainly unfold around the significance of the conclusions of Kant’s philosophy, rather than focusing on sorting out its arguments,
[1] Yang Zutao and Deng Xiaomang: A Guide to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Hunan Education Press, December 1996, p. 2
[2] Deng Xiaomang: Lectures on Kant’s Philosophy, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005, p. 226
[3] Yang Zutao and Deng Xiaomang: A Guide to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Hunan Education Press, December 1996, p. 1
Finally got “The Same Starry Sky” done
Xingding posted on 2005-12-27 15:09:49
So tired~~ Started writing yesterday morning and kept writing until 8 o’clock this morning, slept for two hours, then kept at it until now… not to mention the pain of grinding through the three Critiques before that~~ tired, tired, tired. The full text is nearly 15,000 characters.
But considering that even if I posted it, nobody would comment, sigh, I still won’t post it! From today on, daily blog updates will be coming to an end.
Latest Comments
chong
2005-12-27 17:10:25 [reply]
There are people commenting. I’ve only just read the opening and haven’t gotten my fill yet—post it quickly.
Qihuang
2005-12-28 13:34:03 [reply]
Yes, once I have some free time I’ll definitely read it. I’ll surely treat this article the way I treated your “Ecological Philosophy.”
Sigh… no need to treat it that way, though. I wasn’t originally writing the article all that seriously… If you annotate the article like that, by the time you finish, my own understanding of it will already have changed. It’s better to just skim the article casually and jot down a few remarks at will.
I
2005-12-28 14:27:44 [reply]
Ecological philosophy is a framework, a starting point for my future study; but writing about Kant is a sort of foundation, because I have come to realize that doing philosophy inevitably involves Kant. However, I will not be delving deeply into Kant’s philosophy, so this article is already more or less close to the end. Next, I will find time to read through the three Critiques at least once, but I don’t want to touch Kant again for my undergraduate thesis; I’ll look at him again in graduate school.
The Same Starry Sky—Kant’s View of Science and Religion: (Part I) I Have No Choice but to Suspend Knowledge
Xingding posted on 2005-12-27 20:22:56
I Have No Choice but to Suspend Knowledge
Kant’s thought was deeply influenced by the modern Western scientific current represented by classical mechanics completed by Newton. Kant himself also delved deeply into the natural sciences, and the subtitle of his early work An Outline of the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens was “An Essay on the Constitution and Mechanical Origin of the Entire Universe According to Newtonian Principles.” “His interest was to continue developing this doctrine on the basis of Newton.”[1] But Kant perceived the split between science and philosophy—on the one hand, science shut out discussion of all manner of questions concerning morality, human nature, and religion; on the other hand, traditional rationalist or empiricist philosophy could not only fail to provide a guarantee for the foundation of scientific truth, but skeptics represented by Hume were also prepared to challenge the rationality of scientific knowledge.
Kant originally wrote the Critique of Pure Reason in order to respond to Hume’s challenge. The first proposition addressed by the three Critiques is “What can I know?”—that is, “How is true knowledge possible?” Kant solved this problem through a “Copernican revolution” in epistemology. “He reversed the relation between subject and object: it is not that the subject conforms to the object, but that the subject constructs the object and the object conforms to the subject. In this way, a new foundation was found for scientific knowledge.”[2]
Kant’s reversal of the positions of subject and object in the activity of cognition does not mean that he abolished the objectivity of knowledge and made knowledge depend on subjective sensations and opinions. On the contrary, Kant’s aim was precisely to secure the objectivity of knowledge! Kant said, “I have no choice but to suspend knowledge”—this was not merely in order to make room for faith; suspending knowledge was also a way of safeguarding knowledge. Kant clearly indicated the limits of knowledge: what we can know forever is only the world of appearances, and we can never obtain any knowledge of things-in-themselves. If we do not first make such a determination of the boundaries of knowledge, then, on the contrary, we will plunge the very foundation of knowledge into fog, because a system of knowledge built on such a foundation cannot withstand the criticism of skeptics like Hume. Since the object can never be established by knowledge, how can the objectivity of scientific knowledge be guaranteed? The thoroughgoing skeptic cannot be refuted. Kant avoided entanglement with skepticism on the direct front and instead proceeded from the subject to establish the basis of objective knowledge.
Of course, we can say: the natural sciences can develop independently without any metaphysical foundation at all. This is not wrong. However, “science” without roots always runs the risk of mutating into “technology.” Science cannot be equated with technology after all; the spirit of science is originally the spirit of the pursuit of truth. In this sense, a solid metaphysical foundation is necessary for scientific inquiry. “An intellectual natural science is entitled to be called natural science only when the natural laws that serve as its foundation are understood as a priori, and not merely as empirical laws.”[3] Moreover, understanding the nature of science helps us to correct our methods of scientific research and gives us inspiration and guidance.
Kant devoted enormous effort to establishing a solid “metaphysical foundation of natural science.” Yet many people will have doubts here—Kant’s epistemology of natural science was entirely built upon the Newtonian system of his time, and over these two hundred years natural science has already undergone earth-shaking changes; Newton’s system has been replaced by relativity and quantum mechanics, so surely the arguments Kant made back then to defend the Newtonian system should also be outdated, right? For example, Deng Xiaomang believes that “from a modern perspective, Kant’s explanations of the Newtonian system based on his own metaphysics have very little that is new. On the one hand, this is because some of his views have already been confirmed by modern physics (such as the relativity of space, the relation between mass and motion, and so on), and have received more scientific explanations; on the other hand, it is also because Kant’s views, on the whole, still bear the metaphysical atmosphere peculiar to that era.”[4] Here I cannot fully agree with Professor Deng’s assessment, because I believe that the focus of Kant’s philosophy is not those specific “scientific cognitions,” but rather the mode and limits of “scientific cognition” itself. In this respect, modern people may not be any more insightful than Kant!
The eccentric genius of modern physics, Richard Feynman, once reminded those who wanted to understand “the nature of physical laws” to pay attention to the following: “The newer things may not necessarily be more modern. Modern science was built up exactly in the same tradition in which the law of gravitation was discovered.”[5] Feynman chose Newton’s law of gravitation as the “case study” for discussing “the nature of physical laws,” rather than the newer and more “fashionable” laws of electromagnetism, relativity, or quantum mechanics. This is because although scientific theory from Newton to Maxwell, Einstein, Heisenberg, and Hawking underwent many earth-shaking “revolutions,” what Feynman wanted to describe was the “nature” of physical laws. What this requires is precisely grasping the unchanging things behind the revolutions in scientific cognition. And those fundamental things have undergone no qualitative change since Newton established the mature system of modern physics. Feynman earnestly warned us that if we want to understand the nature of science, we must absolutely not “chase after fashion” or aim too high and yet fail to see what is right before us!
The same warning, in Feynman’s famous Lectures on Physics, is expressed through mockery of the “philosopher of relativity”:
When this idea was first disclosed to the world, it caused a great stir among philosophers, especially those “cocktail-party philosophers,” who said: “Oh, that’s simple—Einstein’s theory shows that everything is relative!” … The fact that “things depend on people’s frames of reference” was then imagined to have exerted a profound influence on modern thought. People may well find this puzzling, because, after all, the idea that things depend on one’s point of view is so simple that there would surely have been no need to trouble physical relativity to discover it; anyone strolling down the street must certainly understand that everything he sees depends on its frame of reference, because when a passerby walks toward him, what he first sees is the man’s front and only afterward his back. In most philosophies supposedly derived from relativity, there is nothing deeper than the statement that “what one sees from the front differs from what one sees from behind.” The old story of several blind men describing an elephant in several different ways may perhaps be another example of philosophers’ views on relativity.[6]
Here Feynman is speaking with irony toward those philosophers who understand relativity in an excessively superficial way. There is no need for us to quibble with Feynman over details; his sarcasm hits the mark. If the goal were merely to break dogmatism, there would be no need to wait for Einstein at all! In fact, this task had already been accomplished more brilliantly in Kant.
Let us now see what Kant’s analysis of space and time is really trying to tell us—“All motion, as an object of experience, is merely relative; the space in which motion is perceived is relative space……”[7] Kant held that space is the a priori form of outer intuition, while time is the a priori form of inner intuition. In short, space-time is a “form of intuition.” The unity of space-time depends on causal interaction among objects to be realized; “empty space is not at all something belonging to the existence of things, but only to the determination of concepts; in this sense, empty space does not exist.”[8] Thus space-time always exists only in relation to the objects within it.
And yet Kant did not abandon the concept of “absolute space-time” — “Matter is movable body in space. That space itself which is in motion is called material space, or also relative space; the space in which all motion must ultimately be thought, and which is therefore itself absolutely at rest, is called pure space, or also absolute space.”[9]
At this point, many people begin to suspect that Kant’s revolution in the view of space and time was not carried through thoroughly enough. For example, Mr. Yang Zhutao and Mr. Deng Xiaomang point out in Kant’s Guide to the Critique of Pure Reason that the first of “the fundamental limitations and errors of Kant’s doctrine of space and time” is this:
First, Kant regarded space and time entirely as a priori forms of intuition inherent in people’s subjective minds. Starting from this transcendentalist position, all his arguments for the “objectivity” of mathematics and sensory knowledge are completely subjective; he restricts the validity of these forms of knowledge to subjective “phenomena” and denies any possibility that they can grasp objective essences (things-in-themselves) beyond the phenomenal world, so as ultimately to leave a place open for fideism. In this respect, this theory has also produced harmful and negative effects on the healthy development of science. Einstein’s theory of relativity holds that any measurement of space-time is related to the observer’s own frame of reference or measuring scale, but this does not mean that there is only one frame of reference for all space-time, nor does it mean that all frames of reference conform to the same space-time framework, and still less does it mean that space-time is merely a subjective a priori form in the observer’s mind. On the contrary, the relativity of space-time is precisely an objective relativity: that is, in relation to different frames of reference of different observers, space-time will undergo relative change. For example, two observers moving at high speed relative to each other each believe that the other’s space-time standard has undergone “FitzGerald contraction,” yet neither side can conclude from anything that the other’s observation is in error, because objectively both are right. In other words, space-time is objectively relative. From this it can be seen that uncontrolled measurement cannot do without the motion of the subject, the subject’s measuring standards, and the participation of experimental means; this does not negate the objectivity of space-time, but only breaks its absoluteness. From here we can reveal the second fundamental error in Kant’s view of space-time, because Kant’s subjective view of space-time logically contains the view that space-time is absolute.[10]
Here Yang Zhutao and Deng Xiaomang discuss Einstein’s theory of relativity, using the theory that standards of space-time undergo “FitzGerald contraction” to argue that “space-time is objectively relative” rather than “subjectively relative.” On this point, the two gentlemen did not make the crude mistake mocked by Feynman’s so-called “relativity philosophers.” However, whether such a conclusion can really be drawn from relativity remains questionable. At least, according to the superficial modern physics knowledge I have, it cannot refute the “view that space-time is absolute.” Feynman gives a simple example—rotational motion. In fact, Kant had already noticed this problem long ago. When discussing the relativity of motion, Kant said: “But here I am positing all motion as rectilinear motion. For when it comes to curvilinear motion, since it is not equal in all respects, whether or not we are entitled to regard the body as moving (for example, the earth’s daily rotation), and the surrounding space (the starry heavens) as at rest, it must be treated specially in its effect.”[11] Curvilinear motion is said to be “not equal in all respects” because rotation involves the question of centrifugal force. A body rotating even in a vacuum—for example, the earth—can recognize the effect of rotational motion, such as the Coriolis force, from within itself alone, without observing its background. But if we are to say that “all motion is objectively relative,” then what is the reference object for rotational motion? If it is the entire stellar background, then if we suddenly “remove” all the galaxies—this is of course impossible in practice, but theoretically removing a distant galaxy would seem to have no effect on the earth’s rotation—would the earth’s rotation suddenly “stop” as well? In fact, Berkeley and Mach both asserted that inertia is caused by the “fixed stars at a distance.” And Einstein, when developing the theory of relativity, was deeply influenced by Mach; it was Einstein who introduced the term “Mach’s principle.” But Einstein’s efforts to incorporate Mach’s principle into his theory of relativity did not succeed (only one special relativistic cosmological model can accommodate Mach’s principle at the same time), and the question remains unresolved to this day.[12]
However, the discussion just now has long since strayed from the theme, because Kant’s doctrine of space-time is not intended to discuss how space-time is objectively. Kant clearly states that “absolute space-time” cannot be known in experience; on this point he is, on the contrary, even more resolute than relativity. — “Absolute space is nothing for all possible experience.”[13] Since it is “nothing,” why must Kant insist on preserving such a “nothing” in “imagination”? I think that, on the one hand, similar to the notion of “things-in-themselves,” Kant’s emphasis on the existence of something that can never be experienced yet is “absolute” prevents his philosophy, after rejecting dogmatism, from sliding into relativism. The basic aim of Kant’s philosophy is “to rescue scientific knowledge from skepticism”[14], and the dangerous idea that “everything is relative” would make it hard to guarantee the objectivity of knowledge. On the other hand, “absolute space-time,” as an a priori form of intuition, does indeed exist in human “imagination”! For example, when we say “gravity bends space,” the “bending” here is likewise only a “form” after all; the curvature of space is merely a convenience for calculation, and compared with treating the effect of curved space-time as photons being deflected by gravity, it seems more intuitive to regard space as curved. Moreover, before we can imagine curved space-time, we inevitably need to have the intuition of flat space-time first: we will draw some curves on paper to explain the state of curved space-time, yet the reason those curves can help us imagine a “curved” space-time is precisely that they are first drawn on the “flat” paper serving as background! It is the same in our thinking: our a priori intuition of space-time is always the “flat” Euclidean space-time! Likewise, we cannot avoid the fact that what we first possess is the intuition of static space. So, which form of space-time is the most fundamental? Kant thought that absolute space-time could not possibly be experienced and is wholly impossible for us to determine; what we can determine is only our “a priori intuition.” Therefore, any scientific system capable of withstanding the attacks of skeptics must first be built upon those categories of a priori intuition whose objectivity can be guaranteed.
What I have done above is merely, by using Kant’s analysis of absolute space-time, to try to clarify certain possible misunderstandings of Kant’s scientific epistemology. In this section I may perhaps have spent too many words, because we have not yet entered the real topic of “science and religion,” and more often than not I have merely tried to clarify what Kant’s contribution is not. Still, I believe such clarification is necessary. What the foregoing discussion seeks to emphasize is this: the profound significance of Kant’s scientific epistemology does not lie in how much he contributed to the innovation of positive scientific theories (his nebular hypothesis is another matter), but rather in Kant’s elucidation of the nature of cognition and his delimitation of the boundaries of knowledge. Kant’s greatness lies in the fact that he not only safeguarded the development of science, but did so while also leaving room for faith, thereby safeguarding the objectivity of knowledge. “One decisive significance of Kant’s philosophy is that it insists on the existence of domains human beings are necessarily unable to know, which keeps philosophers humble.”[15] And this “humility” does not obstruct the development of science, nor does it conflict with science; on the contrary, acknowledging one’s ignorance is absolutely necessary for scientific exploration. Feynman said: “Any scientific concept is at some point on the scale between absolute falsehood and absolute truth; it is not at either end. I believe that accepting the idea of uncertainty is very necessary, not only for science, but for other things as well; I believe that admitting one’s ignorance has great significance.”[16]
Since Kant’s “leaving a place open for fideism” has not in the slightest hindered the development of science, we have no reason to criticize it. However, “making room for faith” is not only unobjectionable; it is also a more important and deeper significance of Kant’s philosophy. The discussion below will explore this issue.
[1]Yang Zhutao and Deng Xiaomang, Kant’s Guide to the Critique of Pure Reason, Hunan Education Press, December 1996, p. 13
[2]Deng Xiaomang, Lectures on Kant’s Philosophy, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005, p. 15
[3]Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. Deng Xiaomang, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2003, p. 9
[4]Deng Xiaomang, Lectures on Kant’s Philosophy, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005, p. 5
[5] [US] R. P. Feynman, The Character of Physical Law, trans. Guan Hong, Hunan Science and Technology Press, 2005, p. 2
[6]
[US] Feynman, Leighton, and Sands, Feynman Lectures on Physics (Vol. 1), trans. Zheng Yongling, Hua Hongming, Wu Ziyi, et al., Shanghai Scientific and Technical Publishers, 2005, p. 168
[7]Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. Deng Xiaomang, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2003, pp. 26–27
[8]Ibid., p. 190
[9]Ibid., p. 25
[10]Yang Zhutao and Deng Xiaomang, Kant’s Guide to the Critique of Pure Reason, Hunan Education Press, 1996, pp. 98–99
[11]Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. Deng Xiaomang, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2003, p. 41
[12]For Mach’s principle and relativity, see John Gribbin, The Big Bang: Quantum Physics and Cosmology, trans. Lu Jufu, Shanghai Scientific and Educational Press, 2000, “Interlude One: The Philosopher’s Universe”
[13]Kant: “The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,” trans. Deng Xiaomang, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2003, p. 40
[14] [U.S.] Garrett Thomson: “Kant,” trans. Zhao Chengwen, Teng Xiaobing, Meng Lingpeng, Zhonghua Book Company, 2002, p. 1
[15] [U.S.] Pang Sifen: “The Tree of Philosophy,” trans. Zhai Pengxiao, ed. Wang Lingyun, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005, p. 72
[16] Feynman: The relation between science and religion, see [R. P. Feynman: “The Pleasure of Finding Things Out,” trans. Zhang Yuhe, Hunan Science and Technology Press, 2005, p. 257
One and the Same Starry Sky—Kant’s View of Science and Religion: (Part Two) Making Room for Faith
Xingding posted on 2005-12-27 20:26:08
We usually say that Kant launched a “Copernican revolution” in philosophy; then in the field of epistemology and religion, one can equally say that he carried out a “Copernican revolution” as well. He inverted the supremacy of Christian faith into the supremacy of Enlightenment reason.[1]
Below, I will first give a rough outline of Kant’s views on religion, and then return to examine Kant’s reconciliation of science and religion.
The Limits of Speculative Reason
As mentioned above, Kant left a place for faith on the premise that the development of scientific knowledge was sufficiently secured. However, just as in the revolution he carried out in the epistemology of natural science, in order to defend the meaning of religion, Kant’s first step was likewise to set limits for religious epistemology.
First, through a simple inference from Kant’s theory of the thing in itself, we know that “in Kant’s view, the idea of God is an idea of reason; like other ideas of reason, it cannot be exhibited in experience; God is not an object of possible experience” [2]; therefore it is impossible to prove God’s existence from experience or from speculative reason.
Of course, Kant did not simply reduce God to an unknowable thing in itself and consider that the end of his critique of traditional theology. Kant carefully analyzed the arguments of traditional theology, and pointed out that “there are only three ways in which the existence of God can be proved by speculative reason” — the proof of natural theology, the cosmological proof, and the ontological proof. “There are no other proofs, and no other proofs are possible.”[A591
B619] [3]
Kant refuted the ontological proof with the claim that “existence is not a predicate or attribute”[seeA626]; and the cosmological proof likewise cannot stand, because it “must ultimately be based on some ontological proof.” Kant pointed out that the proof of natural theology also ultimately depends on the cosmological and ontological proofs, but in his discussion of natural theology he devoted relatively more thought, because natural theology was a rather fashionable theory in that era and, apparently, seemed able to preserve some kind of intimate relationship between science and religion. Yet Kant clearly realized the fundamental problem with natural theology: it led both science and religion into the wrong path. Therefore, what I will focus on below is Kant’s critique of traditional natural theology.
In his essay “The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God” (1763), Kant listed three problems with “ordinary natural theology”:
1. It regards all the perfection, harmony, and beauty of nature as accidental, as brought about by an arrangement of intelligence. But many of them arise with necessary identity from nature’s most fundamental rules.[4]
2. This method is not sufficiently philosophical, and it often obstructs the dissemination of philosophical knowledge.[5]
3. …God is in the strict sense regarded as an artisan rather than as the creator of the world. Although he arranges and shapes matter, he does not produce or create matter.[6]
The first problem means that natural theology has failed to notice the most fundamental rules and order in nature, whereas Kant believes that it is precisely the possibility of these inviolable rules and order that manifests God’s creation — “Precisely because nature can only act in a lawlike and orderly way even in chaos, there is a God.”[7]
The second problem further points out the harm of ignoring natural laws, namely, that it suppresses people’s interest in exploring natural regularities, that is, it denies religion’s enthusiasm for and support of the development of science — “A diminished reason is very willing to give up further investigation, because it regards such investigation as meddling; and prejudice becomes all the more dangerous because, under the pretext of piety and reasonable obedience to the great creator, in whom all wisdom must necessarily unite in its cognition, it grants the lazy man priority over the tireless investigator.”
[8]
The third problem is the key one. If the first two problems merely pointed out, from different angles, the deficiencies and dangers of natural theology, then the third problem directly and incisively reveals that the theistic proof of natural theology is impossible to establish. Kant gives the same judgment in The Critique of Pure Reason as well — “This proof could at most demonstrate a world architect, who is greatly constrained by the suitability of the material he is forever working on, but not a world creator, to whose idea everything is subject”[A627
B655] In Kant’s view, the greatest defect of ordinary natural theology is that “however much skillful craftsmanship the world may display, it can absolutely never prove that moral wisdom which can only be attributed to God.”[9]
Traditional natural theology cannot prove God’s omniscience and omnipotence; more importantly, even an improved natural theology — that is, one that infers God from an order of necessity rather than from accidental arrangement — cannot escape its intrinsic limitation, namely, that it cannot derive God’s morality! “We may indeed infer from the order, purposiveness, and greatness of this world a creator who is wise, benevolent, and powerful, and so on, but not his omniscience, omnibenevolence, omnipotence, and so on.[10]”
For Kant, the highest good is the most important thing. Any proof of God’s existence must first demonstrate the highest good; therefore, Kant believes that the only possible proof of God’s existence can only start from morality, that is, from practical reason. In fact, Kant’s exclusion of any possibility of proving God in speculative reason did not depart from traditional Christian doctrine either. Professor Pang Sifen pointed out: “The Bible warns people not to try to conquer heaven with human knowledge, and Kant has convincingly proved that God’s existence cannot be theoretically demonstrated, which is like a profound philosophical confirmation of the Bible’s warning.[11]”
Kant denied that faith could be established on any speculative or empirical basis. However, he did not let faith slide into irrational arbitrariness; rather, Kant “made faith distinguish itself on the one hand from knowledge, and on the other hand from that kind of uncritically assenting to some unproven claims and wishes.”[12]
In The Critique of Judgment, Kant defines faith as “the moral way of thinking by which reason takes as true what is difficult to attain for theoretical knowledge.”[13] “Therefore it is an inwardly abiding principle, by which one takes as true, for the sake of the duty toward this end, what must be presupposed as the condition of the possibility of the highest moral final end.”[14]”
In Kant’s view, morality does not depend on religion, whereas religion depends on morality. In the preface to the first edition of Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Kant says that morality “absolutely needs no religion. On the contrary, by means of pure practical reason, morality is self-sufficient.”[15]
Kant emphasized that faith can only be established upon morality in order to prevent religion from going astray — “It prevents theology from rising into theosophy (from losing itself in transcendent concepts that confound reason), or degenerating into demonology (an anthropomorphic mode of representation of the highest being); it prevents religion from falling into spiritism (a fanatical delusion, as if one could feel other supersensible beings and exert influence on them) or into idolatry (a superstitious delusion, as if one could please the highest being by other means than moral intention).[16]”
“To put it simply, in Kant’s view, faith in God and religious custom must be rooted in respect for morality, and any behavior that goes beyond this range will be a kind of superstition or a denial of inner freedom. In Kant’s view, to believe in God is to act morally; in itself, this is an affirmation of sanctity.”[17] Kant asks: “In what manner does God wish to be honored?” Is it that we are to become good? Or that we are to worship him? If a person spends the daytime out in the world doing all manner of evil, and then returns home at night to burn incense and worship Buddha or God in order to atone for himself, hoping thereby to please the deity, dissolve his sins, and gain peace of mind, only to go out the next day and continue committing all kinds of evil — such conduct is obviously a vile deception both of oneself and of God. Clearly, compared with such a cunning “believer,” a person who may not believe in God but honestly obeys the moral law within his own heart is more likely to win the approval of the highest good God! Of course, it would be even more perfect if he also believed in God at the same time.
Kant’s placing of morality “before” religion, that is, taking morality as the foundation of religion, does not mean placing morality “above” religion, as if the significance of religion were only to serve ethics and thus Jesus had significance only as a moral teacher; rather, it means “raising morality (which in itself is only a hopeless ideal) to the level of a higher (and also more real) religion![18]” Kant was not abolishing religion’s sanctity, but rather bestowing religion’s sanctity upon morality.
The dilemma posed by Dostoevsky — “If there is no God, then everything is permitted” — is dissolved under Kant’s moral doctrine. Kant points out that even if someone, for various reasons, may believe the proposition “there is no God,” “if, because of this, he is determined to regard the law of duty as merely invented, invalid, and non-binding, and decides to transgress it without fear, then he will be worthless in his own eyes. Such a person, even if later he can be convinced of what he initially doubted, will still remain worthless by virtue of that way of thinking; even if, as far as the outcome is concerned, he scrupulously fulfills his duty as always required. But he does so out of fear, or out of the intention of seeking a reward. Conversely, if as a person of faith he honestly and disinterestedly follows duty according to his conscience, yet nevertheless often assumes, for the sake of testing, that he may one day become convinced that there is no God, and immediately believes himself freed from all moral responsibility, then the inner moral intention in his heart must be nothing but bad.[19]” Although Kant’s age had not yet fallen into the crisis of faith that says “God is dead,” Kant had already clearly and soberly realized that the idea of God could not win the conviction of all rational people. By reversing the order between morality and faith, Kant prevented the ethical collapse that might follow a loss of faith, and the significance of this is quite far-reaching indeed!
It is worth mentioning that Kant’s doctrine of placing morality before faith also does not run counter to Christian teaching. Kant found in the Bible the figure of Job to support his view. In his article “The Failure of All Philosophical Attempts in Theodicy” (1971), he wrote of Job that “even in the midst of the strongest doubt he was still able to say (Job 37:5, 6): ‘Behold, I die not as a transgressor; I hold fast my righteousness and will not let it go…’ For by such an intention he proves that he does not ground his morality on faith, but faith on morality: in this case, however weak faith may be, it possesses a pure and genuine character, namely, the character of establishing a religion, not a religion of winning favor, but a religion of a good way of life.[20]”
As has already been said above, Kant had no intention of making morality replace religion or stand above it. “Kant does not intend to abolish religion, but rather to reconstruct it from the standpoint of moral faith. If one wants to satisfy one’s moral sense and also to ensure that cultural achievements possess enduring value, then this religious concern is something one must hope for and believe in.[21]”
In Kant’s view, a morally decent person who is also sufficiently rational will necessarily move toward religion. For only by believing in God and immortality as “the two postulates of practical reason”[22] can the highest good as an end become possible, and only then can people possibly claim to be “free.” “If we do not regard the world and ourselves in this way, then in moral matters we shall fall into contradiction and irrationality.[23]”
Our duty is to promote the highest good, and therefore not only do we have the right, but we also have, in connection with the duty that is bound up with this requirement, the necessity of presupposing the possibility of this highest good as a premise; since the highest good can occur only under the condition that God exists, this joins its presupposition inseparably to duty, namely the moral necessity of assuming the existence of God.[24]
Moral doctrine can tell people only “What ought I to do?”; the third basic question faced by Kant’s philosophy—when I have done what I ought to do, “What may I hope?”—requires religion to answer. Kant believed that we may hope for happiness; however, only when the moral desire to promote the highest good is awakened, “and after this desire has taken a step toward religion, can this ethical doctrine also be called a doctrine of happiness, because hope for happiness begins only from religion.”[25]
Kant points out that an honest person who does not believe in God and the afterlife may indeed, guided inwardly by the sacred moral law, “promote the good selflessly,” but his efforts are limited, because he cannot turn the moral command within his nature into rational ethical maxims. Moreover, this real worldly existence is merciless: “brutality and envy will always rage around him”; “and those honest people he meets beyond himself, however worthy they may be of happiness, will still, because of a nature that does not care about this, suffer like all other animals on earth poverty, illness, and untimely death, and this will continue until a vast grave swallows them all up (where here being upright or not being upright makes no difference).” Thus, if this good person wants both to persist in doing good and not deny his own reason—that is, not simply to submit blindly to the summons of the inner law and thereby deny that he possesses “freedom”—then, in practical terms, he must “assume the existence of a moral world-creator, that is to say, assume the existence of God: he is perfectly free to make such an assumption, since this assumption is at least not self-contradictory in itself.[26]”
Of course, Kant always clearly recognized that any argument for the existence of God is ultimately based only on a kind of persuasion—namely, it is not self-contradictory and it will bring benefits, so you may as well believe it! And such persuasion can never be absolutely compelling. So at the end of his essay “The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God” (1763), Kant still did not forget to remind us once again: “It is absolutely necessary that men should be convinced of the existence of God, but it is by no means equally necessary that they should be able to demonstrate it.[27]”
Kant made a clear distinction between his moral theology and traditional revelational theology, holding that it should not be Scripture that interprets morality, but morality that interprets Scripture. Thus many people would think that Kant was trying to overthrow, at the root, the traditional religious church and doctrine. Yet Kant never believed that one could establish any respectable religion merely through moral reason, without relying on historicity and revelation. A moral religion must have, in addition to the core of practical reason, an indispensable shell of historical and revelatory irrationality. On this point, Professor Pang Sifen has put it very clearly, and here I will lazily quote his relevant discussion:
Many interpreters believe that Kant’s intention is to deny the real value of most (if not all) traditional doctrines. However, this interpretation is based on a careless reading of Kant’s writings, because in any case Kant’s real argumentative strategy is to demonstrate this point: if these doctrines serve the practical goal of “helping believers to adhere more consistently to the moral law,” then they can have a legitimate rational meaning. On every occasion he reminds people to be wary of any interpretation that easily produces morally lazy individuals. What many interpreters overlook is that Kant also warns of another danger: merely because some doctrines cannot be theoretically proven, one should dogmatically assert that they cannot be true. He reminds people that even a doctrine such as “born of a virgin” cannot be absolutely denied, because the possibility of miracles is a topic that lies beyond the boundaries of human reason.
The real intention of Kant’s argument is to show us that if one wants to believe those doctrines (for example, that Jesus is God incarnate), one must interpret them in such a way that they support, rather than hinder, the truly religious core of personal faith. Kant himself of course did not suggest that we should, as philosophers, adopt such doctrines, nor did he claim that we must believe them in order to be accepted by God. But he did show that we can believe them without sacrificing our reason, and that doing so can sometimes greatly strengthen our religious faith.[28]
Kant believed that although a church founded on revelatory faith cannot ensure its persuasive force, the meaning of the church lies in the fact that, on the one hand, with the help of the Bible, faith can be more widely spread, “guaranteed to reach the most distant descendants”; on the other hand, “because of the natural need of all human beings, namely, that with respect to the highest concepts and grounds of reason there is always a demand for something that can be grasped sensibly,” “one must therefore also make use of some historical church faith,” and Christianity is precisely the example of this in ecclesiastical reality.[29]
But in order to unify the basis of moral, and therefore rational and universal, faith with “such an empirical faith that seems to have been intentionally placed in our hands by a kind of contingency,” “one requires an interpretation of the revelation we have already received,” that is, “interpreting Scripture morally.” “Such an interpretation may often seem forced to us, even with regard to the text itself (the revelatory text), and in fact often is so; however, as long as the text can possibly admit such an interpretation, this interpretation must necessarily be preferred to a literal interpretation.”[30]
Kant’s restriction on ecclesiastical authority was likewise meant to protect the dignity of the church, so as to prevent it from abusing power and thereby destroying itself. These ideas are all the more precious today, when calls for religious pluralism are growing ever stronger. For example, Kant points out: “There is only one (true) religion; but there may be many different kinds of faith.—It can also be added that among the various churches separated from one another by differences in their forms of faith, only one and the same true religion can be found.[31]” This provides a philosophical basis for dialogue and mutual blending among religions.
Kant’s understanding of the meaning of religious activity and his views on methods of religious education are well expressed in a letter he wrote to Volckmann, in which he asked for a good educational environment for a friend’s child:
On religious matters, the spirit of the Philanthropin school is entirely in accord with the father of this child’s way of thinking. He hopes that, as the child grows in age and intelligence, he will gradually attain a natural knowledge of God. This knowledge cannot be concentrated on prayer. The child must be led through study to understand that these activities possess only methodological value. After that, this natural knowledge of God should be used only to arouse in him a serious spirit, so that he may of his own initiative revere God and follow his duty, that is, the commands of God. To think that religion is nothing more than a way of begging for divine favor and flattering the highest being; to think that people differ from one another only because of different views concerning the way of pleasing this highest being, is all an illusion.……[32]
Kant did not deny that “prayer” has value, but this value is only “methodological.” Kant believed that religious education is crucial, and here the traditional church can provide good conditions and an appropriate atmosphere. But religious education should not be content with teaching people various rites, nor should it first of all teach people to distinguish among human beings merely by the different rites through which they seek to please God. Kant believed that studying church history, revelation, ritual, and so forth has irreplaceable value for promoting people’s religious experience, deepening their intimacy with God, and facilitating the transmission of faith. Yet more important still, a good way of life is the ultimate purpose toward which all these doctrines and ordinances, with their patient guidance, lead people. The meaning of the church lies in guiding people toward the highest good—of course, beyond the task of teaching people to do good as a moral instructor would, it can further bring people “hope,” guiding them to deserve happiness in the pursuit of the highest good. Seen in this light, Kant did not diminish the value of the church at all; on the contrary, he elevated it.
[1]Deng Xiaomang: *Lectures on Kant’s Philosophy*, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005, p. 155
[2] [U.S.] Garrett Thompson: *Kant*, trans. Zhao Chengwen, Teng Xiaobing, and Meng Lingpeng, Zhonghua Book Company, 2002, p. 100
[3]The author uses the 2004 edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Deng Xiaomang and revised by Yang Zutao, People’s Publishing House. In what follows, whenever the original text of *Critique of Pure Reason* is quoted, it is directly indicated in the main text in the form “[A591 B619]” (meaning A-edition p. 591, B-edition p. 619), together with the citation of the original edition.
[4]*Kant on God and Religion*, ed. and trans. Li Qiuling, China Renmin University Press, 2004, p. 73
[5]Ibid., p. 74
[6]Ibid., p. 77
[7]Kant: *An Introduction to the General History of Nature and Theory of the Heavens*, trans. Quan Zengjia, proofread by Wang Fushan, Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2001, p. 8 (preface)
[8]*Kant on God and Religion*, ed. and trans. Li Qiuling, China Renmin University Press, 2004, p. 74
[9] [U.K.] John H. Brooke: *Science and Religion*, trans. Su Xiangui, Fudan University Press, 2000, p. 214
[10]Kant: *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Deng Xiaomang, p. 160 — referring to p. 160 of the original edition; the same applies below
[11] [U.S.] Pang Sifen: *The Tree of Philosophy*, trans. Zhai Pengxiao, proofread by Wang Lingyun, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005, p. 308
[12] [U.K.] John H. Brooke: *Science and Religion*, trans. Su Xiangui, Fudan University Press, 2000, p. 217
[13]Kant: Critique of Judgment, p. 346 — Li Qiuling’s translation renders it as “what faith… cannot reach”; here I am provisionally following Deng’s translation
[14]Same as above
[15]Kant on God and Religion, compiled and translated by Li Qiuling, Renmin University of China Press, 2004, p. 287
[16]Kant: Critique of Judgment, §89, see Kant on God and Religion, compiled and translated by Li Qiuling, Renmin University of China Press, 2004, p. 239
[17][U.S.] Garrett Thomson: Kant, translated by Zhao Chengwen, Teng Xiaobing, and Meng Lingpeng, Zhonghua Book Company, 2002, p. 100
[18][U.S.] Pang Sifen: The Tree of Philosophy, translated by Zhai Pengxiao, proofread by Wang Lingyun, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005, p. 308
[19]Kant: Critique of Judgment, §87, see Kant on God and Religion, compiled and translated by Li Qiuling, p. 234
[20]Kant on God and Religion, compiled and translated by Li Qiuling, Renmin University of China Press, 2004, p. 278
[21][U.K.] John H. Brooke: Science and Religion, translated by Su Xiangui, Fudan University Press, 2000, p. 216
[22]See Critique of Practical Reason, Book II – Chapter II – 4
[23][U.S.] Garrett Thomson: Kant, translated by Zhao Chengwen, Teng Xiaobing, and Meng Lingpeng, Zhonghua Book Company, 2002, p. 107
[24]Kant: Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Deng Xiaomang, p. 144
[25]Same as above, p. 150
[26]Kant: Critique of Judgment, §87, see Kant on God and Religion, compiled and translated by Li Qiuling, Renmin University of China Press, 2004, p. 235,
[27]Kant on God and Religion, compiled and translated by Li Qiuling, Renmin University of China Press, 2004, p. 111
[28][U.S.] Pang Sifen: The Tree of Philosophy, translated by Zhai Pengxiao, proofread by Wang Lingyun, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005, p. 314
[29]Kant on God and Religion, compiled and translated by Li Qiuling, Renmin University of China Press, 2004, pp. 379–380
[30]Same as above
[31]Kant: Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, see Kant on God and Religion, compiled and translated by Li Qiuling, Renmin University of China Press, 2004, p. 378
[32]Kant: “Negative education is the best education for children,” March 28, 1776, in Königsberg, to Christian Heinrich Wolke, see The Starry Sky Beyond — A Selection of Kant’s Letters, translated by Li Qiuling, Economic Daily Press, 2001, pp. 69–70
The Same Starry Sky—Kant’s View of Science and Religion: (Part Three) On a Clear Night, Gazing at the Stars; Main Reference Works
Xingding posted on 2005-12-27 20:29:07
On a Clear Night, Gazing at the Stars
By this point, I have already described separately the main significance of Kant’s view of science and his view of religion. This may look like I have written two articles on different themes, so how can these two parts be placed under the same topic of “science and religion”? In fact, the question is also equivalent to this: in Kant, are discussions of science and of religion carried out separately, or simultaneously?
In fact, just from what has been shown above—namely, that the development of science and the meaning of religion are both secured within the philosophy of one and the same Kantian thinker—it is already enough to reveal the inclusiveness of Kant’s philosophy.
By setting limits separately in the realm of science and in the realm of religion, Kant thereby prevented any “conflict” between science and religion—“Kant’s critical outcome did not set science and religion in opposition; rather, in a manner often imitated afterward, it separated the two.”[1] Yet I want to ask: was Kant’s philosophy really as simple as merely “separating” science and religion? In Kant’s philosophy, are science and religion merely “unrelated”? Or are they “in dialogue,” or even “integrated”?
First of all, the premise for a fruitful dialogue is to draw the boundary lines clearly. If both sides try to annex the other’s territory and force the opponent to submit, then such a dialogue simply cannot get off the ground. Kant’s “boundary” does not mean that science and religion are completely separated, each minding its own business and having nothing to do with the other; on the contrary, it is precisely meant to better ensure communication and dialogue between science and religion. When we say that Kant drew boundaries for science and religion, we do not mean that Kant left one patch of ground for science, another patch for religion, and then marked a line between them. More precisely, Kant set limits on speculative reason separately within the domains of science and religion. On this basis, Kant’s philosophy allows science and religion to “arrive at the same destination by different paths,” and ultimately move toward integration.
For Kant, the brilliant starry sky above us has two layers of meaning: one is the mechanistic universe, strictly obedient to the laws of mechanics, that he proudly proclaimed in the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens: “Give me matter, and I’ll build a universe out of it![2]” The other is the starry sky mentioned at the end of the Critique of Practical Reason, the one that “the more persistently and deeply we think about it, the more our mind is filled with ever-new and ever-stronger wonder and awe.” The question is this: for Kant, are the mechanical, law-governed world and the moral, beautiful world two worlds that have nothing to do with each other? Or rather, is there only that one and same starry sky—both orderly and, at the same time, astonishing and awe-inspiring?
First of all, we need to note that there is no necessary contradiction between science’s exploration of natural order and the religious feeling of maintaining wonder and awe. Right at the beginning of the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, Kant declares: “I decided to begin this inquiry only after seeing that my duties to religion would suffer no harm whatsoever.[3]”
Kant believed that the order and laws of nature are precisely what most deserve our wonder; in his early thought there is a tendency toward “natural teleology.” He points out:
Even if I could fully know all the springs and conduits, all the nerve pathways, levers, and mechanical devices of an animal body, there would still remain wonder: how is it possible that so many different devices are unified within one structure, that activities directed toward one purpose fit together so well with activities directed toward achieving another purpose… The reason so much unity and harmony is possible is that there exists a being which, in addition to the grounds of so many actualities, also contains the grounds of all possibilities; yet this does not cancel the reason for wonder….[4]
Yet even after Kant’s philosophical system entered its mature stage, he still did not deny the significance of natural teleology:
A theological ethics is perfectly possible; for without theology, morality can indeed exist by virtue of its rules, but not by virtue of the ultimate intention delivered by those very rules, without reason being made manifest in regard to that ultimate intention. But a theological morality (of pure reason) is impossible; for whatever is not originally given by reason itself, and whatever the law to which reason, as a pure practical capacity, also contributes by producing it, cannot be moral. Likewise, a theology of nature would also be nonsense, for it would not state any law of nature, but rather the arrangement of a highest will; in contrast, a natural theology (strictly speaking, a teleological theology of nature) can at least serve as a true theological propaedeutic, because by examining the natural ends that provide it with rich material, it supplies an inducement to the idea of a final end that nature cannot itself provide; and thus although it can make clear the need for a theology that fully determines the concept of God for the highest practical use of reason, it cannot produce such a theology or fully establish it on its proofs.[5]
Here, the significance of a teleological theology of nature lies in “urging us to seek a theology[6]”; true theology can only be moral theology, but the exploration and apprehension of nature can likewise help people ultimately move toward moral theology. Kant believes that the aesthetic sense contained in natural laws can inspire us to comprehend morality from nature: “We have a moral interest in the beauty of the world.[7]”
In this sense, science and religion reach a common goal, and this sole end is “human beings” — the human being “is itself the end in itself”[8] “All science, art, and law ultimately exist to enlighten human beings and to enable them at last to reflect on their moral quality.”[9]
Scientific inquiry helps religious apprehension; at the same time, the religious spirit is also indispensable for scientific inquiry.
Einstein pointed out: “Anyone who has had a deep experience of the successful advance in this domain (scientific inquiry) will feel profound reverence for the rationality revealed in existence. Through understanding, he is completely liberated from the shackles of his personal wishes and desires, and thus adopts a humble attitude toward the majesty of the reason embodied in existence—a majesty that, because of its extreme profundity, is for human beings beyond reach.”[10] This “profound reverence” and “humble attitude”—that is, the feeling of “wonder” and “awe” that Kant has toward the starry heavens and the moral law—are something science and religion have in common.
On a clear night, gazing at the starry sky, one experiences a joy that only a noble soul can truly feel.[11]
Kant on God and Religion, compiled and translated by Li Qiuling, Renmin University of China Press, 2004
Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Deng Xiaomang, proofread by Yang Zuotao, People’s Publishing House, 2004
Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Deng Xiaomang, proofread by Yang Zuotao, People’s Publishing House, 2003
Critique of Judgment, translated by Deng Xiaomang, proofread by Yang Zuotao, People’s Publishing House, 2002
The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. Deng Xiaomang, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2003
An Introduction to the History of the Development of the Universe, trans. Quan Zenggu, proofread by Wang Fushan, Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2001
Beyond the Starry Sky—Selected Letters of Kant, trans. Li Qiuling, Economic Daily Press, 2001 edition
[U.S.] Pang Sifen: The Tree of Philosophy, trans. Zhai Pengxiao, proofread by Wang Lingyun, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005,
[U.K.] John H. Brooke: Science and Religion, trans. Su Xiangui, Fudan University Press, 2000
[U.S.] Garrett Thomson: Kant, trans. Zhao Chengwen, Teng Xiaobing, Meng Lingpeng, Zhonghua Book Company, 2002
Deng Xiaomang: Kant’s Philosophical Lectures, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005,
Yang Zutao and Deng Xiaomang: A Guide to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Hunan Education Press, December 1996
[1] [U.K.] John H. Brooke: Science and Religion, trans. Su Xiangui, Fudan University Press, 2000, p. 217
[2]Kant: An Introduction to the History of the Development of the Universe, trans. Quan Zenggu, proofread by Wang Fushan, Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2001, p. 10 (Preface)
[3]Kant: An Introduction to the History of the Development of the Universe, trans. Quan Zenggu, proofread by Wang Fushan, Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2001, p. 1 (Preface)
[4]Kant: “The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God,” in Kant on God and Religion, ed. and trans. Li Qiuling, Renmin University of China Press, 2004, p. 101
[5]Kant: Critique of Judgment, “General Remark on Teleology,” in Kant on God and Religion, ed. and trans. Li Qiuling, Renmin University of China Press, 2004, p. 263
[6]Kant: Critique of Judgment, §85, in Kant on God and Religion, ed. and trans. Li Qiuling, Renmin University of China Press, 2004, p. 225
[7] [U.S.] Garrett Thomson: Kant, trans. Zhao Chengwen, Teng Xiaobing, Meng Lingpeng, Zhonghua Book Company, 2002, p. 112
[8]Kant: Critique of Practical Reason, p. 151
[9]Deng Xiaomang: Kant’s Philosophical Lectures, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005, p. 139
[10]Einstein: “Science and Religion,” in Collected Writings of Einstein, ed. Xu Liangying and Liu Ming, Zhejiang Literature and Art Publishing House, 2004, p. 73
[11]Kant: An Introduction to the History of the Development of the Universe, trans. Quan Zenggu, proofread by Wang Fushan, Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2001, p. 142 (Conclusion)
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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