Recently I’ve talked about the relevant issues twice: (studying Wittgenstein, without any tidying up, just pasting the chat log~)
“Is theory a set of propositions? Agree or not?”——
A proposition, a declarative sentence, in itself has no meaning if you do not know the meaning of each word in it, but the meaning of words cannot be given entirely within a set of propositions; ultimately, the meaning of words still has to involve referential definitions, so it is bound to draw in practical activity and the question of the way we contemplate the world.
“Can a system close itself off?”——
A system cannot close itself off
A theoretical system is composed of many propositions and sentences, right? If you do not understand the words and concepts in the sentences, then the sentences are merely meaningless symbols. But how do we understand the meanings of words? If theory is closed, then are the meanings of words all mutually explained through the theory itself? That would surely be circular, and in the end not a single word could be explained. To understand the meanings of words, ultimately one still has to look in practice, to look at the use of words, especially since many concepts can only ultimately be supported through “referential definitions,” such as “red.” So if we want a theory to be more than just a pile of meaningless symbols, then we must understand the language in which that theory is expressed; and to understand language is to understand a “form of life.” On this point, what Wittgenstein says is very good.
////——What I said later, “a theoretical system is composed of many propositions and sentences,” means that in form a theoretical system is composed of sentences, but if theory is to have meaning, it must include more than that.
Latest comments
- UNIC
2007-05-05 14:10:39 Anonymous 222.82.67.202
I was thinking of what is said in
: if whatever you do to question a theory, it can still refute you, then what this can show is not that it is truth, but that the theoretical system itself is closed……so I’m asking you.
A theoretical system seems like a plant; it cannot survive on its own. It must have sunlight, soil, insects, the whole ecosystem….?? - 古雴
2007-05-05 17:43:14
There are two layers to this issue:
First, there is the self-consistency of a system. To say that a system is self-consistent means that it can defend itself, not that it can refute itself.
But no matter how self-consistent, how internally coherent, how tight and solid, a theoretical system cannot float in midair; it must rely on language to be established, and therefore it cannot close itself off.
A self-consistent, coherent system is possible and worth seeking. But a closed, completed system is impossible and not worth seeking. - unic
2007-05-05 20:14:43 Anonymous 220.171.180.81
That book directly gave the example of Marxist theory in certain countries.
I’ve never really been clear on this point: how does ourprove that everyone else is wrong and that it alone is right? What is the fundamental “mao-ni’er” in this? - 古雴
2007-05-05 23:06:00
I can tell you the argumentative logic of
:
In fact, this logic is often used in many other places as well. We may even use it often without being aware of it.
Simply put, it is to erect a target for oneself and then shoot at it oneself.
For example, if I want to attack XX-ism, I first pick out the ugliest aspects of all the various schools and factions of XX-ism, gather them together, then do some sorting and arranging (usually exaggeration), and finally call this collection of every ugly feature “XX-ism,” and proceed to refute it vehemently. At the same time, one often has to create the atmosphere of two armies facing off, lumping the opponent together as ugly, evil, and absurd, while oneself represents beauty, justice, and correctness.
The atmosphere of two armies facing off is created in this way—first, define the ugly aggregate set up as the target as the opposing force, and define the force that heroically fights it as the positive side that one oneself occupies; second, equivocate by turning the various features ascribed to the opposing side into the definition of the opposing side itself (for example, first deciding that metaphysics is an isolated, static, one-sided worldview and methodology, and then saying that an isolated, static, one-sided worldview and methodology is the definition of metaphysics), so that one no longer needs to ask why the opposing side has such ugly claims, because the answer is that those who have such ugly claims are precisely the definition of the opposing side; third, smuggle things through by quietly changing the original definition of the opposing side—“the concentration of everything ugly”—into anyone who is tainted by even a little of it belonging to the opposing camp; fourth, further build momentum by lumping everyone who does not agree with one’s own position into the opposing side; and in the end, the situation becomes this: anyone who hopes to oppose the extremely false, evil, and ugly opposing side has only one choice, which is to join one’s own camp.
But in fact, the XX-ism that is being castigated beyond recognition is entirely something one has fashioned oneself; the so-called two armies facing off is also something one has imagined oneself. In reality, to get out of the extreme position that gathers together everything false, evil, and ugly, there may be many paths, and one does not necessarily have to abandon all of its claims wholesale, nor is there necessarily only one place to which one can defect. But after such a series of offensives from beginning to end, all the complicated realities disappear, and what remains is only a clearly divided, black-and-white battle tableau, leaving you with no room for choice: you can only defect to truth and justice.
The above description is not exaggerated. This sort of technique is often seen being used by others. Middle-school textbooks used this strategy too, though not very skillfully, because after all it was too contrived; and even in academic disputes, this technique is often used more cunningly, such as the criticism by a certain senior student on the Keke forum a while ago of “interventionism” against “representationalism,” and the dispute a while ago on Jiang laoshi’s blog between brother yxy and me about materialism and idealism, both of which gave the vague impression of using the above methods.
In fact, we who oppose scientism also occasionally use this technique. Of course, erecting an extreme position can help display the problem more vividly; arranging all the extreme features of scientism together is helpful to a certain extent. But this is only to reveal the problem and make the problem sharper; it is not to deliberately simplify the situation. One must by no means further apply the one-two-three-four steps; vilifying the opponent should only go “just enough and stop,” one must avoid “two armies facing off,” one must not equivocate, and one must not set oneself up as the sole representative of truth and justice.
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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