Xu Lao-shi is really something… It’s already the last class, and we still have to discuss things, and still have to write a discussion outline… Fortunately the paper can be turned in at the end of the month. Let me write it in a hurry then—I seem to have written a discussion outline for the first time in the form of an outline rather than a paper. But this time it seems to have gone to the other extreme, scattered all over the place… does it have a bit of Vico’s spirit?~
“Religious Knowledge” Discussion Outline
According to Kant, intuition and concept are the two elements of knowledge.
However, the a priori forms of intuition cannot by themselves deduce all knowledge; the ultimate source of any knowledge is always experience.
Things-in-themselves make possible the actuality and universality of knowledge; however, because of the finitude of human cognition, the universality of knowledge is not absolute. The plural coexistence of different knowledge systems is possible.
A computer can record many statements, but that does not mean that the computer possesses knowledge.
Knowledge is not merely statements—the arrangement and combination of symbols.
Symbols in themselves are meaningless; a dictionary can interpret one set of symbols with another set of symbols, but to truly understand language one must enter the lifeworld.
To understand language, one must step beyond interpreting one set of symbols with another set of symbols; language ultimately depends on “ostensive definition.”
Yet ostensive definition is always imprecise (“five red apples”), and it cannot be rigorously conceptualized either (for then one would again return to the world of symbols).
Tacit knowledge: I know how to ride a bicycle; I know what a clarinet sounds like.
Tacit knowledge is bodily knowledge, and all knowledge ultimately cannot do without bodily knowledge. For example, “I know the magnitude of the gravitational constant”; however, to understand “force,” “number,” “magnitude,” and so on, one ultimately depends on tacit knowledge.
Therefore the actuality and intelligibility of systems of knowledge are not established on logic, but on tacit knowledge.
This does not mean that knowledge is completely indeterminate. Tacit knowledge is related to human forms of life.
The diversity of human forms of life supports the plurality of knowledge; however, the similarity of human forms of life makes translation between different languages possible. The fact that language can be translated means that there is common ground among knowledge systems, though translation cannot be carried out by a purely logical, mechanical method.
Tacit knowledge or ostensive definition can only be mastered through long-term life within a certain linguistic environment or through repeated training. This is the customs, habits, and institutions that Wittgenstein emphasizes.
Scientific knowledge is built upon the form of life of the laboratory (SSK). The standardization and repeatability of laboratory life give scientific knowledge the characteristics of precision and universality. Knowledge is built upon forms of life. The characteristics of life determine the characteristics of knowledge.
Religious knowledge is built upon the form of life of religion. Because religious life is private and hard to repeat, religious knowledge has a more obvious tendency toward indeterminacy and personalization. Yet after all, in general human forms of life have far more in common than they differ; thus linguistic communication is always possible (W: a private language is impossible), and to a certain extent consensus can also be formed.
Even if scientific knowledge is said to arise originally from stimulation by things-in-themselves, the absoluteness of things-in-themselves cannot guarantee the absoluteness of scientific knowledge. And the determination of truth or falsity in scientific knowledge does not consist in comparing it with things-in-themselves to see whether it “corresponds.” Only between concept and concept, or image and intuition, is there correspondence; things-in-themselves are imperceptible and unknowable.
Human linguistic activity, like game activity, “and the use of the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ can also be part of the game” (W).
Scientific language and religious language are both language games; judgments of truth and falsity follow the rules of the game, rather than correspondence with reality.
Even if the language game of science and the language game of religion are similar in form and rule, their fundamental purposes are entirely different.
Go and renju. The symbols (the pieces), the environment (the board), and the rules (taking turns to place pieces) are all similar, yet they are completely different games. Seeking knowledge is the aim of science, but not of religion. The aim of religion may be the pursuit of meaning, but it is not the pursuit of knowledge.
The significance of religious knowledge lies in pointing out what religious life has in common, and in helping guide others to participate in religious life. In the final analysis, the key lies in religious life.
June 12, 2007
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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