On “To Exist Is to Be Perceived”

This famous saying by Bishop Berkeley, the philosopher of idealism, is one we all know by heart—of course, as one of the famous targets mocked and criticized in high school “philosophy” class. Berkeley was not only an idealist philosopher, but also a bishop, and so naturally became a negative example for political science teachers to disparage and ridicule.

I remember that when we got to this point in political class, I had already read quite a few popular science books on modern physics, and had already begun to dimly appreciate the profundity of Berkeley’s remark. If a sentence like this can be refuted simply by saying, “Didn’t your mother exist before you were born?” then how did it become a classic in the history of philosophy? Could it be that every philosopher since Berkeley was an idiot? Even if the science of that era had not yet made modern advances and people’s thinking was still relatively ignorant (really?), surely even if Berkeley did not know about electrons and atoms, he should at least have known his own mother, shouldn’t he? The objections that we can easily think of—had he never thought of them? In the end, is it the political textbook that is shallow, or Berkeley who is shallow? Common sense is enough to tell.

The classic rebuttal to Berkeley, often repeated and dating back more than 200 years to Dr. Johnson, is to kick a stone and say, “I refute it thus.” But in fact, this “refutation” is not only ineffective, it can instead serve as support for “to be is to be perceived.” Why do we say that stone exists? What exactly is a stone? When we say a stone exists, what exactly do we mean? If a stone were stripped of our perception—its hardness, for example (when kicked, it rebounds), along with those properties bestowed by sight and touch—would it still be a stone? Does something with no perceptible qualities exist? — I have a treasure, but it is colorless, tasteless, silent, occupies no space, reflects no waves that can be indirectly perceived by people (such as electromagnetic waves), and exerts no influence on anything we can perceive; then what, exactly, is this treasure I have? In what sense is it existent?

Some other idealist philosophers, as well as modern science, would insist that something that cannot in any way be connected with human perception does not exist, and that such a thing will be shaved away by Occam’s razor. That is to say, in fact, “to be is to be perceived” can be said to be one of the tenets of modern scientific positivism. And those political teachers, while on the one hand superstitiously revering modern science and on the other hand sneering at Berkeley, are no different from lifting a stone only to drop it on their own feet, just like emphasizing on the one hand that the world is material while sneering at metaphysics on the other.

Here I should explain that when I say “to be is to be perceived” is a tenet of modern science, many people may find it hard to understand. Indeed, modern science is, on the surface, built upon the tenet of materialism. But in modern science, what does the so-called material “matter” mean? (See my earlier essay “‘Matter’ and Its Expansion” for reference.) A typical definition of matter is as follows: “Anything that has mass and can be sensed and measured.” (The Hutchinson Dictionary of Thought) Now it’s all clear: “matter” turns out to be “something that can be sensed and measured”! If all existence is material, that is to say, all existence is something that can be sensed and measured—doesn’t that just bring us back to “to be is to be perceived”?

The significance of “to be is to be perceived” in the history of philosophy, of course, is not that it proposed a new truth or completed a powerful system. In fact, “to be is to be perceived” is a marker of the so-called “epistemological turn” in modern philosophy. For whether one wants to support this statement or refute it, the focus of discussion shifts from “what, exactly, is ‘being’?” to “what, exactly, is ‘perception’?”—thus pointing to philosophy’s shift in emphasis from ontology to epistemology!

What is being? What is perception? … These questions are all too large, so large that I am not yet able to express any definite opinion on them. This article merely brings up, at random, the importance of “to be is to be perceived”; it simply symbolizes a milestone in the history of philosophy. Anyone who thinks that one can refute it by kicking a stone with one’s foot is like someone who thinks that simply walking around on one’s own is enough to refute Zeno’s paradox—they will never enter the temple of philosophy… Of course, modern rebels are another matter.

August 4, 2007

At Fushan Road, Shanghai

Latest comments
  
mist

2007-08-05 00:56:13 Anonymous 124.17.16.85 [Reply]

It seems Moore made three analyses of “being and being perceived”?

  
luxin

2007-08-05 16:00:19 Anonymous 124.17.17.32 [Reply]

This is as maddening as quantum physics

  
d

2008-03-21 10:05:21 Anonymous 202.113.19.242 [Reply]

Don’t divide idealism and materialism so neatly; in fact, the difference between them is something subjectively proposed by people like Marx. This distinction is almost meaningless.

  
古雴

2008-03-21 12:38:22 [Reply]

The person above is being bizarre. Who is “dividing them so neatly”? What I label as “idealism” here is basically a satire of the textbook’s binary scheme; it is meant to highlight the ridiculous situation in which “those political teachers, while on the one hand superstitiously revering modern science and on the other hand sneering at Berkeley, are no different from lifting a stone only to drop it on their own feet.” 
Moreover, the textbook’s distinction between idealism and materialism is, in Marx’s own thought, a typical case of “metaphysics.” The textbook, on the one hand, stresses materialism at the ontological level, while on the other claims to oppose metaphysics; that too is ridiculous. 
The distinction between idealism and materialism does have a certain significance in some sense. In fact, it is hard for philosophers not to be idealists, or to put it another way, a typical philosopher is bound to be “idealist.” Marx said one should “abolish philosophy”; in fact, it is precisely only by abolishing philosophy that one may possibly break out of “idealism.” To do philosophy while insisting on “materialism” is also ridiculous.

  
灵魂朝圣

2008-03-22 13:00:58 Anonymous 221.0.49.183 [Reply]

Mm, I think the owner of Suixuan makes a lot of sense. Some time ago I read Qing Wang Yongbin’s *Talks by the Hearth*, just a little booklet, and found that idealism—something that has long been discriminated against, criticized, and mocked (actually, from my analysis, it’s basically in those ideological and political textbooks from middle school and high school)—really does have very interesting and profound aspects! Given my limited knowledge and theoretical level, I won’t show off before experts. I’ll just cite a very common example: Kant’s “I think, therefore I am” is actually extremely rich in meaning. Yet I still clearly remember the ridicule and explanation this phrase received from my high school ideological and political teacher. Looking back now, it was utterly unreasonable; the teacher taught us as if we were idiots, or perhaps the teacher himself had already been so domesticated that he could no longer distinguish right from wrong. As for Marxism, it is also deeply misunderstood. Some time ago I borrowed a book about Marx on human emancipation to read, and when classmates saw it, they actually said I had “high political awareness”?! I really want to cry out loud: Marxism does not equal politics. Most university students’ understanding of Marxism is far too narrow; when Marx is mentioned, it is just politics, just communism, and if you ask further, they are at a loss. In my view, the popularization of ideological and political education in high school bears a heavy responsibility. 
   Just now I also wanted to use *The Book of Changes* as an example, but I feel that *The Book of Changes* doesn’t seem to count as idealism; the whole book’s thought of “change” is clearly dialectical materialism, isn’t it! (Is that right?) But I just asked my roommates, and everyone is arguing endlessly over idealism and materialism. And *The Book of Changes* seems to be one of the books criticized in high school as superstition. I have always felt that idealism should not be used as a pejorative term, especially in daily life; of course, in philosophical research there probably shouldn’t be such unfairness, should there? Different forms of idealism, and the same form of idealism in interpreting different things, should be treated differently. However, this thought is still only a fairly vague outline in my mind; perhaps because I have read too little and lack the necessary knowledge and theoretical foundation, I still cannot write it down in comparatively clear, fluent, and persuasive language. 
   I look forward to Suixuan’s master offering criticism and corrections! ^-^

  
灵魂朝圣

2008-03-22 13:02:54 Anonymous 221.0.49.183 [Reply]

How did I write so much again??? It seems sparring with Suixuan’s master can produce an express effect on one’s writing! Ha…

  
szwish

2008-05-14 15:18:35 Anonymous 116.25.61.1 [Reply]

I think the translation of this sentence may be problematic. My understanding of its original meaning should be: “Being” has the property of being perceptible; conversely, something without perceptible properties cannot prove its existence (what can prove existence is what is perceived), and thus does not possess the preconditions or meaning for discussion. 
Also, “being perceived” refers to the perception of the human collective. Berkeley would not be foolish enough to think that something unperceived by an individual is thereby deemed nonexistent, would he?

  
古雴

2008-05-14 18:17:16 [Reply]

I don’t seem to have noticed Soul Pilgrimage’s long comment at the time, let alone szwish’s comment, so let me say a few words: 
As for materialism, idealism, and whether things like the *Book of Changes* count as idealism, I hope beginners will make every effort to get away from the mindset of traditional textbooks. When you go to philosophy classes at a good university, and when you read excellent works of philosophy and the history of philosophy, you will find that, except for a very small period in the history of philosophy and in very specific contexts, there are generally not many people talking about oppositions like materialism versus idealism. Even when people do talk about “idealism,” the concept is not the same as in textbooks. Moreover, in some other contexts, philosophers rather look down on so-called “materialism,” because in a certain sense philosophy must be idealist; otherwise it is hard to call it philosophy. As for things like the *Book of Changes*, they belong entirely to a different tradition from Western thought, so mechanically forcing them into discussions of whether they are materialist or idealist makes no sense at all. Don’t think that if it is not materialist, then it must be idealist; never treat a philosophical stance as a political stance. Even politics allows for neutrals, so how could philosophy be so simple? 
As for szwish’s understanding, since I have not read Berkeley’s original works, I cannot say much. But I would like to remind you not to build a ready-made framework out of your own preconceptions and then insert philosophers into it one by one. For example, traditional textbooks are completely wishful in setting up a series of boxes such as materialism and idealism, and then inserting philosophers one by one: this one is subjective idealism, that one is objective idealism, this one is vulgar materialism, that one is dialectical materialism, and so on. It is truly a childish practice, like a child who has read a fairy tale and then uses it to assign roles to real people: this one is the prince, that one is the witch, this one is the hero, that one is the villain, as if everyone else had become as simple and childish as fairy-tale characters. 
“Berkeley would not be foolish enough to think that something unperceived by an individual is thereby deemed nonexistent” — I don’t know how Berkeley thought, but your statement is also a kind of “it goes without saying” mode of thought, much like the person who walks around and assumes he has refuted Zeno’s paradox, or the person who kicks a stone and thinks he has refuted Berkeley; taking common sense as judge and then feeling superior to others is just self-congratulatory.

Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.