On the Discussion on the Teachers’ Blogs: Truth Standards, Pluralism, and Others
Gu Ya 发表于 2007-07-07 14:02:46
Preface
2007-06-08 16:59:55
Since I ultimately stopped responding, let me add this here: pluralism is related to the metaphor of dumplings and noodles. When I say that anti-scientism is not anti-science, I do not merely mean that I support some other kind of science; rather, I mean that even with the science that exists now, I do not oppose it. On the contrary, mathematization is not something loathsome: mathematics is very beautiful, marvelous, and a mathematical world is awe-inspiring as well. What we oppose is only the elevation of one particular worldview—no matter how excellent it may be in itself—into the supreme and sole one.
“Pluralism can be used when speaking to others, but when one uses it oneself, only monism is possible”—often enough, that is indeed the case, but this does not hinder the pluralist position. Pluralism is like this: I acknowledge that there may be many kinds of “languages” in the world, and no single language can stand above all the others. Different languages each have their own characteristics, but there is no distinction of superior and inferior, noble and base. To uphold such a view of language, I do not necessarily need to know many languages, still less do I need to be able to think simultaneously in several languages—when thinking for myself, one can often only use one language at a time, but this does not prevent me from insisting that the language I use is not the unique sovereign under heaven. A pluralist view of science does not have to produce something better than existing science in order to be persuasive; on the contrary, if we always have to produce something “better,” then we fall back into dogmatism again. In the historical or social-constructivist vein, I can acknowledge existing science and the mainstream mathematized worldview as the most “successful” in this era, and other forms of science, even if possible, can only be marginal. But what we must emphasize is that the status of existing science is not necessary, but contingent and historical. We believe in other possibilities, even if we may not be able to construct an entire alternative science ourselves as an example. In fact, a science cannot be built by one person alone; it always needs to be constructed within society and culture.
Preface
In the tradition of Chinese culture, “to investigate the relationship between Heaven and humanity” should be the scholar’s most important mission. And “wander freely” has a status akin to that of “freedom” in Western cultural contexts—a state that countless ancient people longed for in their dreams. To become a transcendent, dust-free “true person,” to wander freely in the realm between Heaven and humanity, has naturally also become my ideal and pursuit. Of course, I am still very far from this goal. Yet though I cannot reach it, my heart is set upon it. “Human-Heaven Wandering Freely” is not a boast that I have already attained such a state, but a high-hanging goal for effort, intended as mutual encouragement with fellow travelers on the same path.
The realm between Heaven and humanity is subtle, profound, and secretive; how can one possibly glimpse its inner profundity? In this age of splendid scientific development, I think the answer can only be: “start from science.” But by this I do not mean to advocate the unlimited absolutization of scientific knowledge and methods, applying them to solve all problems. That would amount to assuming that science can provide all possible answers, is the measure of all things, is the highest achievement in the human spiritual realm, and is the absolute unity of the true, the good, and the beautiful. This is precisely the scientistic view that I seek to refute in this book. For scientific research is only the starting point of humanity’s exploration of the mysteries of Heaven and humanity, and by no means the endpoint of possession of truth.
Today, when science has become a hegemonic discourse, the predictability of nature is falsely taken as the sole standard of truth. In the glaring light of science, obscure truth becomes even harder to discern. When I say “start from science,” I mean that one should not “stop and linger” at the conclusions science has already obtained, but should continue to “set out,” transcending science, reflecting on science, and criticizing science. This means taking scientific activity itself as an object of study, investigating it with a scientific rather than a superstitious attitude; this is what is called “second-order” research into science, a scientific exploration at a higher level. Borrowing Husserl’s terminology, it means rejecting the so-called uncritical, unreflective, naïve “natural attitude,” and once again revealing the flesh-and-blood connection between modern science and the lifeworld that has been obscured, liberating the multidimensional perspectives of human life from their state of aphasia under the powerful discourse hegemony of scientism, and realizing the free development of multiculturalism. In my view, this is precisely a concrete manifestation of the scientific spirit of constantly pursuing truth and never stopping, as well as a humanistic attitude concerned with people’s actual state of existence.
If I am not mistaken, this position is probably also the common attitude of the other authors in this volume. Some researchers in China’s scientific and cultural circles, through popular texts for the general public, have disseminated the achievements that in foreign academic circles have largely already become scholarly common knowledge, yet have been said by some people—whether out of misunderstanding or malice—to be “anti-science.” This shows the degree to which scientism has spread and run rampant domestically, and from another angle it also highlights the importance of the related work represented by this book.
The entire contents of this book are mainly essays and book reviews published in various newspapers and magazines; only a very small number are accessible scholarly articles. When compiling them into this book, appropriate revisions, additions, and deletions were made both to content and titles, so as to make the book into a relatively self-sufficient and unified whole. The book is divided into five chapters, and its basic line of development is roughly as follows:
(1) To study the truth about scientific ideas and activities, to comprehensively analyze the negative effects brought by scientific activity, ideas, and dissemination, to dissect the deep roots of misconduct in scientific research, to reveal the complexity of scientific research as a social activity, and to break the “myth” of scientism with its single perspective and biased stance.
(2) To understand the “Other” beyond science, to recognize the characteristics and limits of science, to appreciate the value and meaning of non-scientific activities and ideas, to advocate that “Caesar be Caesar and science be science,” and to let science and non-science each take its place and obtain its due.
(3) To reveal that beyond the dimension of prediction and control disclosed by modern science, there is also a deeper and closer relationship between humanity and nature; nature is not a slave from which humans may demand what they will, but the source of life that should be treated with awe and reverence; and to advocate rebuilding, in this new age of scientific flourishing, a beautiful homeland of harmony between Heaven and humanity.
(4) To argue that science should serve human life, rather than human beings submitting themselves to scientific chauvinism; to call for a good and harmonious relationship between science and other cultural traditions; and to summon forth the humanistic concern of science.
(5) To explain that modern science is a new stage and special form in the evolution of the human spirit, and that it stands in complex interrelations with various religions and traditions; to advocate beneficial interaction between science and religion, fully excavating humanity’s spiritual resources, and realizing a mind’s free and carefree wandering.
Although the distribution and arrangement of the 60 articles roughly conform to the above line of thought, because each piece was written in its own context and textual lineage (context), because the concepts they refer to vary in their scope and nuance, and because the author’s own thought also “keeps pace with the times,” they, as postmodernism emphasizes, possess their inherent fragmentariness and may not fit so seamlessly into the “grand narrative” I now “reconstruct” for them. Repetition and overlap in expression, deviation and overflow of meaning, and even contradictions and self-deconstruction in thought are all unavoidable. Wittgenstein said that the writing style of his Philosophical Investigations was “like a series of landscape sketches made during a long and intricate journey,” and explained that “when I violate their natural tendency and try to force them further into a single direction, my thoughts immediately become lame.” Of course, by invoking this I may be disguising the disorder and contradictions of this book’s thought, and the suspicion of mixing fish eyes with pearls is unavoidable; yet to a certain extent, this may well be the fate of human thinking activity. Wittgenstein was simply more honest than others in confronting this fate.
Among the collected articles there are some pieces written in debate with contemporary thinkers. If it were up to the author’s original intention, I would prefer to preserve their original appearance; indeed, if my opponent agreed, it would be best to include both sides’ arguments in the book so that readers could understand the full dialogue. However, out of various considerations, this book has undergone some technical handling and is more like a monologue speaking to itself; for this I must apologize to both my opponents and my readers. For the convenience of those interested in searching, the original sources of each piece and the relevant contexts are listed at the end of the book.
This book covers a wide range of topics, and the issues involved are extraordinarily complex; coupled with my own shallow learning and limited ability, errors are unavoidable. If any readers wish to discuss these matters, you are welcome to exchange views with me. Please send e-mail to: jsjiang@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn, or leave a message on my Sina blog (“Starting from Science”: http://blog.sina.com.cn/jiangjinsong).
In early summer 2007 at Tsinghua’s Xinzhai
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[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-11 13:06:05
“Nature’s predictability is falsely taken as the sole standard of truth.”
———–
It’s not easy to find another standard. There still isn’t one that is very successful.
I don’t think Heidegger’s approach works either.
[Anonymous] Sina netizen
2007-06-11 21:51:35
Even if other standards are not very successful, that still doesn’t mean they are not standards at all.
Also, how do you judge whether something is successful or not? Do you have to use scientific standards?
If science is said to be the most successful, then what standard is being used? Is it the standard of “nature’s predictability”?
Shouldn’t scientism be more logical?
[Anonymous] Xinzhai Old Jiang
2007-06-11 21:52:33
The above comment was posted by me.
[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-12 12:04:28
If a standard is not successful, is it still a standard?
If a ruler measures inaccurately, is it still a ruler?
I do not think predictability is the sole standard of truth.
But before a better standard is found, calling it a pretense is a bit too much. Which one is not a pretense? None!!
It’s just like noodles tasting bad while dumplings taste good. OK.
But before dumplings are made, one still has to eat noodles.
Those who think noodles taste bad should work hard to make dumplings;
if you first denounce noodles and tell everyone to throw them away,
wouldn’t that leave people hungry?
[Anonymous] Xinzhai Old Jiang
2007-06-12 12:21:11
You won’t be convinced when I say your logic isn’t rigorous.
“I do not think predictability is the sole standard of truth.”
Since that is the case, then treating predictability as the sole standard of truth is pretending, is falsification.
Even if we accept what you said—“it’s not easy to find another standard. There still isn’t one that is very successful.”
that merely means that other standards are not as successful as “predictability,” nothing more; they still cannot be entirely ruled out!
What’s more, is “predictability” completely successful? Doesn’t it have any problems?
If a standard is not so successful, doesn’t that count as a standard?
Is there a ruler that measures with 100 percent accuracy?
Did I tell you to dump the noodles? Where exactly did I say that science should be completely rejected?
One must first understand other people’s words before commenting on them.
Let me press you further:
【Also, how do you judge whether something is successful or not? Do you have to use scientific standards?
If science is said to be the most successful, then what standard is being used? Is it the standard of “nature’s predictability”?】
You still haven’t answered that. You need to think it through carefully; it is not so easy to answer.
[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-12 18:01:53
“You say you do not think predictability is the sole standard of truth.” But “it’s not easy to find another standard. There still isn’t one that is very successful.” “I don’t think Heidegger’s approach works either.”
If it is not successful, that means it has not been accepted by the majority; a standard that people do not accept is not a standard. Haven’t I already answered your later questions?
I estimate that if you were asked to produce another standard right now, it would probably be quite difficult. Not only would the majority not accept it, but even supporters could not conveniently produce it. It is truly too unsuccessful.
Maybe when human civilization develops to a higher level, people will be able to accept a better standard of truth, but for now there is only the standard of predictability. Other standards are future possibilities; predictability is the only one in the present. The only thing that can possibly be misunderstood as an eternal only one, so it is not accurate, but it does not count as a pretense either.
“Did I tell you to dump the noodles? Where exactly did I say that science should be completely rejected?”
————
You just kept saying noodles are not tasty, and that there is something better. But you yourself knew you could not produce the dumplings, so you stopped talking about it.
Whoever dumps the noodles is not doing so because you told them to.
A friend of mine calls this kind of method “incitement,” a high-level sales technique. More than 50% of people in a crowd have a chance of falling for it.
[Anonymous] Sina netizen
2007-06-12 20:04:38
Let me change the metaphor again and say it once more, to see whether you can understand:
Even if, as you say, noodles are the tastiest food, you still cannot make noodles the only food.
Rice, even if not as tasty as noodles, is still food.
Because noodles are more popular, you say noodles are the only food people accept. That’s really not very scientific in spirit, is it?
At least you admit I did not ask people to throw away the noodles; that is progress.
A simple-minded friend, hearing me say that noodles are not the only food, went and dumped the noodles. What he should do is improve his logical ability, not investigate my fault, right? He should learn that A not being the only one does not mean A is bad and should be discarded.
Finally, to answer the question I pressed earlier. According to what you say, the standard accepted by the majority is more basic than the standard of predictability; obviously, in your view the standard of predictability is not the only standard.
Then can we treat the standard accepted by the majority as the sole standard of truth?
[Anonymous] Zhān bǐ Qí Ào
2007-06-12 22:49:59
I used to find the title “Starting from Science” odd when I saw it from the teacher; after reading this article I understand it, though it really is fairly easy for outsiders to misunderstand.
I think that any theory (including science), no matter how much it proclaims its objectivity, always has a tendency to suppress or replace other theories (or one might say, a “will”). Science is powerful, but that does not mean it is omnipotent. Once it enters other fields such as art or religion, it becomes helpless. But the current situation is precisely that science is about to extend its power into every field, providing other fields with a “metanarrative.” This demand is not very reasonable, and it is something that needs to be avoided. Science needs such a brake.
Personally, I feel the world can be described from different angles by different theories, and for different individuals, what they see is different. A devout Christian and an experimental scientist each see phenomena that present different meanings, or perhaps are simply two entirely different worlds. Since the God believed in by Westerners for thousands of years in the Middle Ages can be doubted—though that would have been unimaginable at the time—then standing today in an age when science stretches its arms into every field, we can also imagine the day, many years from now, when science will relinquish its crown.
PS: Personally, I feel that if the foundations of belief are different and the systems of knowledge one comes into contact with are different, then heated debate will not yield a common result. Although one proclaims that debate is carried out in a rational manner, what truly takes effect is still the will within. Victory in debate on the surface is not due to the statement of objective reasons, but due to the temporary victory obtained by the “will to power.”
[Anonymous] Someone
2007-06-13 09:00:02
Let me interrupt for a moment:
May I ask, which book is this the preface to? Has it been published yet?
[Anonymous] Xinzhai Old Jiang
2007-06-13 09:35:22
It will be published soon.
[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-13 09:53:29
Can’t even bring out a bowl of rice!
On the question of truth, besides correct predictability, it seems there isn’t a single decent standard one can bring out. Don’t believe it? Then try bringing one out.
So the analogy above is the same.
You say noodles are no good, but there are also rice, dumplings, … and yet you can’t bring out a single one. If people really believe you and throw away the noodles, then you turn around and say they “should improve their logical ability.” Ah!
I think the problem lies with you. Since you can’t bring out rice or dumplings, you should honestly admit that for now there is only noodles to eat. Of course you can say noodles are neither the only thing nor the best thing to eat, and that in the future we will make rice, dumplings, … But since you can’t bring out anything else right now, all that is just drawing cakes to stave off hunger, and cannot be taken seriously.
You should, after eating your fill of noodles, work hard to make dumplings, or tell others who might also be able to make dumplings that noodles taste bad, encouraging everyone to develop dumplings together. But after you’ve had your fill of noodles, you keep telling the public that noodles taste bad, while entirely ignoring the fact that what you yourself are eating is also noodles.
More than 50% of the public “still have much room to improve their logical ability”; if, after hearing your words, they throw away the noodles, isn’t that your responsibility? Isn’t this kind of behavior irresponsible?
It reminds me of our last discussion, where I insisted: fooling people correctly is more important than fooling them correctly.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-13 09:54:18
Everyone accepts is not a standard; a standard accepted by everyone is what is called a standard. The meaning is very clear.
At present, the standard everyone accepts is correct predictability; there is no other standard everyone accepts.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-13 10:00:41
Correctly fooling something incorrect is the worst outcome.
Second worst is incorrectly fooling something incorrect.
Next is incorrectly fooling something correct.
Best is correctly fooling something correct.
[匿名] 新斋老蒋
2007-06-13 11:03:59
At last I understand your thinking.
Besides predictability, there are so many other standards people actually use in scientific research.
For example, being derivable from self-evident principles, being consistent with the prevailing overall worldview, promoting harmony between humanity and nature, and so on.
Moreover, if we are talking about the “facts” of the current state of science rather than what “should” be, then in fact people do not, at every moment, use predictability as the standard in the way you assume.
Can you find some cases where something that satisfies the standard of predictability is excluded from science, while many things that do not satisfy the standard of predictability are included within science?
Try it—go find some!
And one more question: is the meta-standard for measuring standards accepted by everyone?
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-13 14:18:28
I once had the pleasure of attending one of your salons; Wu Guosheng spoke on science and the humanities, and in very broad terms he said that the core of science is prediction (roughly speaking). Of course he was speaking from the negative side, believing that predictability does not count as truth, but it inspired me greatly, and I think this is precisely the best standard.
You ask about self-evident principles and consistency with the prevailing overall worldview; I think none of these can do without predictability. My guess is that when Wu Guosheng put it so broadly at the time, he had considered all these things and then proposed that formulation, not just said it casually.
How is a worldview chosen? Isn’t it still based on the accuracy of prediction? Where do self-evident principles come from? A being living in a world entirely different from ours would have self-evident principles different from ours too. The phrase “predictive accuracy” has extremely great explanatory power; it really is not easy to find something that everyone recognizes yet cannot be included in it.
The biological world has a meta-standard: living on, the continuation of the species. Any species that continues on does so because its way of survival is adaptive. This is not a meta-standard set by anyone; it is formed naturally. Species that did not take this as their standard have all disappeared.
Human beings also have a meta-standard: the survival and quality of individual life, as well as the continuation of humanity. What is favorable to this meta-standard is good and accepted by everyone; what is unfavorable is not good and is not accepted by everyone.
Using predictability as the standard of truth is conducive to making human beings live better, so it is widely accepted. Other standards, if they can make human beings live better, everyone would of course be willing to accept them too, but it seems they still have not been found. There are some in religion, but they are not reliable enough.
[匿名] 新斋老蒋
2007-06-13 16:58:05
Wu’s statement and mine come from the same source, namely Heidegger. It is Heidegger who summarized it and opposed it.
Predictability is the standard that dominates today; once people get used to it, they like to reduce other standards to it. But that does not mean other standards have no independence.
The flourishing and development of human practical life (how to understand this still involves cultural factors) is of course the more basic standard.
Today many people think (or vaguely feel) that predictability is the only standard that satisfies this value, but a careful study of how science actually operates shows that this is not the case.
For example, many people acknowledge the effectiveness of traditional Chinese medicine in specific cases, but still do not acknowledge the truth of traditional Chinese medicine; that is to say, they are, though unconsciously, invoking other standards. For instance, traditional Chinese medicine has no theory; the Five Phases have no basis; and so on. If you examine their arguments carefully, you will find that in fact they are invoking the dominant worldview as the basis for judgment.
Based on their conclusion of rejecting traditional Chinese medicine, people in turn then offer other explanations for its effectiveness…
The actual situation is far more complex than scientism people imagine.
I think standards such as making human beings live better are much better than the standard of predictability. Although there remains the further question of what exactly “living better” means.
The reason the standard of predictability has swept the field is fundamentally that the worldview of the subject-object split and the world’s becoming image has become the dominant culture of humanity; human beings extol the value of calculation, and forget and neglect being-in-the-world. So the profundity of Heidegger’s philosophy lies precisely here: it never simply stops at the level of existing values, but excavates the supporting ground behind them.
[匿名] 新斋老蒋
2007-06-13 17:07:00
By the way: I think the most important qualities in philosophical research are imagination and logic. These two things, which seem completely opposed, are in fact complementary.
[匿名] 费米
2007-06-13 22:52:03
Let me give an example.
I can predict that YXY will definitely die; sooner or later he will die.
Is this science?
Must it be based on science in order to be predicted?
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-14 11:04:05
Reply to Fermi:
What we are talking about is the standard of truth. YXY will sooner or later die is a correct prediction, so it satisfies this standard. Whether it is science or not, let’s talk after you have defined science.
Of course, one can also ask: can a singular proposition count as truth? It probably can too.
If it cannot, that is fine; in that case, it is merely a correct prediction, not truth.
According to Buddhist theory, the prediction is that YXY’s body will die, but his life will continue. If in this life he is sufficiently earnest, responsible, and beneficial to sentient beings, he will have the opportunity to live a better life in the next life. I think this is also a correct prediction; it is truth.
What do you think? If you do not accept it, why not?
(Through the answer to this question, one can see exactly what you are using as your standard of truth.)
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-14 11:14:50
Reply to Lao Jiang:
Since it is Heidegger’s summary, then there is no need to doubt the summarizing power of predictability, right? I believe Heidegger’s original intention was also to make an encompassing summary of various standards, and then propose another set of things to confront them. That understanding should be correct, right?
In my first post I already said, “I think Heidegger’s set is no good either.”
That is to say, in my view, Heidegger’s summary of predictability is very good, while the new standard he proposed in opposition to it does not work.
If you are saying that predictability cannot encompass a sufficiently broad range, then you are questioning Heidegger, but I can help him respond.
If you are saying Heidegger’s set works, then it is I who am questioning Heidegger, and you are helping him respond.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-14 11:29:47
If one thoroughly adheres to the principle that “whatever can be correctly predicted is truth,” then many theories of traditional Chinese medicine are truth. There is nothing to doubt. There is no need to seek help from cultural relativism to find living space for traditional Chinese medicine.
I think many people have simply muddled the standard of truth, failing to distinguish what is right from what is wrong, and that is why they oppose traditional Chinese medicine. There are also people who have muddled the standard of truth and want to support traditional Chinese medicine with another set of reasons. They are all confused.
To put it bluntly, some anti-scientistic cultural people commit these two errors at the same time. On the level of truth, they in fact do not recognize the theories of traditional Chinese medicine, the Book of Changes, or Buddhism, and their reasons are no different from those of the XXs. But on the cultural level, they support traditional Chinese medicine and so on, giving reasons unrelated to truth. One head, two confusions.
Heidegger himself also muddled the standard of truth to the point that he could no longer distinguish right from wrong. On this point, don’t learn from him.
2007-06-14 13:35:23
I gave the example of traditional Chinese medicine to show that:
In scientific research, people in fact do not absolutely adhere, as is often supposed, to “predictability as the standard of truth,” while at the same time they consciously insist on this principle to exclude other standards.
What I am trying to do is theoretically demonstrate that other standards are equally reasonable, while at the same time showing that in scientific research people in fact also use other standards.
Also, let me say something: you have a habit I very much dislike. That is, with important figures and doctrines you are not very familiar with, you casually make a dismissive judgment without much basis. That is not good for your own academic development.
2007-06-14 14:11:02
【Many people have simply muddled the standard of truth, failing to distinguish what is right from what is wrong, and that is why they oppose traditional Chinese medicine.】
It can be seen that this standard is by no means one that everyone follows.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-15 11:42:00
“ I gave the example of traditional Chinese medicine to show that: in scientific research, people in fact do not absolutely adhere, as is often supposed, to ‘predictability as the standard of truth,’ while at the same time they consciously insist on this principle to exclude other standards.
What I am trying to do is theoretically demonstrate that other standards are equally reasonable, while at the same time showing that in scientific research people in fact also use other standards.”
————
The standards used by those who oppose traditional Chinese medicine are unreasonable. As long as one insists that correct prediction is the standard of truth, the problem of traditional Chinese medicine is very simple. How can you use those examples to “demonstrate that other standards are equally reasonable”?
“That is, with important figures and doctrines you are not very familiar with, you casually make a dismissive judgment without much basis. That is not good for your own academic development.”
———-
Is this referring to my evaluation of Heidegger, or to my evaluation of certain anti-scientistic cultural people? I take responsibility for everything I say. The fact that I did not state my basis in the post does not mean there was no basis. A post this short cannot spell everything out in detail. If you want to press the issue, I can explain in detail. If I was wrong, I declare my apology.
You also need not talk about academic development. What I was thinking of was: “According to Buddhist theory, the prediction is that YXY’s body will die, but his life will continue. If in this life he is sufficiently earnest, responsible, and beneficial to sentient beings, he will have the opportunity to live a better life in the next life.”
I stand by this principle. I think that undermining reasonable standards, and the disguised banishment of scientific theories such as traditional Chinese medicine, is not earnest, not responsible, harmful to sentient beings, and—perhaps without the person himself even realizing it—also irresponsible toward himself. Opposing these things benefits both sentient beings and the people being opposed themselves. I have nothing to worry about regarding the future.
[匿名] 新浪网友
2007-06-15 15:54:33
【How can you use those examples to “demonstrate that other standards are equally reasonable”?】
I already said it, and I’ll say it again:
I gave the example of traditional Chinese medicine to show that in scientific research, people in fact do not absolutely adhere, as is often supposed, to “predictability as the standard of truth,” while at the same time they consciously insist on this principle to exclude other standards.
The problem of evaluating traditional Chinese medicine fundamentally lies in the limitations of the basic paradigm of current scientific research; it is not to say that the way opponents of traditional Chinese medicine look at it necessarily violates the customary practice of scientific research.
Using standards other than predictability in scientific research is not, in itself, unreasonable. In standard physics research, it is actually the same. Otherwise science simply could not be carried on. On this point, I support the practice of the scientific community. (I am not anti-science!)
I am not likely to count 【certain anti-scientistic cultural people】 as important figures, am I! As for the later words, you are too agitated. We all may make mistakes.
The remark was about your evaluation of Heidegger.
【Heidegger himself also muddled the standard of truth to the point that he could no longer distinguish right from wrong. On this point, don’t learn from him.】
I suspect you are not very familiar with Heidegger. His line of thought has not necessarily been truly understood.
It seems that there were similar simplistic, crude criticisms of Cartwright before as well.
My reminder is well-intentioned, but with this kind of issue it is even harder to reach consensus and understanding. There is no need to continue expanding on such matters below.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-15 16:23:11
Whenever people deviate from the standard of “correct prediction,” problems arise in the development of a discipline.
I think that, regarding the issue of evaluating traditional Chinese medicine, the root of the matter lies in the fact that the way opponents of traditional Chinese medicine look at it violates the customary practice in scientific research; there is no need to discuss the “limitations of the basic paradigm of scientific research.”
I have of course only read a little of Heidegger’s line of thought; it doesn’t count as very familiar, though it is not completely unfamiliar either. However, his failure to distinguish right from wrong has been criticized by many people, and their words are much sharper and harsher than mine. Even if I don’t fully understand the situation, let me just follow along and talk nonsense. No need to expand on it.
As for the other person you mentioned, it sounds as if I’ve never even heard that name. I’ve forgotten which occasion it was. But it might well have been. I don’t think people are beyond criticism, and I also don’t think that one cannot criticize people without having read all of their works. As long as you grasp some key issues and have evidence, you can criticize.
I remember a famous master once saying: “Master Yinshun wrote ten million characters’ worth of material (at least several million); we must at least have read five million characters before we have the right to speak.” He used those words to suppress opposing views at a meeting. If you went to the conference, you’d definitely be in the opposition too—could you agree with him? And if you haven’t read so many characters, what are you basing your opposition on? That was a heavyweight authority, after all.
2007-06-15 17:17:57
1. Regarding the integrated use of multiple standards in scientific research practice, this is both a descriptive fact of the history of science and a normative defense in philosophy of science.
2. I already said: 【But with this kind of issue it is even harder to reach consensus and understanding. There is no need to continue expanding on such matters below.】
Because this is based on substantive judgment rather than formal judgment.
I don’t know how many people I have seen say that Heidegger is not a philosopher; some even say that Wittgenstein is a bubble, and some even exclude Kant from the ranks of the great philosophers.
Therefore, how to do scholarship well really does require a certain sense, and it is hard to reach agreement.
[匿名] 费米
2007-06-16 02:52:05
A brief recap:
［What we’re talking about is the standard of truth. YXY dying sooner or later is a correct prediction, so it satisfies this standard. Whether it is scientific or not, wait until you define science and then we can talk.］
I don’t understand matters of the soul, or matters of the next life, and I don’t care about them. Let’s just go along with your meaning and add the two words “the body.”
In your view, YXY (the body) will die; this is a correct prediction and satisfies the standard of整理, so “YXY (the body) will die” is, in your view, a truth.
Have I understood your meaning in a way that accords with your intention?
Why should whether it is scientific have to wait until I define science and then be discussed? What I am asking now is: according to your definition of science, is this judgment scientific or not? Does it necessarily have to be judged only on the basis of your definition of science?
［Of course, one can also ask: does a singular proposition count as truth? It probably should count, right.
If it doesn’t count, that’s fine too; in that case, it is merely a correct prediction, not truth.］
That is not my question; it is yours. But from the second half of your sentence, it looks as if you are patching your theory of truth. If singular propositions do not count as truth, then a correct prediction does not equal truth.
Then truth does not equal correct prediction either.
You’ve got a hole in your truth pocket.
[Anonymous] Fermi
2007-06-16 02:52:26
Classmate yxy has real confidence, and dares to speak; in the future he will surely become a first-rate master.
2007-06-16 10:19:53
To Fermi: I think Fermi is just Tian Song!
Stop fooling around, “Fermi,” hurry up and show yourself!
The “sweet-fans” have been waiting all along, haven’t they?
[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-16 15:15:39
Replying to Fermi:
You didn’t read the earlier posts carefully; you missed the point. Anyone looking on carefully can understand.
I made myself very clear: the discussion began from the issue of truth, and the subject of science was introduced by you, so it has to be defined by you.
The core of truth is the ability to make correct predictions. Whether to add a restriction on singular judgments can be discussed; in any case, that is a side issue. If you insist that there is a loophole, that’s fine.
You refuse to answer the question of the next life, so I’ll keep asking you: I think the meridian theory of Chinese medicine can correctly predict many physiological and pathological phenomena, and can guide acupuncture treatment. I think it is a correct theory, and it satisfies the standard of truth. Do you agree?
yxy is not a classmate, and not a teacher. He is a friend.
[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-16 15:47:51
Replying to Lao Jiang:
“1. Regarding the combined use of multiple standards in the practice of scientific research, this is both a descriptive fact from the history of science and a normative defense from philosophy of science.”
——–
This is where our basic disagreement lies. I say those standards can either be reduced to correct prediction, or else they are heuristic standards in the exploratory process; they can be used, but they cannot serve as the final standard.
You bring up the history of science and philosophy of science; I say that many people who do history of science have never done scientific research and do not have firsthand materials. There are also statements by some philosophers of science and scientists supporting my view, and I think Heidegger should also be on my side (you can consult Lao Wu about this point). I’m not afraid of fighting an authority battle.
“I don’t know how many people I’ve seen say that Heidegger is not a philosopher, and some even say Wittgenstein is froth; there are even people who exclude Kant from the ranks of the great philosophers.”
———
If we’re going to put it that way, then this needs to be clarified. I never said Heidegger’s philosophy was no good. I said that he could not tell right from wrong, that he could not see how much disaster Nazism would bring to humanity, and that he could not see the inevitable fate of Nazism’s failure. I believe all this is related to his doubting, and even abandoning, reasonable standards of truth. I don’t really want to say these things, and if I am misunderstood as saying that he is not a philosopher, then that has to be explained.
Heidegger questioned reasonable standards of truth; Nazism exalted superhuman politics. There is a logical connection here. If rational standards are unreliable, then whom do you rely on? On saints! Hitler dressed himself up as a super-rational superman, and reportedly he did indeed have certain special abilities. A superman has nothing to discuss with ordinary people, so his dictatorship is justified. Turning an entire nation insane—do you think that’s easy? It has a powerful intellectual foundation behind it.
2007-06-16 16:42:28
1. I think that, beyond predictability, whether there are independent standards that play a role is a matter on which most historians of science and philosophers of science today disagree with your view. Of course, this alone cannot prove that you are wrong; that has to be argued carefully in the context of academic debate. However, academic work must keep moving forward, and I myself have no doubts about this, so I do not plan to devote more energy to this issue.
2. There is no evidence showing that Heidegger’s philosophy necessarily led to his sympathetic political view of Nazism. His student Sartre was an active participant in the Resistance; his student and lover Arendt was a famous philosopher opposed to totalitarianism, and her philosophical views were basically consistent with Heidegger’s.
Most philosophers who opposed Heidegger did not criticize his philosophical views on this basis.
There were not a few scientists, even very traditional ones, who supported Nazism—certainly more than Heidegger’s disciples.
[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-16 17:15:40
As for the reason why Heidegger could not tell right from wrong, let me count it as my own view; if it is extended too far, it still needs careful argument. In any case, it is one individual view, and it can also be made internally coherent; take it or leave it as you please.
On the previous issue, you agree with the views of most historians of science and philosophers of science, and you “have no doubts about this yourself, so you do not plan to devote more energy to this issue.”
I have laid out all my specific reasons, and I have not seen any forceful rebuttal, so I too “have no doubts about this myself, so I do not plan to devote more energy to this issue.”
Each side has no doubts, each side has its own reasons for having no doubts, each side cannot convince the other, so let each side keep moving forward.
I’m just causing a little trouble so that you and the bystanders know that there is another point of view out there, one that is equally confident and equally free of doubt, and not easy to refute. Isn’t it a good thing if everyone thinks about it a bit more?
2007-06-16 21:46:38
1. “An individual view” is certainly true, but I don’t know where “it can also be made internally coherent” comes from.
2. I also stated the specific reasons; “not having seen any forceful rebuttal” may mean “not having seen it,” not “not having had it presented.”
3. The “another point of view” you mentioned does indeed exist among philosophers of science and historians of science.
[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-17 00:36:49
3. Since another point of view does indeed exist within the field, and you say you have no doubts about your own view, how do you regard that other point of view and the people who hold it? A bunch of people of low caliber mixed into the field spouting nonsense? Not worth serious consideration at all?
2. It may also be that we understand what counts as forceful differently; I have seen some opinions, but I do not think they are forceful. 1. I have never thought that citing authoritative views is a forceful reason. 2. My strategy of reducing multiple standards to correct prediction has a great deal of flexibility; randomly bringing up other standards cannot constitute a forceful rebuttal. 3. It is only something like what Heidegger did that really looks like trying to propose a standard that cannot be reduced—but even he did not succeed.
1. By “internally coherent,” I mean: 1. his inability to tell right from wrong is a fact. 2. In his philosophical thought, his opposition to taking predictability as the sole standard of truth is also a fact. 3. The standards he proposed as a countermeasure are not widely accepted, and are even hard to make clear, much less apply; that too is a fact. 4. I build a logically workable explanation between these facts, just as a scientist assembles a theory from a pile of experimental facts. To be able to link a pile of facts together in a logically self-consistent way, I think that is what is meant by being internally coherent.
[Anonymous] Xinzhai Lao Jiang
2007-06-17 09:28:38
1. In philosophy there are always different voices; minority views are not mainstream, but one cannot casually say others are of low caliber—they should all be taken seriously. I have already considered them. Of course you can say I have not considered them enough. But at any time, people cannot possibly entangle themselves endlessly in every issue; they need to make decisions to let go of certain issues. Of course, those who are willing to keep entangling themselves can continue, and they may well make something of it.
2. Since the understanding is different, there is no need to go into detail here. Put simply, no one can truly carry reduction all the way through.
3. You have misunderstood Heidegger’s meaning. When I say that you cannot make yourself internally coherent, it is because his students constitute counterexamples to your hypothesis.
[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-17 11:16:25
This set of discussions has reached 7,000 characters.
The first two points are my basic disagreement with the “anti-scientific culturalist” view; we have discussed them many times from different angles, and each time the result is more or less the same. I won’t get tangled up in it.
As for the third point, let’s count it as not being fully internally coherent. It’s just an individual view; take it or leave it as you please.
[Anonymous] Gu Chu
2007-06-17 20:37:37
What a long discussion… I didn’t finish reading it, so I’ll just say a couple of things at random:
As for the “standards” of science, aside from the noodle-like thing of predictability, of course there are ready-made dumplings to be found. There’s no need to borrow cultural pluralism; just look among scientists.
Predictability may be the thing most easily accepted by the general public, but the most cutting-edge top scientists, especially mathematicians and theoretical physicists, do not attach much importance to it.
What they value is the internal harmony and beauty of scientific theory. There are many examples: Einstein was not interested at all in verification concerning the bending of light rays; legend has it that he even refused to check a certain hypothesis just because “this equation” was not beautiful; as for Dirac, he is the most typical example, so I won’t say much. If mathematics is also counted as part of science, then any standard of natural predictability is even more completely irrelevant.
In short, besides the empiricist-style “standard,” there has always been at least another series of rationalist-style standards that are there as well; the noodles and the dumplings are both eaten by scientists, and in stimulating scientific revolutions—especially revolutions in physics—I think the impetus of aesthetic standards may be even greater.
Standards are definitely not unique; not only should they not be unique, in fact in the actual development of science they have never been unique.
[Anonymous] Gu Chu
2007-06-17 20:51:21
I read a little further, and it seems the issue I mentioned has already come up:
“You asked about self-evident principles and consistency with the overall worldview of the present moment; I think all of these depend on predictability.”
——————
That is correct. But the reverse is just as true: the standard of predictability also depends on self-evident principles and consistency with the worldview.
“If it doesn’t succeed, that means it has not won majority recognition; a standard that people do not recognize is not a standard.”
——————
Taking majority recognition as a “meta-standard” for testing standards is rather ambiguous. Which people are we talking about, exactly, and what does it mean to recognize? In fact, most people in society do not seriously reflect on the issue of scientific standards. If we were to do a questionnaire and ask, “Do you think testability is the highest standard of science?”, then indeed perhaps most people would nod; but if we didn’t ask that, and instead asked, “Do you think the internal logic and harmony of scientific theories are the highest standard?”, then I’m afraid most people would still nod. So how exactly should majority opinion be counted?
Even if one says that the standard of predictability is the most logically rigorous, the “majority recognition” meta-standard used to judge the success of this standard is in fact the least rigorous and least workable of all.
2007-06-17 21:21:27
Little Gu has read carefully.
I agree with the last post entirely; I had more or less that meaning earlier too. My ability to express myself has some problems—I always feel I’m talking in circles, not as straightforwardly as others. I don’t know how it ended up like this.
But the most important thing, in fact, was never mentioned in the earlier discussion, and that is that Heidegger’s truth is not discussed at the level of theoretical representation, but rather in an ontological sense; it goes one layer deeper.
[Anonymous] Gu Chu
2007-06-17 22:04:25
I’ve read little Heidegger, so I won’t claim too much. But I have read a bit about Heidegger on modern science and the mathematization of the world-picture, and actually, if we are talking about standards of truth, I think “mathematization” is one of the important main themes. For example, truth must be expressed quantitatively; if a discipline cannot be mathematized, then it is not science; if a theory cannot undergo quantitative calculation, then it is not scientific truth. Here the standard is not prediction, but mathematics. If we speak of “prediction,” then in contemporary science it must also mean predicting in a mathematical and quantitative way; if it cannot be quantified, then at most it is prophecy, not prediction, so in fact the mathematization standard comes before the standard of predictability.
This raises the question: even if we say that predictability is the standard, what counts as prediction, and what counts as better conformity to prediction? There are still some more basic “standards” at work here.
“If a standard fails, is it still a standard?
If a ruler measures inaccurately, is it still a ruler?”
——————
But a ruler is not that simple either. Whether it measures accurately depends not only on the ruler itself, but also on what is being measured, how it is measured, how we understand what counts as accurate, and so on. For example, a vernier caliper is precise enough, isn’t it? But if you use a vernier caliper to measure the width of a playground, will it be accurate? Whether a ruler is accurate or not still depends on how we use it; one cannot talk abstractly and in isolation about whether a ruler is accurate. The content of science is rich, and in different fields the most appropriate standards will not be uniform, let alone in fields outside science.
[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-18 10:49:25
Replying to Little Gu:
1. “You asked about self-evident principles and consistency with the overall worldview of the present moment; I think all of these depend on predictability.”
——————
That is correct. But the reverse is just as true: the standard of predictability also depends on self-evident principles and consistency with the worldview.
—————-
Wrong! The standard of predictability can stand apart from self-evident principles and consistency with the worldview. Take Chinese medicine, for example. You may not believe it because it does not fit your worldview. But that is only a subsidiary standard; if we get serious, we still have to come back to correct prediction. Chinese medicine can predict and guide treatment, so it satisfies the standard of correct prediction. That is why I say that if one adheres to the most basic standard, the Chinese medicine issue is very simple; Fang XX and others went wrong at this point, using a standard similar to the “two whatevers.” There are also some disrespectful things I have said about anti-scientistic cultural intellectuals, and they too come from this.
2. Taking majority recognition as a “meta-standard” for testing standards is rather ambiguous.
———-
I later added another criterion. Borrowing from biology, use the quality of human life and the continuation of the species as the standard. This standard should be acceptable to everyone. And it can basically lead to correct prediction. What else besides correct prediction can achieve this goal? In this way, several standards are logically unified.
[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-18 10:49:54
3. As for predictability, that may be the thing most readily accepted by the general public, but the most cutting-edge top scientists—especially mathematicians and theoretical physicists—do not value it that highly.
What they value is the inner harmony and beauty of scientific theories. One could cite many examples: Einstein was simply not interested in verifying the bending of light rays at all; legend has it that he even refused to check a certain hypothesis merely because “this equation” was not beautiful. As for Dirac, that is the most typical case, so I won’t say more. If mathematics is also counted as part of science, then what standard of natural predictability there is becomes even more completely beside the point.
——————
Dirac went off the deep end: he had some theories about the cosmological constant based on the principle of elegant symmetry, but scarcely anyone in the scientific community took them seriously. Harmony and symmetry can only be accepted if they can pass experimental verification; otherwise they are sent back to start over again (this was something a teacher in theoretical physics said many years ago). Go ask around at the Institute of Theoretical Physics and see how many very beautiful theories have been rejected because they failed the test of experiment. Who is the final standard is perfectly clear.
Symmetry and harmony are also approaches I like to use, but only as heuristic methods; they still need to be tested later. I also use yin-yang and the five phases, and that too is a kind of harmony and symmetry.
Mathematics is special. Most of the time, mathematics is still driven by solving practical problems, and it does accept the requirement of predictability. But there really are formal systems, artificially constructed, that accept only the standard of logical consistency and do not accept the standard of empirical testing. This still needs to be discussed.
4. If we speak of “prediction,” then the meaning of contemporary science certainly also involves making predictions mathematically and quantitatively; if it cannot be quantified, then at most it is prophecy, not prediction. So in fact the mathematical standard comes before the standard of predictability.
—————
What I mean by prediction includes both quantitative and qualitative prediction. Fermi’s prediction that yxy would sooner or later die was a qualitative prediction, and it was a correct one. Mathematization is a prerequisite for quantitative prediction, but not a prerequisite for prediction itself.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-18 11:00:42
Replying to Lao Jiang
But the most important thing, in fact, was not mentioned anywhere in the earlier discussion: Heidegger’s truth is not discussed at the level of theoretical representation, but in an ontological sense; it goes one level deeper.
—————
This is also what I wanted to say. His whole framework is not at the level of theoretical representation, so it is irrelevant to the problem we are discussing. One cannot criticize the standard of predictability on his behalf, because what others are talking about is not his issue. It is fine to refer to him in philosophy of science, but we should make it clear that these are two different directions.
I actually think quite highly of Heidegger; his direction is connected to Buddhism. But when seeking a higher standard, one must not throw away the lower standard as well. People who study Buddhism sometimes make this mistake too.
[匿名] 古雴
2007-06-18 12:25:07
2. Taking what most people recognize as the “meta-standard” for testing standards is very ambiguous.
———-
Later I added another point. Borrowing from biology, I take the standard to be the quality of human life and the continuation of the population. This standard should be acceptable to everyone. And it can basically lead to the correct prediction. What else besides correct prediction could achieve this goal? In this way, several standards are logically unified.
——————————————
Heh, this is really far too messy. I simply won’t accept it. I am a human being, and to require everyone to accept it is certainly impossible.
The quality of human life and the continuation of the species are not necessarily consistent with each other; staying alive is not necessarily living. This is exactly what is at issue in the debate over euthanasia: should life that has no claim to quality of life still be allowed to continue? It is therefore clear that quality of life and species continuation can conflict; at the very least, those who support euthanasia will all tell you that these are two different standards. At most they can be counted as plural standards, not merged into a single standard, and once merged together they certainly are not something everyone accepts. Likewise, correct prediction and quality of life are not necessarily consistent either. For a person to live well, is correct prediction necessarily required? If I tell a person with a terminal illness “the correct prediction”—that he has only two weeks left to live—versus telling him a wrong prediction: that maybe he can still live many years. In which case would the quality of the life remaining to him be higher?
Standards all have their proper context. Whether a ruler is accurate depends not only on the ruler itself but also on the context. If one detaches from all contexts and merely seeks unity in logic, it will not work.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-18 13:42:27
Personal quality of life and the continuation of humanity are indeed two issues; I know that. The relation between collectivism and individual freedom comes from this as well.
I estimate that you would not object to these two goals.
What you are still objecting to is the standard of correct prediction. But to achieve any goal at all, correct prediction is a prerequisite, whether it is personal quality of life or the continuation of humanity, as well as some other goals.
The doctor’s benevolent deception is also based on correct understanding. If one cannot predict that he has only two weeks to live, then deception or not deceiving him is equally meaningless.
I wonder whether you object to this point.
“Standards all have their proper context. Whether a ruler is accurate depends not only on the ruler itself but also on the context. If one detaches from all contexts and merely seeks unity in logic, it will not work.”
———–
Principles come first, and then one flexibly adjusts according to context. Without basic principles, what happens when one faces context? Often it is still some principle at a deeper psychological level that is at work. For example, last time we discussed materialism, and I said that many people may be relativizing all day long, but when they encounter concrete problems, the materialist intellectual foundation is still what operates. Talk of not fixing principles and the like is just a performance for other people.
[匿名] 古雴
2007-06-18 15:33:08
I really do not object to these “two” goals, and I also do not object to the standard of correct prediction. I am not saying we should stop talking about correct prediction; what I am saying is that it is not enough to talk only about correct prediction, only about improving quality of life, or only about inner rationality. So what I am saying is not that there should be no standards, or that correct prediction should be denied as a standard, but rather that there are many standards, and standards are not unique.
“Correct prediction is a prerequisite for achieving any goal” — that is of course not right. Perhaps for you, you have this requirement. But for me, perhaps in many cases it is not a bad thing to know the correct prediction, but it is certainly not a “prerequisite” for my happy life. Being so concerned with prediction is in fact also related to one’s worldview or values.
The contextual issue of a ruler is not merely a matter of some flexibility or lack thereof. The key point I want to make here is: you cannot talk about the accuracy of a ruler in isolation, detached from context. How do you determine that a ruler is accurate? By measuring it with a ruler itself? Even if a ruler can be folded up and used to measure itself, you still would not know whether the whole scale is biased high or low. To judge whether a ruler is accurate, one must place it within certain contexts for judgment, and different rulers need to be examined under different contexts. What is meant by “principles”? Basic principles are roughly just a basic guiding direction, for example, that a ruler is used to measure length. But under this principle, when one further establishes actual criteria of testing, those are again plural. My ruler analogy means that even if, as you say, one establishes only one principle—predictability—the “standards” established under that principle still cannot be unique. This is my concession, and I think you should at least admit this point. “Standards” are always plural. Then I further want to argue that “principles” are plural as well.
Teacher Jiang also has two levels of meaning. First, he is saying that in actual scientific activity, “standards” have in fact never been unique; they have merely been “counterfeited” as unique by propagandists. When real scientists conduct research, they use multiple standards, including mathematization, aesthetic standards, consistency with worldview, and so on. We should acknowledge that the real activity of science does not in fact follow a single standard. yxy also says that if everyone were to follow one standard, then in principle Chinese medicine ought to be accepted, but in fact scientists do not accept it, and the reason they do not accept it is precisely that they also employ another standard, namely whether it conforms to their worldview. So then the standards actually used in scientific activity are indeed plural, and to claim that predictability is the only standard is undoubtedly a kind of “counterfeiting.” And the second level is a discussion of how scientific activity “should” be. Teacher Jiang and I probably agree that standards should be plural, whereas yxy seems to say that standards should be unique. Yet yxy also says, “Other standards are not easy to find. None has been very successful so far,” and then brings in whether most people accept them—this is again using practicality to argue for reasonableness.
So first of all the issue should be made clear: are we discussing facts or shoulds? Although it is not impossible to argue from facts to oughts, we should still first make the issue clear.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-18 17:17:36
Brother Gu has analyzed it very well.
On the factual level, there are indeed many specific standards in scientific research activity. Lao Jiang also gave these examples.
On the level of what should be, I insist that correct prediction should be the only standard; other things are merely heuristic, and when they collide with correct prediction, they must yield. “Those other standards actually used are all counterfeit”—they are not standards at all, just heuristic methods. Things like harmony, as you mentioned, I also use, but I do not take them as standards. Don’t think that symmetrical theories are all good; a lot of theories with excellent symmetry are wrong.
It is precisely under this principle that I say the issue of Chinese medicine is actually very simple: if they can correctly predict physiological and pathological phenomena and treat them, then even if it does not conform to your worldview, it must still be accepted. Of course one can try to modify Chinese medicine theory under the condition that it conforms to one’s own worldview; if that does not succeed, then one must modify one’s worldview. If one thinks that “everything that does not conform to the worldview of modern science is wrong,” that is the “two whatevers,” scientism. Little Gu, surely you don’t think this way too. Haha.
The distinction between principles and standards is also very good. Correct prediction is the only principle; under this principle, many concrete methods and standards related to correct prediction can be used, and I agree with that. But the principle is unique, and the reasonableness of those concrete standards comes from their ability to bring about correct predictability.
When Heidegger criticizes predictability, he certainly does not mean “there are actually other standards in fact.” That would be far too insulting to Heidegger. I think he believed that predictability could summarize everything people ordinarily take to be standards, and then he proposed another standard in opposition to it; only then does one deserve to be called a great philosopher.
Lao Jiang’s line of thought is influenced by Heidegger, but if “not unique” predictability is understood as “there are actually other standards in scientific practice,” then I think Heidegger would sit up and say, “Don’t say you learned that from me!”
You say you do not care about prediction because you are a student and can talk without feeling the pain. When it comes to actually doing things, when can one get by without prediction? Imagine you are looking for a job: which direction to pursue, whether you can find one, what the future outcomes will be, and whether it aligns with your life ideals. Can any of this be separated from prediction? If you cannot find a suitable job, can you still live happily? The same is true of many things; think carefully and you will understand. Even if you do not understand now, once you leave school you will gradually understand.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-18 17:55:36
Think it through carefully, and there really are situations in which one can be happy without needing correct prediction. For example, dancing: while dancing, one feels happy, without needing prediction. The cost is not high either; it can be achieved without much planning.
Art is the same.
Academic research itself is the same. I myself derive pleasure from research. But in order to have the conditions for research, I have to plan.
Religious practice is the same. But in order to have the conditions for dedicated cultivation, one must also accumulate Dharma companions, material support, and a place to practice.
At the very least, it can be said that in many cases one needs prediction and planning in order to live better; with the ability to make correct predictions, a person can live better.
[匿名] 古雴
2007-06-18 18:28:32
No one has said that correct prediction has no benefits; correct prediction is of course very important. Still, I suddenly think that using Liu’s “double negation” is just right: correct prediction is very important for judging scientific truth, but it is neither sufficient nor necessary.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-18 22:06:57
Is it that comments over 50 are not shown?
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-18 22:13:18
It is a sufficient and necessary condition. Only this is a sufficient and necessary condition. Things like symmetry are double negations.
Anything that cannot correctly predict is certainly not truth. Anything that can correctly predict, even if not completely correct, is still truth in some respect, or close to truth.
Absolute truth is very hard to reach, and may not even exist at all. Being able to correctly predict is relative truth.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-18 22:20:46
But it seems one can say, “Grasping truth is very important for a happy life, but it is neither sufficient nor necessary.”
I think truth, at least relative truth, is basically just a tautology of correct predictability.
[匿名] 古雴
2007-06-19 10:21:57
From this it seems that brother yxy is an extreme instrumentalist: scientific theories only need to be useful, and have nothing to do with reality. For example, if there are two theoretical systems at the same time, such as the Copernican and Tychonic systems, which are completely equivalent in mathematics, and their ability to make correct predictions is the same, then even if they provide completely different pictures of physical reality, their distance from truth is also the same. Or, compared with the mature Ptolemaic system, the Copernican system when it was first established: the former’s ability to make correct predictions is stronger, while the latter’s advantage is only that it is slightly simpler; then we should regard the former as closer to truth than the latter.
Instrumentalism easily turns into relativism, and once it starts, it cannot be contained. Although one is still stressing “truth,” it is actually just a synonym for “useful,” and has nothing to do with “real.”
I personally also oppose realism, but I am not willing to side with instrumentalism either; it is a long story, and we can talk about it another time if there is a chance.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-19 10:51:20
Your summary is good.
I think that at the level of theoretical representation there is no need to emphasize reality. For example, I simply do not think the external world is real; I think it is just a dreamscape, more or less like what The Matrix says. But theories are still useful.
If we are talking about Heidegger, his framework really does aim to touch “the real,” and I approve of his direction. But that is another field; it has little to do with philosophy of science, and it cannot really be used in the scientific domain either. Moreover, his results are a bit inferior to Buddhism.
In philosophy of science, I lean toward the constructive empiricist position, the view in
I am an instrumentalist who emphasizes principles and standards, so I will not turn into relativism.
Analyzing the Copernican example would be more complicated; it would require the theory of confidence, which belongs to the domain of inductive logic. In the end it also serves the purpose of correct prediction.
[新斋老蒋
2007-06-19 22:57:00
These past two days my computer has had some problems, and on top of that I’ve been busy with some baffling stuff. Today I’ll squeeze out a little time to say a few words and then leave.
Heidegger’s “mathematization” is very important, but it is not merely a matter of using mathematics as a tool; the key lies in what is called “the mathematical.” First it sets nature as homogeneous, stripping nature of its inner character and turning it into something purely external, essentially measurable. Only then does the issue of taking “predictability” as the standard of truth arise.
Heidegger’s thought is by no means irrelevant to philosophy of science. He goes one step deeper than philosophers who take an analytic-philosophy route. Wu Guosheng’s proposal of a second kind of philosophy of science was insightful, although it did not later produce many research results.
Heidegger’s critique of the standard of predictability indeed, as yxy said, does not involve the standards other than predictability that I emphasize in scientific practice. But I think this is because old Heidegger was not thorough enough. He keenly recognized that practical relations are deeper than theoretical relations, but he mistakenly believed that science is essentially merely theoretical; he did not deeply understand the practicality of science, and did not realize that even successful operation within science cannot do without the ready-to-hand mode, and cannot merely remain in contemplative observation of “present-at-hand” things. It should be said that Rouse is continuing from where Heidegger left off. Of course my earlier remarks also never claimed that it was Heidegger who said that standards other than predictability are at work in fact. I support his opposition to predictability as the sole standard of truth, and then I put forward some arguments of my own. Whether they are right or wrong can be discussed, but what exactly I am saying, and how I am saying it, must not be mistaken.
[匿名] 新斋老蒋
2007-06-19 23:24:31
I support yxy’s basic instrumentalist position; Xiao Gu’s thought is still more classical and more Western.
However, yxy’s instrumentalism is only half-baked: it is an instrumentalism that clings stubbornly to the level of theoretical representation (this is why he thinks Heidegger is useless for philosophy of science). In fact, theoretical representational activity itself is also part of instrumental activity, and its legitimacy and rationality must be discussed by appealing to humanity’s overall practice. That is why Xiao Gu repeatedly reminds us to consider the situation, while yxy keeps pulling things back to standards.
yxy seems to think that the “predictability standard” can function independently. He has not seriously considered scientific practice. Of course, one can also describe other standards as manifestations of the “predictability standard,” but that no longer means much, except as a rhetorical device. To shrink the rich content of truth and squeeze it into a formula is, in the end, simply to say that “predictability” is “predictability.”
[Anonymous] Gu Chu
2007-06-19 23:56:15
Teacher Jiang’s summary is excellent. Actually, up to this point the discussion is more or less enough; the main thing is that everyone’s line of thought and position have become a bit clearer. If we go deeper, my accumulation of knowledge is not enough, and I really still need to cultivate myself.
As far as I am concerned, pluralism is my basic concern and will not change, but now I would prefer to retreat to a classical starting point and rebuild pluralism. If that road does not work, then in the future I may give up the classical position, but I will not give up pluralism. But since I have not seriously tried it yet, I will not give up until I run into a wall! Some people say that postmodernity seems trendy but is actually a retreat; I don’t know exactly how it is, anyway I’ll just openly retreat then~
[Anonymous] Someone
2007-06-20 10:59:48
Teacher Wu Guosheng has been planning to write a Comprehensive History of Science. It would not only record the achievements of the history of science, but would also intend to shake out all the processes of how mathematization/quantification/predictabilization were concretely realized in history. It seems this has been planned for over ten years. Exactly when it can be written, nobody knows yet; it depends on Teacher Wu’s plan.
[Anonymous] Xinzhai Lao Jiang
2007-06-20 15:45:16
Xiao Gu’s idea is good.
Academically, from a certain angle, what position one takes is not especially important; the key is to “try seriously.” If it were not for people like Carnap seriously trying logical reconstruction, perhaps even now some people would still think the ideal of logical positivism might be feasible.
[Anonymous] Someone
2007-06-21 11:50:45
The old Heidegger is not thorough enough… He keenly realized that practical relations are deeper than theoretical relations, but he mistakenly thought that science was essentially only theoretical, and did not deeply grasp the practical character of science,
———————————-
Teacher Jiang: Is it possible for a purely theoretical “science” to exist?
[Anonymous] Xinzhai Lao Jiang
2007-06-21 12:31:05
I think that, ultimately, purely theoretical “science” does not exist.
At bottom, science is a mode of human being-in-the-world.
Of course, this involves defining “theoretical,” and that easily leads to wrangling.
[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-21 15:41:33
1. If Heidegger’s predictability refers only to mathematized predictability, then my thought is still very different from his. My correct predictability is broad in scope; it does not have to be quantitative. Many concrete standards and principles, if carefully analyzed, can be summarized as prediction. So I think I have grasped the most essential thing. If someone says there is something even better, of course I want to discuss it. If it is only quantitative prediction, then that is not profound enough.
2. I really do think more about theory and less about practice. For the moment I still can’t turn that around.
3. “If it were not for people like Carnap seriously trying logical reconstruction, perhaps even now some people would still think the ideal of logical positivism might be feasible.”
———-
I basically think the ideal of logical positivism is feasible, of course from an instrumentalist standpoint: that science is the work of constructing theoretical tools according to correct prediction and confidence level as standards. It is probably different from classical logical positivism, but the direction is the same.
Carnap later studied inductive logic, but the confidence level of universal propositions was 0; after being dealt this fatal blow, this road was no longer walked. In fact, later the Finnish school perfected his inductive logic, and this road could have been walked again, but people’s attention was already elsewhere.
2007-06-21 15:54:25
There are two relatively comprehensive articles discussing my views; you can see them on yangxinyu’s blog.
<On the Relationship Between Science and Religion from the Perspective of Public Choice>
<On the Theory of Confidence Levels>
The former discusses the relationship between accurate prediction and confidence level, and also mentions the relationship between other standards and these two standards.
The latter discusses the relationship between inductive logic and confidence level.
[Anonymous] Xinzhai Lao Jiang
2007-06-21 16:42:24
yxy always thinks at the final level. Here, “mathematization” is not merely a matter of “quantification.”
I have said: [Heidegger’s “mathematization” is very important, but it is not merely the use of mathematics as a tool; rather, the key lies in the so-called “mathematical,” which first posits the homogenization of nature, causing nature to lose its interiority and become something purely external and essentially measurable; only then does the issue of “predictability” as a standard of truth emerge.]
For example, only after nature has been “mathematized” is it possible to consider the sharply different “heaven” and “earth” in Aristotle’s theory together and think that they obey the same laws. So the key is what he emphasizes as the “mathematical”; he thinks the importance of mathematics lies precisely in its ability to express the “mathematical.”
[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-21 17:23:26
“first posits the homogenization of nature, causing nature to lose its interiority and become something purely external and essentially measurable,”
————-
Described like that, mathematization is certainly rather profound.
But I want to ask a question: who really thinks that nature is not homogenized, that nature has its interiority, that nature is not something purely external and essentially measurable? Such a world should be full of possibilities for change, and should not so rigidly obey laws. That is really what I think; in A Brief Discussion of the Worldview of Consciousness-Only, I call it the “life-world model,” inspired by Wu Guosheng, and I think this is what Wu Guosheng means by another philosophy of science. It’s just that it is not philosophy at all, but a model of the world different from modern science, another kind of science.
I think many people simply do not believe the world has lifeness, so they simply have not broken out of the mathematized worldview.
If you break out of the mathematized worldview, does that mean you can no longer predict? No, you can still use correct prediction as the standard for whether a theory is correct. For example, why do I think the life-world model is more correct than the mathematized world model? Because it can predict the existence of anomalous phenomena, whereas the mathematized world model completely rules out this possibility. Since such phenomena do in fact exist, it is more correct.
The standard of correct prediction does not need to take the mathematized worldview as its premise.
[Anonymous] Xinzhai Lao Jiang
2007-06-22 23:07:16
1. Indeed many people have not broken out of the mathematized worldview, so the old Heidegger’s thought has value.
2. Prediction of course is possible; the key is taking predictability as the sole standard of truth, and that involves the mathematized worldview.
[Anonymous] Someone
2007-06-23 04:59:05
If you break out of the mathematized worldview, does that mean you can no longer predict? No, you can still use correct prediction as the standard for whether a theory is correct. For example, why do I think the life-world model is more correct than the mathematized world model? Because it can predict the existence of anomalous phenomena, whereas the mathematized world model completely rules out this possibility. Since such phenomena do in fact exist, it is more correct.
————————————-
Mathematics is not only about quantity. Mathematics is an a priori-synthetic judgment.
The “life-world” has no “model.”
[Anonymous] Gu Chu
2007-06-23 09:25:30
“Someone” is right: mathematization is not just quantification; “model” is also a mathematical thing.
I am not clear about yxy’s specific theory, so I do not dare make rash comments. However, I do wonder whether this science of the life-world can “support downward compatibility”? I think that is probably difficult. Because modern science is an enormous system as a whole; the reason scientists cannot accept many anomalous phenomena is not only a lack of evidence. Another point is that once certain anomalous phenomena are acknowledged, it will necessarily require major changes to the existing theoretical system and the rewriting of many existing conclusions. Then, if the new theory cannot be compatible with existing science, even if in certain fields, judged by another set of standards that some scientists do not recognize, the science of the life-world has stronger predictive power, nevertheless in other fields—such as predicting planetary motion, predicting chemical reactions, physical changes, predicting the operation of precision instruments—I think the so-called science of the life-world would in any case not be able to be more effective than mainstream science, would it? According to the predictability standard, the status of mainstream mathematized science still cannot be shaken. And this new “model” could at most serve as an addition to the original science, specially studying the so-called anomalous phenomena. Then giving up quantification in this area does not really count for much; in fact, within the original scientific system there can also be some marginal parts that emphasize qualitative analysis more than quantitative analysis.
2007-06-25 00:36:42
All three of you have expanded the concept of mathematics. Someone is the most extreme: a priori synthetic judgment—probably anything that uses logical-rational methods is called mathematics, right? I wonder whether that was really what the old Heidegger meant. Anyway, it is hard for ordinary people to understand.
I generally do not use the expression “mathematized worldview”; I use “rigid” and “closed,” and lifeness is opposed to rigidity and closure. Because Lao Jiang mentioned that the mathematized worldview is “the positing of the homogenization of nature, causing nature to lose its interiority and become something purely external and essentially measurable,” that happens to be exactly consistent with my definition of a rigid and closed worldview, so I continued along those lines. If the definition keeps being revised, then I won’t keep revising it too. Let’s go back to the most general and most popular understanding, okay?
According to Lao Jiang’s definition, I say its opposite is the life-world model. The key point of the life-world model is to deny absolute time-translation invariance and absolute space-translation invariance. These two points both occurred to me when I was reading Old Wu’s books, and I was inspired by them. These two points are also important foundations for mathematics in describing the world. Aren’t the natural numbers constructed from 1 by infinitely many successors?
These two kinds of translation invariance are of course only beliefs, and have no foundation. I think if everyone thinks carefully, they can agree to abandon them. And the result of seriously abandoning them is: do not think that because a pill cannot pass through a bottle in your hands, it absolutely cannot pass through a bottle; in another time and space, it is entirely possible. Isn’t the subtext of not accepting anomalous phenomena precisely not giving up the two invariances?
Please, Someone and Xiao Gu, think it over deeply.
The life-world model will not be incompatible with science, because it accepts that scientific theory is right in most cases, but only opposes absolutizing it into scientism, acknowledging that in most cases things operate according to scientific laws, but in some cases they can also fail to do so. Isn’t that compatible?
[Anonymous] Someone
2007-06-25 08:58:27
Mathematics being an a priori synthetic judgment comes from Kant, not Heidegger.
Denying absolute time-translation invariance and space-translation invariance,
－－－－－－－－－
Denying these two does not equal the “life-world”—Husserl’s “life-world.” Such phenomena, Heidegger would call the antithesis of metaphysics, yet an antithesis of a metaphysical proposition is still a metaphysical proposition.
[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-25 10:19:41
My understanding of mathematics is very narrow. Later Lao Jiang said that mine was the lowest level,
【Heidegger’s “mathematization” is very important, but it is not merely the use of mathematics as a tool; rather, the key lies in the so-called “mathematical,” which first posits the homogenization of nature, causing nature to lose its interiority and become something purely external and essentially measurable,】
and you said “Mathematics is not only about quantity. Mathematics is an a priori-synthetic judgment. Mathematics as an a priori synthetic judgment comes from Kant, not Heidegger.”
Since this discussion started from the old Heidegger, using his definition is still reasonable enough. Let’s not use Kant’s definition, okay.
The life-world model is not the same as the life-world; this term is my own usage and has nothing to do with Husserl. Of course, in coining it I was once inspired by him.
The right to define this concept is mine; you don’t need to keep bringing in others to modify it.
The reason I brought up this concept is precisely to show that many people, while talking about the homogenization and mathematization of nature, have not seriously considered what a non-homogenized, non-mathematized nature would look like. It is like someone who keeps shouting that noodles are not tasty, but has never eaten dumplings, or even studied how to make dumplings; he is just shouting that noodles are bad. I merely want to bring out the dumplings and say, “Hey! Stop shouting and try the dumplings first.”
[Anonymous] Someone
2007-06-25 14:22:47
I’ve always felt that your understanding is not quite clear enough; compared with the old Heidegger, Kant, and Husserl, you still fall a bit short.
As for what Heidegger said about mathematics, he did not depart from Kant. You can understand Heidegger’s formulation as an upgraded version that is downward-compatible with Kant.
Whether buns or dumplings taste better, after all one is still eating, and eating “buns” or “dumplings”; if a person is hungry he eats, thirsty he drinks, sleepy he sleeps—does he really need to be clear about the name of what is being “eaten”?
[Anonymous] Gu Chu
2007-06-25 23:49:44
In Kant, “nature” is mathematical. But the thing-in-itself is beyond what mathematics can reach. Kant’s setting limits on knowledge is in fact setting limits on mathematics. I very much appreciate Kant’s approach of setting limits on science, but Kant’s deficiency is the lack of philosophy of language and philosophy of technology.
“Do not think that because a pill cannot pass through a bottle in your hands, it absolutely cannot pass through a bottle; in another time and space, it is entirely possible. Isn’t the subtext of not accepting anomalous phenomena precisely not giving up the two invariances?”
————I do not think that pills absolutely cannot pass through bottles; I just don’t believe anyone really can pull off pill-through-bottle. Perhaps yxy brother has witnessed it, but I have not witnessed it, and I have also not read a convincing theoretical prediction—how could I be so credulous? We need not look elsewhere; quantum mechanics says everything is only possible. We also need not look to masters of special powers; pills can automatically pass through bottles at any time, and a pill can even fly to Mars in the blink of an eye. But even though I know this is not physically impossible, I still do not believe it really can happen. Why must I believe in pill-through-bottle? For example, suppose I say one person can lift a ten-thousand-ton mountain, and another person can run one kilometer in one second—these are not absolutely impossible in physics, but do you believe them? I do not believe in special powers not because I think they are logically impossible (don’t think I’m Fang Zhouzi), but because I do not believe anyone can actually do it (my experience is limited, after all…). And we are now discussing theoretical issues; it is really pointless to keep bringing up these things to draw boundaries.
[Anonymous] Someone
2007-06-26 05:58:29
Kant’s philosophy of technology is not lacking; you need to look for it in the Critique of Practical Reason.
[Anonymous] yxy
2007-06-26 11:31:44
When discussing a question, as long as everyone can understand the point, there’s no need to insist on measuring up to some grand authority in order to count as professional. In philosophy, conceptual definitions are the most troublesome thing of all; everyone has their own understanding of Kant and Heidegger, and even Gu Yun and so-and-so can’t be made to line up perfectly. If we keep tangling ourselves up in that sort of thing, won’t our own topic never get discussed at all?
Xiao Gu’s use of quantum mechanics to explain the pill going through the bottle shows that you did not understand the two translational invariances, nor did you understand what I meant by the lifeworld. This is the key point, and you shouldn’t find it tiresome.
I am an instrumentalist; theories are only models constructed on the basis of experience. But constructivist empiricism and positivism are connected. The appendix to <科学的形象> goes back from constructivism to realism, using a metaphysical argument derived from Christianity. I read it and found it very interesting; I thought about it for a long time, and finally understood that the key issue here is this: if one thinks that laws are invariant, then constructivist empiricism and realism are basically no different! The crucial disagreement is whether one recognizes that laws may change! When I say that I have gone one step further than constructivist empiricism, that is where it lies.
To deny the two translational invariances is to say that laws may change at certain times, and that things may happen that completely violate scientific laws. But when you use quantum mechanics to explain the pill going through the bottle, you are still assuming that the laws of quantum mechanics satisfy the two translational invariances. There is an essential difference here! Please think it over carefully.
Remember: the laws of quantum mechanics are also inductively derived; there is never any reason to believe that an inductively derived universal proposition is absolutely correct. Denying the two translational invariances is nothing more than reiterating this point.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-26 11:41:56
The story of the noodles and the dumplings is about the fact that one must not only negate; while negating what is wrong, one must also produce what is right. Don’t be like Li Ao’s so-called intellectuals, forever opposed, forever picking faults, forever being a contrarian for its own sake. (I remember there used to be someone named Tian Song, who was very fond of Li Ao and thought that this was what an intellectual should be. I feel that some of someone’s ideas are a bit like his, but on this point, by all means don’t imitate him.)
I think that when saying noodles are not tasty, one should bring out tastier dumplings; otherwise, if you block people from eating noodles, aren’t you simply leaving them hungry?
If you say that the standard of correct prediction generally accepted by people is not good, then you should produce a better standard.
If you say that a mathematized worldview, a worldview that homogenizes nature, is not good, then bring out a worldview that is neither homogenized nor mathematized.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-26 12:08:38
The worst thing is to criticize, with righteous indignation, a mathematized, homogenized worldview on the one hand, while on the other hand clinging to a set of worldview assumptions that is mathematized, homogenized, and governed by two translational invariances.
It is like telling others that noodles are not tasty while secretly eating one’s fill of noodles.
This reminds me of an essay by Feng Jicai called “Three-Inch Golden Lotus,” in which he depicts an intellectual from the early Republican period who fiercely opposed foot-binding and gave speeches everywhere, full of passion and righteous fervor. Before each speech, he would go to a little room, take out a bundle of tiny shoes from his bag, sniff them for a while to get his fix, and then stride out energetically to denounce bound feet.
[匿名] 新齋老蔣
2007-06-26 14:54:42
【The worst thing is to criticize, with righteous indignation, a mathematized, homogenized worldview on the one hand, while on the other hand clinging to a set of worldview assumptions that is mathematized, homogenized, and governed by two translational invariances.】
It is certainly not the best state of affairs if one’s thought contains contradictions, but it may not necessarily be the worst state of affairs.
I think that, in the process of people’s thought evolving, a certain degree of contradiction is probably unavoidable; even those who think others have this flaw may not themselves have truly avoided it.
The key is the direction of its development.
For example, some people care only about pets, and turn a blind eye to the suffering of livestock. Of course, from the perspective of animal protection, we may criticize their attitude toward animals as inconsistent.
But we still think they are better than those who abuse all animals, even though they are not as “logically consistent” as the latter.
Take the example you gave: this person is also better than a literatus who consistently praises bound feet in both word and deed. He may have come to realize intellectually that bound feet are cruel and immoral, but physiologically or aesthetically he has already been locked in to a great extent. Such a person, still overcoming an extremely difficult temptation and persisting in opposing bound feet, deserves both our pity and our admiration.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-26 15:07:12
What Lao Jiang says also makes sense.
We should look at problems from the perspective of development.
[匿名] 古雴
2007-06-28 17:13:37
Saying that laws are absolute is not the same as saying that laws are unchanging. If a law changes, then if one says that the change itself also follows a law, then there is still a higher-level law; but if one says that the change of laws follows no law at all, then what exactly are we seeking? How can an unpredictable law still be a law?
I am not denying that laws may change; I simply think that this lies beyond the capacity of science. At the very beginning of <最后的沉思>, Poincaré raises this question: “Are the laws of nature not liable to change lightly? If the world is in continuous evolution, then is the law governing this evolution of the world itself uniquely excluded from all change? Such a concept has never been accepted by scientists; in the sense that he may understand the meaning of this concept, a scientist will not accept it unless one denies the rationality and the genuine possibility of science. But philosophers retain the right to ask this question, so as to consider the various answers that it delimits and examine the consequences of these answers, …” I agree with Poincaré: the possible change of laws is something that needs to be considered, but the one capable of considering it is philosophy, not science.
Forgive me for the antiquatedness of my thinking, but I really cannot understand these new interpretations of “law” and “prediction.” Since they so thoroughly overturn the traditional usage of these words, why not simply find new terms to avoid confusion? Why not just redefine science as any kind of “learning” at all?
In addition, I must state that, as a pluralist, I have never advocated that “noodles are not tasty.” Noodles are very tasty; dumplings are also very tasty. What I oppose is dogmatism: the claim that in this world only noodles are tasty, or even only noodles are edible, that one can eat nothing but noodles every day. That is what I oppose. Of course I will continue to eat noodles; who said noodles are not tasty?
[匿名] 古雴
2007-06-28 17:49:10
A supplementary note: although I suggest that brother yxy find new terms, if one insists on using this vocabulary, that is of course also possible. In that case, for me, brother yxy’s “science” and mainstream science will have “incommensurability”: although the vocabulary used is similar, the entire language system is already situated within different paradigms. Thus these two sciences are difficult to make commensurable and difficult to subsume one under the other. In this sense, I can support brother yxy’s science, but only on the premise of pluralism; yxy’s “science” cannot replace mainstream science.
The pluralist’s menu is rich: we like to eat both noodles and dumplings. We think that if one wants to claim that dumplings are tasty, one does not necessarily have to give up eating noodles; even if I myself do not like dumplings, I cannot force the claim that dumplings are also not tasty for others. Brother yxy does not necessarily have to agree with pluralism’s claims, but at least he should make our claims clear and not mix things up: when others are clearly only saying that dumplings may also be very tasty, and have not said that noodles are definitely not tasty, one should not take them to be saying that.
[匿名] yxy
2007-06-28 23:02:32
Accepting that laws may evolve is already one step further; this is also the view of certain postmodern sciences.
One step further still is the possibility that laws may suddenly change, not constrained by any higher-level laws. That is also possible, isn’t it?
If the change in laws is influenced by human consciousness, then this falls within the scope of bodily science.
These situations all go beyond a worldview governed by the two translational invariances, and I call them all lifeworld models. The last kind, because it is related to consciousness, is still a subject-object resonance model.
I often call those theories “worldviews,” “models,” and so on, and generally do not call them science, because they are easily confused with science in the narrow sense. But I think these models are trying to predict and explain empirical phenomena, and are on the same level as science; they belong to science in the broad sense. Philosophy, however, should be at a higher level. That is why I say that Lao Wu’s second kind of philosophy of science is, in fact, another kind of science.
I feel that pluralism is hard to be thoroughgoing about, because plurality can only be superficial; in one’s innermost heart, it is hard to be plural. When speaking to others, one can be pluralistic, but when using things oneself, one can only be monistic. For example, Buddhism’s worldview requires one not to eat meat, whereas the scientific worldview says eating meat does not matter. How can there be pluralism in such a case? Whether to eat or not to eat can only mean choosing one.
The noodles-and-dumplings example first came up when I was discussing with Lao Jiang, and it had nothing to do with pluralism. The main point was that if one thinks something is bad, one should produce something to replace it; one cannot only tear down without building up, leaving people hanging without caring where they land.
Because everyone mentioned modern science’s homogenizing understanding of nature, I took a critical stance. So I said that if one criticizes noodles, one ought to bring out dumplings; one cannot leave people hanging. I demonstrated what kind of dumplings should be made in response to a critique of homogenization. But it seems many people still cannot accept that. What I want to say is that if one cannot accept these dumplings, then one basically has no right to criticize science’s homogenized worldview either. Homogenized and non-homogenized: can one really reject both sides? That would just make one a contrarian.
Of course, one can try other forms of non-homogenized models; if anyone can come up with one, that would be best. I happen to want to enrich the lifeworld model anyway. It would be perfect to take it and use it.
2007-07-05 11:28:46
I summarized this discussion and put it up on my blog.
This discussion is very long, took a great deal of effort, and was also fairly thorough.
If anyone still has new thoughts, you are welcome to continue there.
2007-07-05 11:57:45
I also put up the discussion about being taken in as well.
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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