This was also a topic discussed with ZW last night.
Q: Why is philosophy of science, unlike philosophy of history, political philosophy, and so on, able to become an independent second-level discipline?
A: The philosophy of science became an independent second-level discipline for both historical and contemporary reasons. The historical reason is that philosophy of science was originally what was called “dialectics of nature”; in that era, it was an attempt to provide methodological “guidance” for science, and this is an institutional arrangement left over from history. The contemporary reason is this: ours is precisely the age of so-called “science and technology”; almost all the problems this age faces—questions of values, questions of belief, environmental problems, bioethical issues, globalization, and so on—are all closely related to the development of science and technology. So one might say that philosophy of science is the field that confronts this era itself most directly; it is a very broad topic, and also a very important one.
Q: Philosophy of science has no disciplinary genealogy, its line of development is unclear, and its long-term development is not guaranteed.
A: Philosophy of science is an emerging field, and unlike Chinese philosophy, Western philosophy, or Marxism, its academic lineage is very unclear. Moreover, the scope covered by philosophy of science is very mixed. For example, both scientistic people and opponents of scientism can be called philosophy of science; it includes environmental ethics, science and religion, sociology of science, science communication studies, history of science, and so on. These are mostly what are called “interdisciplinary fields” or “marginal fields”; that is to say, philosophy of science is “struggling to survive in the cracks.” Such a situation leaves philosophy of science without a solid foundation, without clues for later generations to trace its roots, and its long-term development is indeed lacking in guarantee. Will it be like the boom in aesthetics, which flares up for a while and then fades away? However, whether it can endure over the long term is not something we need to care about, because philosophy of science faces real social problems and the urgent needs of the age. So if in the future this age no longer has such urgent needs—that is, if philosophy is no longer needed to reflect on the predicaments brought by the development of science and technology—then philosophy of science will no longer be important. In fact, that is exactly what we hope for most. It is like doing environmental philosophy: if our environmental problems are no longer so prominent, then this academic field will be hard pressed to continue developing, and would that not be the ultimate goal toward which we are striving? I would actually hope that the lifespan of philosophy of science as a discipline is as short as possible, and hope that our age can as soon as possible emerge from the many predicaments brought by science and technology. But in fact, for quite a long period of time, these predicaments are very hard to dispel. As long as the predicaments still exist, philosophy of science has the mission of surviving.
Q: Can philosophy of science answer the question “What is science?” Shouldn’t this be a question that scientists are more qualified to answer?
A: On the one hand, there are humanistic scholars discussing “what science is”; on the other hand, there are those great scientists telling us what “science is” out of their own firsthand experience. Which side is more credible, and more worth listening to? — Personally, I have enormous respect for the humanistic thought of scientists. I think humanistic scholars are not qualified to point fingers at scientists and tell them what science is; the insights scientists derive from a lifetime of practice are undoubtedly more profound. That is why what I most like to read are the humanistic essays written by great scientists—for example, Einstein discussing science and religion, Hume, Kant, and Mach; Schrödinger discussing ancient Greek philosophy and Indian Vedanta philosophy, discussing what life is; Paul Davies discussing God and the new physics; Prigogine discussing chaos and order; Lovelock and Margulis discussing symbiosis and Gaia; Roger Penrose discussing mind and artificial intelligence; Capra discussing physics and Eastern philosophy; Kip Thorne discussing time and space; Gribbin discussing quanta, the cosmos, and genes; Feynman discussing the nature of physical law; Carl Sagan discussing science and pseudoscience; David Bohm discussing causality, holism, and implicate order; Gould discussing evolution and humanity… These are all things that deeply attract me. It is no longer merely that scientists are more qualified to talk about “what science is”; scientists are participating in the discussion of many topics that originally belonged to philosophers—what life is, who we are, where we are, what we should do—and the domains of traditional humanistic scholars are also being challenged by scientists. Scientists are beginning to speak up in the fields of philosophy and the humanities and social sciences too! — I listen very attentively to what scientists have to say, and their words deserve respect and attention from the humanities world! Gould pointed out a problem: the humanities world is far too lacking in understanding of science. He said that, of course, many scientists do not know Shakespeare, but no scientist takes pride in not knowing Shakespeare; yet there are precisely many humanistic scholars and artists who take pride in not understanding science! — In China, this situation seems even more serious: scientists have no culture, while cultured people do not understand science! And the key point is that this “not knowing” has not become a shame for either side; instead, it has become mutual indifference, even mutual disdain! After reading many such books, I became deeply disappointed both in popular science works written by Chinese scientists and in works written by Chinese humanistic scholars discussing science. But the only thing that truly cheered me was reading the work of our philosophy of science circle—Teacher Wu Guosheng, Teacher Liu Huajie, and others. They showed me the hope of communication and integration between science and the humanities! I feel that philosophy is precisely such a bridge: philosophy can enter the cracks between disciplines and devote itself to the blending of disciplines! Philosophy of science absolutely cannot be in the business of directing science; on the contrary, when philosophy of science listens to scientists’ accounts, it is the attitude of a layperson humbly seeking instruction from an expert. What philosophy of science can do is work hand in hand with scientists and philosophers to answer the question of what science “means.” Of course, that is not to say that scientists can direct philosophy. If some scientist tells me that the power of science is unlimited and that science can solve all problems, then of course I must strongly oppose that, because in fact there are other scientists who tell me the opposite. Then I can make a choice and support the things I believe in.
Q: Anti-scientism is only one step away from anti-science
A: Opposing scientism is my most basic position; opposing scientism is precisely a way of defending the nobility of science! This stance of philosophy of science often puts it in the awkward position of “pleasing neither side.” For example, when we do “science and religion,” we do it in order to affirm both science and religion, yet we often end up being recognized by neither the scientific community nor the religious community. As for me personally, on the one hand I strongly oppose pseudoscience and mystical science; on the other hand I also oppose the supremacy of science and leaving room for irrational, unscientific things. In that case, we will be hated by pseudoscientists, and we will also have to bear attacks from anti-pseudoscience fighters such as Fang Zhouzi. This is indeed a difficult problem to solve. But at least my own position is very clear to myself, just as pluralism (perspectivism) is easily liable to slide toward dogmatism and also easily liable to slip into relativism, yet in fact it is sharply distinct from both. The development of intellectual currents often follows precisely this kind of thesis-antithesis-synthesis trend: with positivism’s exaltation of science to supremacy, there follows in quick succession humanism that exalts human nature and even irrationalism that negates science; and ultimately scientism and humanism will also tend toward integration. I believe that although my position is sometimes disliked by both sides, in the end it conforms to the ultimate direction of this whole series of intellectual currents.
Q: Philosophy of science lacks philosophical flavor.
A: Many fields of philosophy of science—such as sociology of science, science communication studies, history of science, and so on—seem to be interdisciplinary fields of two other disciplines. If there is philosophy at all, it is only as a bridge, or even merely as a kind of “lubricant”; indeed, it is easy for them to lack philosophical depth! I admit that if one is doing philosophy, metaphysics as the foundation is the most important thing. If one moves away from the roots of philosophy, one will indeed seem to lack a foundation and a foothold. So for those of us doing philosophy of science, a philosophical foundation is very important. This is also one of the advantages I am confident I possess in doing philosophy of science—compared with those who came to it from another path, having studied science and engineering as undergraduates and then switched to philosophy of science, my foundation in scientific theory is of course not solid enough, but I can lay down a more solid philosophical groundwork, which will be quite beneficial for future research. But is it necessary to cling to the question of whether the philosophical flavor is rich enough? Philosophy of science faces the real predicaments of the age and is devoted to answering these difficult questions; as for which discipline is used to answer them, there is no need to cling to that. One of my basic claims is precisely that we should break through the clear-cut boundaries between disciplines. In that case, if you say that my doing philosophy is “not pure enough,” then from a certain perspective that is precisely a recognition of me. We need to view all kinds of problems with philosophical depth, but this depth should not be something deliberately pursued, not something in which one intentionally displays metaphysical thought while discussing problems. Rather, it should be that after I have read philosophy, after the speculative spirit of philosophy has been integrated into our thinking, then when I look at various problems again, philosophical depth naturally comes through. It should not be that one is constantly inspecting metaphysical foundations and showing them off in the course of discussion. Pang Sifen has a very interesting metaphor—metaphysics is the root of the tree of philosophy, and of course it is the most important part. But if a gardener keeps digging up the roots from time to time just to take a look, then this tree will not live long!
December 29, 2005
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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