Liu Huajie: *China-Style Pseudoscience—From the Perspectives of Philosophy and Sociology*, Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press, January 2004
I will read this book again later; mainly because in it, Liu has “collected a great deal of precious historical documentary material” (p. 1, Wu Guosheng’s preface), and it “is a valuable attempt at research into the local social history of science” (ibid.).
It is a bit of a pity that “this book has omitted some parts that are not yet suitable for public publication” (ibid.), and the names of many officials in the text are rendered as “×××.” I have absolutely no interest in those hidden names, but the fact that such things have to be hidden can itself reflect how serious pseudoscientific activity is in China.
Of course, what I admire even more is Liu’s stance and views. One can see from the title alone that Liu uses the neutral term “quasi-science” in place of the clearly pejorative “pseudoscience,” and moreover, compared with the concept of “pseudoscience,” “quasi-science” covers a broader range. This shows that Liu takes a calm and tolerant attitude toward quasi-science, an attitude that enables him to make a rational analysis of Chinese quasi-science.
I very much agree with Liu’s views on the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Liu believes that many of SSK’s theories are one-sided; however, as a distinctive perspective, SSK is very helpful for thinking about and reflecting on the issues of science and quasi-science. Although I have not yet directly read the original works of the Edinburgh School and the like (I plan to read two books this semester), my initial impression is that I do not support their theories such as the “strong programme” and relativism; I feel that they are obviously “going too far in correcting excesses.” Nevertheless, their perspective is interesting, and their theories are also worth taking seriously. As the saying goes, “It is not the true face of Mount Lu; I am simply within this mountain” (不是庐山真面目，只缘身在此山中). Even the most seasoned natural scientists may not necessarily have a complete understanding of the question of what science is, and to step outside science in the narrow sense itself and observe from afar—for example, by reflecting through sociological, historical, philosophical, and other perspectives—is extremely meaningful. This is also why I am very interested in the sociology of science. Of course, it is worth emphasizing that if one merely circles around outside and does not personally walk into the mountain to take a look, one’s understanding will be even more one-sided.
In addition, although Liu is very tolerant of “quasi-science,” he is by no means trying to vindicate “pseudoscience” in the pejorative sense in any meaning of the term. The fact is precisely this: in the present situation, where distrust of the government, contrariness, and gullibility are widespread among the public in modern China, if one were to insist on drawing a sharp line between oneself and pseudoscience, and to suppress it harshly—especially by using political means to do so—one would instead further arouse the resistance of pseudoscience and its believers. Moreover, in fact, science and quasi-science really cannot be clearly separated, and governments and scientific communities (especially in China’s actual conditions) often do make many foolish mistakes—indeed, even if they are not foolish, errors on the part of scientific communities and governments are always unavoidable; what is recognized as science may very well contain pseudoscience, while what is denounced as pseudoscience may also contain true science). Therefore, treating quasi-science arbitrarily is unpersuasive, whereas calmly analyzing and facing these quasi-sciences is the better approach.
Page 140
“Over the past nearly 20 years, both sides in the controversy over pseudoscience have spared no effort to politicize the dispute and to mobilize non-academic forces. On the surface, they quickly end the battle and determine victory or defeat, but in the long run this is fundamentally of no help in solving the problem; neither side is convinced, and the result of the quick battle has only intensified the underlying contradictions. Our government must persist over the long term and unremittingly strengthen the popularization of science; among this, the popularization of scientific knowledge is only one aspect, and more important is the popularization of scientific methods, scientific spirit, and scientific culture.
As for scholarship, in terms of ideas and understanding we must guard against agnosticism and relativism. Between science and non-science, superstition, religion, and pseudoscience, one may draw relatively flexible boundaries at the operational level; there is no need to drag in philosophy of science in every matter.
In academia, anti-scientific tendencies and criticism of technology, so long as the motives are pure, do no harm; in the long run, they are also beneficial to the healthy development of human reason, and even beneficial to making science more humane. Criticism in the name of science must also grasp policy and proportion; the criticized side must be allowed to respond publicly, and one must not thereby infringe citizens’ freedom of belief and freedom of speech.”
I very much support Liu’s position. However, having said that, administrative intervention is also needed when necessary—especially when pseudoscientific activities clearly violate the law and there are obvious acts of fraud and harm, the government has a duty to intervene actively. For example, the crackdown on ××功 should still be necessary. Of course, even while carrying out strict legal suppression through administrative means, in academic matters the government still should not be arbitrary; it must always maintain the necessary calm and restraint—if the law has been broken, then punishment should be meted out according to law, but questions of thought still have to be addressed by reason and persuasion.
February 22, 2006
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
Leave a Reply