[French] Jean Ladrière: “The Challenge of Science and Technology to Culture”

[French] Jean Ladrière: “The Challenge of Science and Technology to Culture,” translated by Lü Naiji, Wang Zhuojun, and Lin Xiaoyu, Commercial Press, November 1997

Page I (Publisher’s Preface) This book was prepared by the philosopher and scientist Jean Ladrière at the invitation of UNESCO, in response to the organization’s “Science, Ethics, Aesthetics” symposium, held in 1974 at its philosophy division in Paris and attended by philosophers and scientists from around the world.

Pages 2–3
However, it is becoming increasingly clear that science, as a method for understanding reality, relies primarily not on imagination but on action; this is the meaning of “knowledge is power.” ………… Today, science is no longer merely a method of acquiring knowledge, nor merely a body of knowledge; it is an immensely important social and cultural phenomenon that determines the entire fate of modern society and is now posing extremely grave problems for us, because even as things stand now, science has already reached certain limits. The most far-reaching influence of science on modern society may lie mainly not—of course, not directly—in the statements about reality that science provides, but in the external projection it has brought about in the form of massive apparatus, instruments, and practices, into which our own existence is thrown. Whether we like it or not, it directly determines our way of life and indirectly determines our statements of value and our value systems.

Page 5
A culture is the expression of a particular historical situation; it is a distinct, irreversible expression of views about the world, 生丝, the meaning of life, the duties a person must fulfill—that is, his rights and constraints—what one must do and what one may expect, and so on.

Page 5
Although in some respects science, as a special system of expression, and technology, as a special system of action, are nothing more than secondary components of culture; yet in another sense they are independent systems, fundamentally autonomous, interacting with culture while also standing in opposition to it,

Page 10
Scientific activity was once the enterprise of a few individuals, detached from research institutions; yet today it has become part of an important and in some respects decisive social activity. It is highly institutionalized, and therefore highly planned. Imagination, chance, unforeseeable individual creativity—factors that were very important in the early stages of scientific development—have today become secondary; research activity, like all other activity, has become a profession.

Pages 14–15
Theory is not a vain admiration of a world that is nothing but surface, fading, and flashy brilliance; nor is theory a meaningless labor, a useless meditation that cannot alter things in the slightest and only adds excessively intensified, futile contemplation atop the misfortunes of life. It is the “logos” in human beings themselves, the highest striving. It raises an accidental life, plainly subject to fate and destined to be obliterated, to the lofty realm of a flawless good life in harmony with the factor at the very core of the phenomenal world; an idea in accord with the real or with truth is by no means meant to retreat before alien forces, but rather reflects what may be called an inner demand of human beings: to trace in life the footprints of primordial creative power. This power, appearing in the form of “logos,” tends to perfect purple cloth in the manner of discourse; such discourse expresses all its potentialities while at the same time becoming the process of its actuality.

Page 15
The highest form of theory is the system, that is, a complete conceptual construction in which all elements are interconnected and whose internal consistency and completeness are precisely manifested through its structure. As a system, it has its own operative principles; with the aid of these operative principles it demonstrates the principles governing the world and the truth concerning being. Its action is that of a revealer rather than a mirror. It is precisely this that characterizes the nature of interpretation. Interpretive discourse is not description, but a kind of re-creation. Its conjunction with phenomena is not an attempt to restore their surface structure, but an attempt to reveal their meaning.

Page 19 Science has a tendency to adopt mathematical expression as far as possible, because mathematical expression provides extremely varied possibilities for realizing systematization, and is more suitable than other modes of expression for precisely testing the operations being carried out.

Page 20<
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In science, the word “experience” does not merely mean contact with the world—for example, sensation—but rather systematic intervention in the course of events. Strictly speaking, a scientific experiment is a process that, in an environment set up according to an exact plan and by means of hypotheses related to possible results, produces determinate, detectable, and analyzable effects. ………… To observe a system scientifically is not to record passively the events that occur in the system, but to make an arrangement that makes it possible to collect specific kinds of carefully selected information from the system.

Page 21 The experimental method, like the theoretical method, can also be analyzed from the standpoint of operations. ……… (five characteristics of operations) ………

Page 24 A model is an abstract construction designed to provide a roughly and ideally approximate representation of the field under study, ……………… Page 25
Theory is in fact a description of a model, ………… Page 26
Only with the aid of models can theory be linked to experiment, ………… An experiment is an action, but it is an action that is fundamentally not “natural,” an action fundamentally not governed—at least not directly—by survival purposes or by constructs driven by innate or childhood-acquired sensations. It is an act of construction, ………… Of course, sometimes an experiment may not yield the expected result, and sometimes the experiment cannot even continue because reality resists. This is a sign that the model is inappropriate.……

Page 34
Ancient technology was mainly a body of practical skills, lacking a genuine theoretical basis. Our ancestors knew how to produce specific effects, but—at least in general—they could not explain why those effects came about.

Page 35
It is interesting to note that at the beginning scientific theory lagged behind technological innovation, as in the case of the steam engine; whereas in more recent times, theory has run ahead of technological achievements, as with atomic energy. Hence modern technology indeed seems to possess a striking feature: its close interaction with science.

Page 36
The progress of science partly depends on the progress of technology, and the progress of technology also partly depends on the progress of science; this by no means means that science and technology are tending to become completely merged into one. In any case, they are two distinct kinds of activity. Simply put, science aims to advance knowledge, while technology aims to transform a specific reality; science seeks to obtain new information about reality, whereas technology seeks to inject information into existing systems—whether natural or artificial.

Page 38
In the domain of technology, the fundamental problem is to intervene in the course of events, either to prevent a certain state from arising or to bring about a state that cannot emerge spontaneously; yet all this is carried out in accordance with some goal, and that goal is ultimately determined by the system of values governing all action. It is precisely these value systems that determine what is to be pursued and what is to be avoided. Strictly speaking, the problem of technology is to obtain the desired effect with maximum efficiency, …////——Professor Wu Guosheng once wrote an article advocating “Technology Should Have Forbidden Zones,” and then Mr. Fang Zhouzi wrote a response titled “Science Has No Forbidden Zones.” Leaving aside the logical argumentation of the articles themselves (Gong Jingcai’s later “A Terrifying Tendency” contains a brilliant rebuttal—these three articles are all included in the book The Crossroads, which I read the day before yesterday), Fang Zhouzi’s criticism of Professor Wu Guosheng from the very beginning quietly changed Wu’s term “technology” into “science.” In fact, as this book by Jean Ladrière demonstrates, in modern society science and technology have long since formed a tightly linked, relatively independent whole that has a great impact on culture. Professor Wu is precisely examining the matter from the perspective of this “science-technology independent entity.” If what is meant is the Greek kind of “scientific spirit” that seeks truth, thenperhaps it is indeed not appropriate to set up “forbidden zones” for this pursuit of knowledge (I myself also remain somewhat reserved, but if one is talking about “technology,” the issue becomes much clearer). However, modern times are not ancient Greece; the relationship between science and technology, and the relationship between science-technology and society-culture, have undergone enormous transformations! And technology, in the so-called sense, has as its aim—its effect—something that inevitably includes the factor of “value”; science too, having shifted from an activity relying mainly on thought to one increasingly dependent on technology, is also increasingly able to act upon technology. Therefore, to defend science once again from the abstract standpoint that it is a pure activity is, though imposing in momentum and commendable in spirit, actually impractical naivety.

Page 46
Therefore, as in science, one can formulate the hypothesis that the technological domain increasingly tends to form gigantic aggregates composed of interlinked and interdependent subsystems, and that the technological domain increasingly tends to strengthen its own integration (and the intensity of interaction among its components), thereby also strengthening its autonomy relative to other domains of social activity. ………… This also means that the technological domain increasingly tends to establish its own ultimate goals. To the extent that technological activity increasingly determines its goals on the basis of its own internal possibilities rather than external circumstances or needs, to that extent those goals become increasingly unrelated to motivations that, strictly speaking, are not technical but arise from other branches of culture, or merely from systems of “basic needs.” Granted, for a specific technology to be accepted by society, it must cater to some motivation and must at least give the impression of satisfying some need. But it is obvious that needs can be “created,” and thus have the same artificial character as the corresponding technological system. Through some transformation, at some point it is no longer a “system of needs” determined by the human body or psyche that governs technological development; instead, technological progress itself governs the system of needs.

Page 48
In this superstructure, ultimately science may exert the more decisive influence. At least, this is a highly plausible hypothesis: if the defining feature of modern technology is indeed its close connection with science, then whatever the motive force of its own growth may be, we seem compelled to admit that its intrinsic dynamic mechanism is fundamentally governed by science. It is precisely the scientific method—understood as a special, highly deliberate, and highly self-controlled rational method—that lies at the core of the common dynamic of the domains of science and technology. What this dynamic is to produce is an autonomous reality situated between natural and human reality, what Karl Popper called a “third world”: an accomplished “logos.” The conceptual constructions of science provide its formal structure, while the dense network of the various instruments and devices around us, which together constitute the so-called technological domain, is its material embodiment. Whether in theory or in material embodiment, the more complete the formation of this logos becomes, the more its autonomy, its inner energy of evolution, and its unforeseeable potentialities destined to be realized are strengthened together. It is a part of humanity, because in one sense it is nothing but a human product; and yet in another sense it is moving farther and farther away from humanity, becoming some alien force that seeks to impose its own laws upon human beings. That law is its own growth. Moreover, this growth is at least not directly for human beings, for human glory, satisfaction, or happiness, but entirely for logos itself, for its perfection and transcendence, and for the unconditional, wholly impersonal affirmation of its bewildering power.

Page 63 From the historical process, the principal phenomenon associated with the modern development of science and technology is industrialization.

Page 69 Culture, especially the system of values at its core, can hardly serve as a mediator between human beings and the world unless it can present itself as a whole, unless it can sufficiently integrate itself.

Page 71
In a very harmonious cultural system, if values constitute the basis of unity, then values themselves are based on certain expressions, and these expressions are often religious expressions, and perhaps sometimes metaphysical expressions. If these expressions begin to waver, then values also begin to waver. If science is ultimately regarded as the only system of expression that has been critically proven to be reasonable, or at least as the dominant system, then a questioning of the foundation and rationality of values arises. Can science take the place of the original boundary system? Can it form a new value system that is uniquely integrated with it and thereby lead to a new human civilization? Or must one believe that values are entirely unrelated to science, and therefore should be allowed, whenever needed, to remain groundless?

Page 73
Although these instruments greatly expand human capacity for action in both quality and quantity, and in general obey human will and merely carry out human plans, they nevertheless impose themselves upon human beings as a mode of reality, increasingly determining everyday life, determining the external form, rhythm, and latent possibilities of everyday life?

Page 74
The replacement of life by automatic machines disrupts ancient analogies, and metaphors arising from contemplation of nature (and therefore of life phenomena) become feeble and powerless. Yet more importantly, automata seem unable to perform the same function; only through ingenious design that is obvious to all can they be regarded as bearing symbolic significance. Thus technological facilities strike at traditional expressions, saying that they are somewhat semantically powerless, although technological facilities themselves are no better suited to the operations of transformation that support the edifice of the major symbolic systems of ancient culture.

Page 77
When we turn to consider the time associated with plans or programs for advancing science and technology, we find that the meaning of the present here is now extremely different. Through planning, the present undoubtedly seems to transcend itself and unite with the future, and the realization of the future becomes the sole aim of the present. But this future is entirely planned, and even in some sense becomes the present’s sole aim, at least along the time axis, where there is continuity between the successive moments linked together by the capacity to realize the design. The past has lost most of its value; in fact, the past has value only in the things that have been sublated, in the beneficial experiences that one should sometimes draw upon when proposing new tasks to be carried out and the methods for completing them. In this case, action no longer depends on any other time, whether primordial time or the time of a reality yet to come; action seems to become wholly responsible to itself, and no longer concerned with anything else except its own completion.……

Page 78
All the destructive features of science and technology mentioned above can be broadly likened to “rooting out.” The essential function of culture can be said to be to provide human beings with a place where they can truly live and truly feel “at home.” Thus culture is not an external accessory added to existence, merely some interesting embellishment appended to existence in a fundamentally trivial way; it is absolutely necessary for genuine human beings and rational beings, because it is precisely through the content of culture that existence—by transcending itself and separating from itself on the one hand, while at the same time remaining in accord with itself—acquires meaning and is elevated above the sequence of events or lower forms of life, reaching a true possession of itself. But human beings are related not only to the cosmos, but also to the entire human past beyond their memory, and thus cannot place themselves in relation to the cosmos and the human past unless they can bear this existence; this relation does not lie in simple speculation, nor in reflection drawn from an unstructured life, but in practice that depends on the actual conditions under which human beings can realize themselves. In other words, human beings need roots; they must first of all be deeply rooted in the fertile soil of the cosmos, life, and history.

Page 108
However, it is evident that responsible action is possible only under the following condition: that it can effectively influence the situation, and that there is indeed such an opportunity to weigh gains and losses and evaluate the reasonably expectable results brought about by a particular course of action. In short, responsible action is both effective and illuminating. Therefore, where the process of events possesses absolute authority, where everything has already been decided and human action has no way to intervene, there can be no ethical process. Likewise, when action is possible but the effects thereby produced are to a large extent uncertain, such action consists more of processes that, once set in motion, lose control than of processes that accord with one’s own will and have direction. In such circumstances, a genuine ethical process is also impossible. Now science provides us with increasingly rich knowledge of the processes related to us, which enables us to act upon these processes in an increasingly knowledgeable manner. At the same time, technology enables our activities to extend into domains that were previously inaccessible.。////——This book is not a work of technological criticism, but rather attempts to reveal the mutual relationship between science-technology and culture—including both destructive and constructive aspects—and offers useful insights. Science-technology is by no means a cure-all, but neither is it worthless or even an evil demon. The author calmly analyzes the mutual relations between science-technology and culture in every respect, maintaining a positive and affirming attitude toward science-technology, but without blind worship.

Page 111
The idea of control—this epitome of those values (science and technology also put forward new values), in fact, corresponds with an enhanced sense of responsibility, at least with a potentially enhanced one. ………… If a person must adapt himself to external laws, freedom will be interpreted as worship of necessity. ………… But once human beings live with control over their environment and over their own actions, once the acquisition of knowledge is no longer a matter of luck but the result of coordinated action, once “skill” no longer depends on lucky discovery but is organized in accordance with the goals that skill itself has set for itself, or with the goals that have been set for it; at that moment, freedom begins to regard itself as possessing the power to effect real change, to regard itself as the ultimate cause of causality, and thus, in its hidden coming-to-itself, in its own full realization, it increasingly experiences itself as an irreducible potential autonomy. As noted above, although control over cognitive or operational systems—which in any case is only partial—falls far short of satisfying the demands inherent in the nature of free will, once control has been effectively achieved, it does in a certain sense move toward satisfying those demands, and that is enough for the aforementioned control over systems to acquire an ethical character.

Page 148
Science and technology, on the other hand, must fully recognize their own limitations, not only recognizing the frontiers they reach at particular moments in the course of their development—frontiers which after all are merely accidental in nature—but also paying attention to the intrinsic limitations imposed on them by their most basic presuppositions.

Page 149
In short, the demand placed on science and technology is that, for the sake of their own critical analysis, they must strive forward until they reach the point where their limitations clearly appear and are truly understood. This is not a judgment passed on them from the outside; rather, it requires that they carry through to the end their own claim to control their own processes, making themselves the judges of their own self-transformation. ////——I quite agree.

Pages 156~157
Culture can no longer be regarded as such a synthetic form, one that imposes a certain unity, clearly defined and objectively governed by an inner principle of unity, upon existence; and this narrow concept of synthesis cannot be reconciled with a genuine view of culture as something in constant motion. ………… The kind of culture that the already effective interactions between the scientific and technological system and the various cultural subsystems seem to foreshadow is a culture crossed by multiple tensions, ………… It is a culture that coexists harmoniously with multiple systems in order to achieve balance; in a word, it is not the end of a unifying principle that necessarily and a priori functions for each individual cultural form (and thus for various forms of behavior), but rather a field in which the demand is for various forces to coordinate and coexist in an almost infinitely variable and diverse configuration, in accordance with directives that ultimately must come from behavior itself and its specific creativity. In such a culture, strictly speaking, there is no longer a single center that constitutes all things, but many centers, ………… Thus the monistic picture is replaced by a relative pluralism, but this by no means signifies any irretrievable loss; on the contrary, this phenomenon may represent a transformation that reveals prospects with infinite possibilities for development. Cultural pluralism, the relative independence of elements, and the indeterminacy of interaction patterns—these both represent a relaxation of constraints and manifest an expansion of autonomous domains. ////——In the face of technology’s destruction of traditional culture, beyond sighing that “the world is going downhill and human hearts are no longer what they once were,” what we need more is to stand on reality, look toward the future, and calmly accept the fact that technology has already brought irreversible and enormous changes to culture, and then think about how to work hard to make them harmonious and congenial. “The diversification of culture” is a very good aspiration, but what exactly is “multiculturalism”? How can it be realized? These are questions worth discussing.

Page 157
The danger of alienation certainly exists, but the increase in creative opportunities matches this danger.

February 18, 2006

Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.