Human beings are descended from animals; one could even say that human beings are a kind of animal.
Of course, human beings are not only animals. Human beings have their own distinctive strengths; their power to understand the world and transform the world is incomparable with that of animals, and rational thought and judgment are the special hallmarks of humanity. To regard human beings merely as a kind of animal is indeed one-sided.
But to view human beings from the standpoint from which we view animals, and to examine the commonalities and similarities between human beings and animals, is obviously also highly meaningful. It helps us examine human nature from a broader perspective, and think about the relationship between human beings and animals with a more open-minded attitude. Whether one is an anthropocentrist or a defender of animal rights, whether one firmly believes that human beings are more advanced or claims that human beings are inferior to animals, one can all accept the standpoint that human beings are a kind of animal.
Especially in the modern age, human beings have increasingly become complacent because of their own power to transform nature, and have forgotten that human beings and animals alike belong to one whole; they have forgotten that human beings are also a certain kind of animal; they have forgotten that without human beings, animals can still survive, whereas without animals, human beings cannot stand on their own. In such circumstances, appropriately emphasizing the animality of human beings helps human beings reflect upon themselves and helps reduce human arrogance. This is quite necessary.
——Replace every instance of “human beings” and “animals” in the above passage with “science” and “religion.”
To compare science and religion to the relationship between human beings and animals is inappropriate, and I do not wish to make any further comparison. What I hope to explain through the above analogy is this: regarding science as a kind of religion and examining it from that angle is a useful standpoint. After all, the statement “human beings are a kind of animal” is relatively easy for people to understand; but once one says “science is a kind of religion,” one is likely to anger many people. Therefore I hope, through this analogy, to show that “science is a kind of religion” is not, first of all, some radical position, but rather a neutral “standpoint” that both those who hold a scientistic position and those who are anti-science can try to adopt.
In addition, before we proceed with the discussion, there is a question that must be noted: what exactly does “religion” refer to? This question seems even more complicated than “what exactly is science?” Einstein said: “Although most people can easily reach agreement on the meaning of ‘science,’ their views of the meaning of ‘religion’ are for the most part quite different.”[①]
In fact, people’s understanding of the meaning of science is often rather vague as well, but modern science is after all comparatively unified; activities called “science” can usually recognize and support one another and thus form a coherent enterprise. By contrast, activities such as Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, fetishism, and so on, which are called “religions,” appear to differ enormously from one another; it is difficult to find a universal definition that can encompass all religions.
Fortunately, in discussing religion, it is not necessary to presuppose a strict definition in advance. In particular, the topic we are discussing is the similarity between science and religion, and it is more realistic to borrow Wittgenstein’s way of thinking in terms of “family resemblance.”
Thus, what we focus on are certain features that are “neither sufficient nor necessary, but important” for “religion.”
First, religion is always manifested through “faith.” Religious “faith” differs from “belief” in the general sense. Although scholastic philosophy and primitive Buddhism, among others, have all tried to use rational deduction to demonstrate “faith,” faith is faith precisely because it must contain an element that transcends reason. Believing that “water will freeze” or “chickens will lay eggs” does not require religious faith. If something is an empirically accessible fact or can be reached through strict logical demonstration, then it would not be called faith. The point is that what is usually regarded as “science,” established on strict empirical evidence and logical deduction, also has “faith” at its core! The first part of the main text will discuss this further.
Second, from the perspective of the “object” of faith, “sacredness” is a distinctive feature of religion. “The sacred” can carry meanings of solemnity, sublimity, ultimate truth, ultimate goodness, ultimate beauty, infinity, eternity, and so on; reverence for, longing for, and pursuit of the sacred are what is called “religious feeling.” In the second part of the main text, I will discuss the religious feeling of science, a feeling that is crucial for scientific exploration.
Finally, from the perspective of social function, religion, as an organized activity, plays an important role in every aspect of social operation. In the modern age, this role seems to be gradually being replaced by science. In the third part of the main text, I will discuss this, pointing out the similarity between science as an integrated set of social activities and religion, and finally explaining why science cannot ultimately and completely replace the position of religion.
Many people believe that science is the only possible truth. Although many people acknowledge that science is developing and progressing, and that there is no absolute truth, people often think that the progress of science is due merely to the accumulation of empirical knowledge, and that science develops only in relation to humanity’s increasing understanding of nature.
This is indeed not wrong; however, it easily leads to an overly simplistic view of scientific development—namely, the idea that although science is developing and fallible in the progress of human cognition, at any given historical moment, when human knowledge is relatively fixed, science represents “absolute correctness,” and any theory rejected by science can have only one possible reason for its rejection: it does not accord with experience.
That is to say, people may understand that there is no such thing as “absolute truth,” yet they often insist on the existence of “absolute error.” In fact, scientific truth is not established merely on the basis of empirical facts; like any religious theory, the fundamental basis on which scientific theory rests is also some faith that cannot and need not be demonstrated. I will show that scientific theory is indeed scientific precisely because it is “falsifiable,” yet its “falsification,” like its “confirmation,” is only relative in meaning, and still requires certain non-falsifiable beliefs as presuppositions.
Let us begin with a concrete case—the transition from the Ptolemaic system to the Copernican system and then to the modern astronomical system. Was it merely because of incontrovertible empirical evidence that people accepted Copernicus’s doctrine, or did it involve a fundamental transformation of faith?
In fact, before Copernicus, the geocentric theory had never had any fatal flaw in explaining the motions of celestial bodies. By setting up a series of “epicycles” and “deferents,” and combining the “eccentric-circle model” with the “equation-point model,” the geocentric system could, as long as appropriate modifications were made to each planetary model, “predict the apparent positions of the planets with remarkable success”[②] using uniform circular motion. Although Copernicus’s heliocentric theory revolutionarily exchanged the positions of the earth and the sun, the orbits designed in his theory were still circular, and there remained rather large errors compared with actual observations. In order to reduce deviations, the Copernican system still had to add epicycles and deferents; at the time, its superiority consisted merely in having drastically reduced the number of epicycles and deferents compared with the geocentric theory. It was not until Kepler replaced the circular orbits in Copernicus’s system with ellipses that epicycles and deferents were truly discarded.
So why do we usually say that the Copernican system is closer to truth than the geocentric theory, and that the Keplerian system is closer to truth than the Copernican system? Or why should a system using 34 epicycles be better than one using 80 epicycles? Why is the modern astronomical system, which has abandoned epicycles and deferents, even better? If the answer is: “The theory that better accords with the facts is the one closer to truth”—that does not make sense! For Copernicus’s system was not necessarily more accurate than the earlier geocentric systems. Bert states: “Historically there was no known celestial phenomenon that could not be explained by Ptolemy’s methods. If one did not use more modern instruments, Ptolemy’s methods could indeed achieve the kind of precision people expected. Predictions of astronomical events were made, and in terms of the actual occurrence of those events, those predictions were no less accurate than those made by a Copernican.” Under the conditions of astronomical observation and mechanics available at the time, “the new astronomy obviously gained nothing in accuracy. Just as according to Copernican ideas, so according to Ptolemaic ideas, one could correctly draw maps of celestial motion.”[③]
Even in modern times, I believe it would not be difficult, with the help of a computer, to design a geocentric system containing, for example, thousands of epicycles and deferents, so as to achieve a very high degree of agreement with actual observations. Then, given two theories that both accord with objective observation and can both withstand “practical verification”—one, an elliptical-orbit model based on the law of gravitation; the other, a geocentric circular-orbit model based on epicycles and deferents—why do we always tend to regard the former as truth and the latter as error?
The answer should be, and can only be: because the former is simpler! Copernicus’s idea “casts astronomical facts into a comparatively simple and harmonious mathematical order”[④]
An equation like “F＝Gm1m2／r2
” is obviously simpler than thousands of epicycles and deferents. Even if many people are still unwilling to admit it, we believe in this theory because we believe that “truth must be simple”!
Why does a simple theory “seem more like” truth? This can only be some belief of ours. Just like the shared belief of geocentrists and Copernicus alike—“the circle is the most perfect form,” and therefore the orbit must be made circular; while the belief of geocentrists is—“the earth must be at the center of the universe”… “simplicity,” “circle,” “the earth at the center,” and so on, are merely different beliefs people have about the question of what “truth ought to look like.” Building scientific theories around any one of these beliefs may fit experiments with precision, so why can we declare that “simplicity” is the most fundamental requirement? That can only be a kind of faith, and can never be empirically verified.
One important reason scientific laws are always finite is this: the information we obtain from practice is always finite and discrete—we can observe the properties of something at 1°C, at 2°C, at 1.5°C, at 1.05°C, at 1.005°C, and so on; yet we can never observe even all the cases between 1.0001°C and 1.0002°C—for any interval, however small, is not discrete but continuous, that is, it contains infinitely many cases.[⑤]
The way we “induce” scientific truth from finite information is somewhat like a primary school student doing a “find the pattern and fill in the number” puzzle—2, 4, 6, 8, ___, … What number should be filled in at the fifth position? Even the dullest primary school student would without hesitation write “10” on the line, while a somewhat more intelligent one would “induce” a universal law—“the i-th number is 2i.” But such a question could not appear on a test paper for middle school students, because many middle school students already know that any number can be written on the line! The pattern found by a primary school student is: xi=2i, but a middle school student would ask: why not xi=3i4-40i3+180i2-303i+162, or 15i4-200i3+900i2-1523i+810, or [2p/3] (meaning the integer part)? Why do we often tend to think that 10 is the correct answer, while if I fill in 22, it would be considered incomprehensible? Many people may say: xi=2i is so simple and clear, something you can see at a glance—why make it so complicated? But “simplicity” is a faith, after all; and if I do not care whether the pattern is cumbersome, if what I believe and care about is that this pattern must have some connection with the fourth power of i, then from the same data I can induce another equally fitting pattern—although my method may look much more laborious, I do not care; the key is that i4 appears in my theory—that is my faith! Of course, the construction of scientific theory is far more complicated than a “find the pattern and fill in the number” puzzle, but even so, in being inductive on the basis of finite data, we believe in the simplicity of truth, while others do everything they can to introduce into theory beliefs such as “the earth is at the center of the universe,” “celestial motion can only be uniform circular motion,” or “there exists a God who intervenes in the world.” By what right can one accuse them of error?
Of course, scientific truth is not only a matter of matching existing experiments. The so-called “practical verification of truth” is actually quite crucial. When people believe in a certain scientific theory, besides its requirement to accord with experimental data and the additional faith in “simplicity,” there are also some crucial links, such as “prediction.” In addition to explaining existing data, a scientific theory generally also needs to be able to make “predictions”; for example, one theory predicts x5=10, another predicts x5=22, and when we obtain the exact information that x5 is indeed 10, the credibility of the first theory is greatly strengthened. Only then can such a theory qualify as empirical truth, and only then does the entire process by which a scientific theory comes into being and is established take shape. But this still cannot shake the conclusion that “scientific truth is fundamentally some kind of faith.” First, the success of prediction is still not enough to extend finite observation to infinity; for hundreds of years the Newtonian system had been able to predict successfully, yet problems still arose. Second, a theory whose predictions fail does not necessarily mean that overnight it has gone from truth to error: for example, the Newtonian system, though ineffective in certain extreme situations, does not stop it from still functioning as an approximate truth in ordinary situations. Third, the task of some scientific theories is simply to explain past phenomena and not to emphasize making predictions, or the predictions they make are difficult to test, such as evolution theory, quark theory, and so on. Finally, a theory can be patched up to accommodate new circumstances, for example by adding a new variable or parameter not previously considered, without shaking the basic framework of the entire theory. For instance, Einstein’s cosmological model originally contained a “cosmological constant” in order to keep the universe static; later, with new discoveries such as redshift, Einstein removed the cosmological constant from his cosmological model, and more recently, due to newer observations such as “the universe is accelerating in its expansion,” scientists are once again considering reintroducing this cosmological constant into the cosmological model… whether or not to introduce the cosmological constant, and what value the cosmological constant should have, are not the core of Einstein’s cosmological model. Without overturning the entire original theory, we can accommodate our actual observations of the present state of the universe by adding and adjusting the value of the cosmological constant. In other modern scientific theories such as quantum theory, similar techniques are not uncommon. So why can we not allow the geocentric system to preserve its original theoretical framework by adding tricks such as deferents?
Professor Jiang Bisheng is right: in terms of the theory of scientific knowledge, the facts science talks about are not merely a pile of “pure facts” (pare facts) or “raw data.” If natural events are the text of science, then scientific theory is the interpretation of that text. Just as no text can exist independently of a linguistic system and its grammatical rules, scientific facts cannot exist on their own outside a philosophical system and its methodology. That is to say, the facts on which science rests, and the theories built upon those facts, and even the values and meanings derived from those theories, often involve deeper metaphysical assumptions and other philosophical categories. Science therefore, like religion, has its own presuppositions that it itself cannot verify. Scientific facts, scientific knowledge, and scientific theories alike cannot be entirely independent of certain conceptual frameworks or metaphysical categories.[⑥]
Historians of science such as Bert and Koyré have already pointed out the close connection between the development of scientific theory and changes in the metaphysical foundations of religion and philosophy. As Brooke put it: “To say that religious belief can function as a presupposition of science does not necessarily entail the strong claim that, without prior theology, science would never have begun to develop. But it does mean that some of the specific scientific ideas held by scientific pioneers were often influenced by theological and metaphysical beliefs.”[⑦]
Besides depending on these beliefs, which may change, scientific theory also has, as what makes science science, its most fundamental and unshakable creed. This is the firm conviction that “there is order in nature, and that order is knowable.” This faith resembles “there exists a God”; in fact, in many cases in ancient Greece and the Middle Ages, “there exists an intelligible order” and “there exists God” were for people precisely one and the same belief. In discussing the objectivity of the external world with Tagore, Einstein said: “I cannot prove that my view is right, but this is truly my religion.”[⑧]
“The Sacred” and the Scientific Spirit
At the end of the previous section I mentioned Einstein’s remark. In fact, Einstein’s views on science and religion have attracted great attention; anyone who tries to discuss the relationship between modern science and religion will certainly not overlook Einstein’s relevant statements. In related discussions, Einstein seems to be cited too often. Although my discussion also begins with Einstein, it will involve more great scientists—Einstein was by no means a special case who poured “religious feeling” into science; the fact is that religious feeling is indispensable for the greatest scientific explorers.
Einstein said: “It is hard to find among the deep scientific minds a person who does not possess his own religious feeling.”[⑨] Scientism cannot accept this assertion. Many people firmly believe that science and religion are as incompatible as fire and water, and they cannot imagine why “the scientific spirit” and “religious feeling” could coexist in the same person—and it seems, moreover, that they necessarily coexist in every great scientist!
First of all, in the West, scientists who hold devout religious beliefs are by no means rare. Not only in Newton’s era, but even in a relevant survey at the end of the twentieth century, “the percentage of scientists with religious belief was exactly the same as it had been 80 years earlier. Not only that, under a very strict definition of religion, approximating Christian belief, scientists with religious belief still accounted for a remarkably significant proportion—up to 40 percent of scientists believed in ‘a personal God who listens to people’s prayers’ and in ‘eternal life.’”[⑩]
Contrary to many ordinary members of the public influenced by scientism, many of the greatest scientists are very friendly toward religion.
For example, the “scientific enfant terrible” Richard Feynman said: “We know that even with definite moral values, human beings are still very fragile. In order to keep them from being false to their conscience, they must be reminded of the value of morality at every moment. This is not simply a matter of whether you have the right conscience; there is another problem here, namely whether you can retain the strength to do what you know is right. We need religion to give us strength, to give us comfort, to give us inspiration to follow these moral views. This is the inspiring side of religion: it not only inspires people in moral behavior, but also in art and in all kinds of great thought and action.”[11]
Bohr mentioned: “Here the starting points taken by science and religion are fundamentally different; the aim of science is to develop a universal method for ordering ordinary human experience; the root of religion, by contrast, lies in the effort within society to promote harmony in views and behavior. … However, the development of modern science has emphasized the necessity, for unambiguous communication of thought, of paying proper attention to drawing the line between the subjective and the objective; in this way, a new basis has been created for the use of words like knowledge and faith.”[12]
Heisenberg mentioned: “Although I firmly believe that scientific truth within its own domain is beyond dispute, I can by no means exclude the content of religious thought, nor can I regard it merely as a stage of human consciousness that we have once experienced and that we can later dispense with.”[13] “If there were no model to guide the way, we would lose the measure of value (ethical standards), and along with it lose the meaning of our actions and our endurance of suffering; the final result could only be negation and disappointment. Therefore religion is the foundation of ethics, and ethics is the precondition of life.”[14]
Bohm said: “… if one wants to understand the significance of general scientific knowledge for one’s own concrete problems, and to carry through the scientific spirit of looking at oneself as one is in fact, without being confined by one’s own likes and dislikes, then this artistic spirit is very important and also helps to dissolve conflicts. However, if people do not at the same time possess the spirit of facing life as a whole and in its entirety, such an approach is impossible; we still need religious spirit, …”[15]
Many more arguments by great scientists for the compatibility of science and religion could be found. However, this is not the primary question this article is mainly concerned with. What I care about is this: besides the fact that “religion and science address different questions,” is the reason the greatest scientists hold such a tolerant attitude toward religion also that science and religion have an inner commonality? That is to say, has a religious kind of feeling long been internally absorbed into their scientific explorations, thereby making religion seem especially intimate in their eyes?
This conjecture is not groundless. We notice that the several great scientists mentioned above—Einstein, Feynman, Bohr, Heisenberg, Bohm, plus Poincaré, Planck, Schrödinger, Born, and others who will be mentioned later and who showed friendliness toward religion—all without exception were theoretical physicists; more precisely, they were theoretical physicists who made outstanding contributions to quantum mechanics and the like; one could even say that this list almost covers the strongest lineup of modern theoretical physicists!
Physics can be called the purest and most fundamental of the natural sciences, and quantum mechanics is the very frontier of modern physics. Why is it that those masters engaged in the purest and most frontier-oriented scientific explorations instead display such a tolerant attitude toward religious activities, which are usually considered the most conservative and most ignorant? Although there are many theoretical physicists who are extremely averse to religion, compared with experts in other scientific fields such as biology, theoretical physicists’ friendliness toward religion is undoubtedly striking. This is probably no accident! In fact, it is precisely in the purest and most fundamental scientific activities that religious feeling manifests itself most prominently!
What Einstein referred to as “religious feeling” is something internal to science; one could say that religious feeling is precisely the core of the scientific spirit, the original motive force of scientific exploration!
The original motive of scientific exploration—and likewise the origin of philosophical speculation—is human beings’ “wonder” when facing nature. Scientific research in ancient Greece seems to have had no “purpose.” Aristotle said: “It is plain that we do not seek wisdom for any ulterior advantage; for because man is free by nature, existing for his own sake and not for another’s, we count philosophy as the only free learning and investigate it deeply, for it is the only learning that exists for the sake of learning itself.”[16] In Aristotle’s view, “the desire to know is human nature.”[17] The passion for scientific exploration does not need any practical benefit to support it; the pursuit of knowledge itself has a sacred meaning. At the end of the Timaeus, Plato admired this orderly cosmos as “a knowable god, supreme and excellent, most just and most beautiful.”[18] Clearly, in the eyes of the ancient Greek philosophers, scientific exploration and the pursuit of God were one and the same.
Even in modern times, in the eyes of the greatest scientists, scientific exploration and the “sacred” are still closely linked.
Poincaré pointed out: “Scientists do not study nature because it is useful; they study it because they love it, and they love it because it is beautiful. If nature were not beautiful, it would not be worth knowing; if nature were not worth knowing, life would not be worth living.”[19]
Born said: “From the beginning I felt research work to be a great joy, and even today it remains a pleasure. … Perhaps, except for art, it is even more pleasurable than creative work in other professions; the pleasure lies in experiencing the mysteries of nature, discovering the secrets of creation, and bringing some sense and order to a part of this chaotic world; it is a philosophical joy.”[20]
Schrödinger said: “I was born into such a predicament—knowing neither where I came from nor where I am going, nor even who I am. This is my situation, and yours too, and that of every one of you. Every person is in such a predicament, and always will be. This reality cannot give me any answers. We eagerly want to know where we came from and where we are going, but the only thing we can observe is the environment in which we find ourselves. That is why we so urgently exert every effort to seek answers. This is science, scholarship, and knowledge; this is the true source of all human spiritual striving.”[21]
Planck believed: “When one asks about the existence and essence of a supreme force that governs the world, religion and natural science come together. The answers each gives are at least to some extent comparable; as we can see, they are not only not contradictory, but also harmonious; first, there is a rational world order, and second, both sides recognize that the essence of this world order can never be directly known, but only indirectly known, or rather, only conjectured. For this, religion needs those unique symbols, while exact natural science uses measurement based on sensation. Therefore, nothing can prevent us from identifying these two ubiquitous and mysterious forces with one another: these two forces are the world order of natural science and the God of religion.”[22]
Among modern top theoretical physicists, Dirac is rather special. He was probably the most “single-minded” of the great modern physicists. Apart from his love of science, Dirac had no interest in philosophy, literature, art, music, and so on—this stands in sharp contrast to Schrödinger, who was well read in classical literature; Einstein, who played the violin; Feynman, who played drums in a samba band; and Planck, Sommerfeld, Heisenberg, Born, and others who were good at the piano. As for religion, he made no attempt to hide his strong aversion—“(Dirac) when he first came to Copenhagen, spoke emotionally to his colleagues: ‘The suffering of the poor is senseless; the wealth of the greedy is meaningless. Organized religion is nothing but absurd deception.’”[23] In fact, Dirac is precisely the most extreme example of someone who pours religious feeling into scientific exploration. As Pauli said: “Dirac has a new religion—there is no God in this religion, and Dirac is its prophet.”[24] For Dirac, scientific exploration concentrated all his pursuits of truth, goodness, and beauty; for him, science was also religion and art.
Einstein pointed out: “Whoever has had a profound experience in this field of scientific advancement will feel a deep reverence for the rationality displayed in existence. Through understanding, he is completely liberated from the shackles of personal wishes and desires, and thus holds an attitude of humility toward the majesty of reason embodied in existence; and because of its extreme profundity, this majestic reason remains, for human beings, within sight but beyond reach.”[25] This “deep reverence” and “attitude of humility” are precisely what science and religion have in common!
“Preaching” and Science Popularization
In the article “The Gospel and Science Popularization,”[26] Professor Liu Huajie first makes an intriguing set of correspondences between scientific activity and religious activity: “Religion strengthens belief and enhances the cohesion of the community through various rituals, such as the ‘sacraments’ of Catholicism, which include baptism, confirmation, confession, Eucharist, holy orders, marriage, and extreme unction. As for science, on the sociological and anthropological levels, and from a functional perspective, there are also analogous rituals, such as conferring a doctorate (corresponding to baptism and holy orders), academic conferences and cooperative research and development (corresponding to marriage), applying for grants or publishing papers (roughly corresponding to the Eucharist), receiving awards or being elected to the academy (corresponding to holy orders), and being posthumously recognized with honors after retirement or death (corresponding to extreme unction), and so on.” Professor Liu then makes a one-to-one correspondence between the working methods of traditional science popularization and believers’ prayer activities (Matthew 6:9-13, Luke 11:2-4).
Professor Liu’s “one-to-one correspondence” may well contain many strained points, but the similarities between science popularization and religious propagation are indeed very striking!
Just as religion is not necessarily odious, to say that scientific activity is similar to religious activity, and scientific communication similar to preaching, is by no means to disparage science popularization. If one truly spread science with the attitude of proclaiming the Gospel, that devoutness would deserve respect. However, preaching also has different modes, and what is regrettable is that what is more similar to actual science popularization is not a “good” way of preaching, but something closer to “spreading superstition”!
Professor Tian Song put it very interestingly—“Believers are often more fanatical than prophets; this statement still holds true for believers in science.”[27] Just like religious fanatics, many “believers” in science merely “superstitiously believe” in science in a state of lacking “understanding.” It is much like many secular forms of religious propaganda: they rely on flaunting “benefits” such as “curing illness and warding off disaster” to spread belief, while the faithful go burn incense and worship the Buddha only out of such utilitarian aims as “seeking promotion and wealth”; science, like the most authoritarian religion, demands a monopoly on truth and becomes the sole authority.
That is not true religious faith, nor is it true “preaching the gospel” at all! True religion, through moral persuasion, awakens in people an inner yearning for the sacred, draws them to convert from the heart, and urges them to practice their faith through a good life. True religion can provide a spiritual haven for devout believers. What is meant by a spiritual haven is to entrust the ultimate meaning of life to faith in the sacred; such faith makes one feel fulfilled and satisfied, and even if life contains many sufferings, it is always full of “hope.”
Yet much of today’s science popularization merely relies on flaunting science’s “power”: “Look! How effective, how successful it is—able to cure disease and strengthen the body, to resist disasters, to benefit humankind, to bring such enormous material gains…” In a certain sense, this kind of science popularization is even worse than preaching,
Modern people’s blind faith in science has led to an neglect of the meaning of existence and a distorted understanding of the relationship between human beings and nature. The deified “science” makes people arrogant and conceited, and this blind arrogance in turn plunges humanity into crisis—the crisis of the environment and the crisis of the spirit. Technology and science, whose power expands without limit, have made the earth ever “smaller,” yet the “distance” between neighbors has grown ever greater; the number of species people recognize is greater than at any previous time, yet species extinction is proceeding faster than ever before; people work harder than in any previous age, yet they understand the purpose of labor less than ever; people live longer than in any previous age, yet they are less clear than ever about the meaning of being alive; people are more capable than in any previous age of probing the essence of matter, yet they understand human nature less than ever…
Like a good religion, science indeed can also provide a haven for life’s highest hopes and aspirations. As has already been pointed out above—those greatest scientists all endowed scientific inquiry and the pursuit of knowledge with sacred meaning; in their careers they invested their religious feelings in science. Their moral nobility and the joy of life often also stemmed from that religious-like attachment to the beauty of nature; in the pursuit of truth and supreme beauty, they found fulfillment. Scientists can obtain sufficient sense of fulfillment from science rather than religious practice. However, all of this mainly applies to scientists.
For the majority of ordinary people, is this enough to satisfy them? After all, science is an undertaking with extremely high professional demands; the vast majority of people simply do not have the conditions to devote themselves to scientific exploration.
Scientists are pursuing truth, but what exactly is the life of ordinary people pursuing? How can the lives of ordinary people all feel that they have something to pursue, something to be fulfilled by? How can the cruel truth be reconciled with everyday ethics and morality?—That view of life, in which fulfillment is attained through the pursuit of truth, is possible among great scientists; but how can ordinary people also be able to pursue happiness? How can ordinary people be persuaded to adopt an ethical way of life? Clearly, science and reason are not enough for the entirety of human civilization. Philosophy, art, and religion, though they cannot be merged into one with science, nonetheless always have reason to exist independently of science; they do not demand to stand above science, nor do they allow science to stand above them. They only ask to complement science, so as to help satisfy humanity’s longing for “meaning,” just as, in a great scientist, the coexisting, complementary scientific spirit of rigorous rationality and the religious attachment to pursuing and believing in the beauty of nature complement one another.
Paul Davies put it well: “Even if religion has been banished from the domain of consciousness, it cannot be said that the ground left vacant by religion has certainly been occupied by rational scientific thought. For science, like any exclusivist religion, though it has a very great influence on everyday life at the practical level, is equally inscrutable to the general public and equally difficult to grasp.”[28] Just as good religious faith requires people’s heartfelt understanding and identification, good science popularization does not depend on flaunting science’s power or the material benefits it will bring, but instead requires the public’s understanding and identification. At the same time, just as a good religion always hopes to persuade people through free choice rather than through coercion and force, good science popularization should not tyrannically suppress any heresy.
For human civilization, science is an expression of our reason and wisdom, and of course it has a lofty significance. Yet, as Schrödinger said: “What is the value of the natural sciences? I would answer: its sphere of influence, its goals, and its value are equally important to the other branches of human knowledge. Not only that, it is only when one discusses its scope or value with reference to the unified whole formed by them, rather than to any single branch, that such a discussion becomes meaningful.”[29]
Compared with most religions, science is more tolerant and more open, so carrying out dialogue between science and religion may be more convenient than carrying out dialogue between two different religions! This dialogue is crucial, because, as Whitehead said, the future direction of human history will depend on how modern people regard the relationship between science and religion.
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Schrödinger, *Nature and the Ancient Greeks*, trans. Yan Feng, Shanghai Scientific & Technical Publishers, 2002
Paul Davies, *God and the New Physics*, trans. Xu Pei, Hunan Science and Technology Press, 1992
*Collected Works of Einstein*, vol. 1, Commercial Press
John H. Brooke, *Science and Religion*, trans. Su Xiangui, Fudan University Press, 2000
Zhou Zhanzhang, ed., *Dialogue Between Science and Religion: Proceedings of the Sixth Sino-American Symposium on Philosophy and Religious Studies*, Xiamen University Press, 2002
Ted Peters, Jiang Bisheng, and Sigmon Benard, eds., *Bridge: Science and Religion*, China Social Sciences Press, 2002
Alister E. McGrath, *An Introduction to Science and Religion*, trans. Wang Yi, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2000
Xu Liangying and Liu Ming, eds., *Selected Writings of Einstein*, Zhejiang Literature and Art Publishing House, 2004
Feynman and Weinberg, *From Antiparticles to the Final Laws*, trans. Li Peilian, Hunan Science and Technology Press, 2003
Qian Shiti, *Science and Religion: Their Relationship and Historical Evolution*, People’s Publishing House, 2002
Roger G. Newton, *What Is Science Truth—Is the Moon There When Nobody Looks?*, trans. Wu Jike, Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2001
Bohm, *On Creativity*, trans. Hong Dingguo, Shanghai Scientific & Technical Publishers, 2001
*Selected Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr*, trans. Ge Ge, Commercial Press, 1999
Plato, *Timaeus*, trans. and annot. Xie Wenyu, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2003
Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Wu Shupeng, Commercial Press, 1983
G. E. R. Lloyd, *Early Greek Science*, trans. Sun Xiaochun, Shanghai Science Education Press, 2004
R. P. Feynman, *The Pleasure of Finding Things Out*, trans. Zhang Yuhu, Hunan Science and Technology Press, 2005
Edwin Arthur Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*, trans. Xu Xiangdong, Peking University Press, 2003
David Lindberg, *The Beginnings of Western Science*, China Translation & Publishing Corporation, 2001 edition
[①] Einstein: “Are Religion and Science Irreconcilable?” in *Collected Works of Einstein*, vol. 3, Commercial Press, p. 253
[②] See [U.S.] David Lindberg, *The Beginnings of Western Science*, p. 104, China Translation & Publishing Corporation, 2001; Chinese edition, p. 108
[③]
[U.S.] Edwin Arthur Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*, trans. Xu Xiangdong, Peking University Press, 2003, p. 36; Chinese translation, p. 22
[④] Ibid., p. 24
[⑤] As a supplementary reminder, one should note not to think that heating something from 1°C to 2°C counts as observing it over a continuous interval, because one cannot replace the examination of an object’s properties in a constant-temperature environment with an experiment involving changing temperatures; and even under continuously changing temperatures, it is impossible to extract infinitely much data, since the number of times data can be collected and recorded is always finite.
[⑥] Jiang Bisheng: “Partners in Cognition: A Dialogue between Science and Theology,” in Ted Peters, Jiang Bisheng, and Sigmon Benard, eds., *Bridge: Science and Religion*, China Social Sciences Press, 2002, p. 55
[⑦] John H. Brooke, *Science and Religion*, trans. Su Xiangui, Fudan University Press, 2000, p. 19
[⑧] *Collected Works of Einstein*, vol. 1, Commercial Press, p. 270
[⑨] Einstein: “The Religious Spirit of Science,” in *Collected Works of Einstein*, vol. 1, Commercial Press, p. 67
[⑩] Jiang Bisheng: “Partners in Cognition: A Dialogue between Science and Theology,” in Ted Peters, Jiang Bisheng, and Sigmon Benard, eds., *Bridge: Science and Religion*, China Social Sciences Press, 2002, p. 60
[11] R. P. Feynman, *The Pleasure of Finding Things Out*, trans. Zhang Yuhu, Hunan Science and Technology Press, 2005, p. 261
[12] *Selected Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr*, trans. Ge Ge, Commercial Press, 1999, p. 196
[13] Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy*, Commercial Press, 1984, p. 160
[14] Ibid., p. 165; see also Wu Guosheng, ed., *A College Reader on Science*, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2004, pp. 247–255
[15] Bohm, *On Creativity*, trans. Hong Dingguo, Shanghai Scientific & Technical Publishers, 2001, p. 34
[16] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 982b26~28
[17] Ibid., 980a22
[18] Plato, *Timaeus*, 92C, see the translation in G. E. R. Lloyd, *Early Greek Science*, trans. Sun Xiaochun, Shanghai Science Education Press, 2004, p. 71.
[19] Cited in Roger G. Newton, *What Is Science Truth—Is the Moon There When Nobody Looks?*, trans. Wu Jike, Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2001, p. 227
[20] Born, “Science and Philosophy,” in Wu Guosheng, ed., *A College Reader on Science*, p. 220
[21] Erwin Schrödinger, *Nature and the Ancient Greeks*, trans. Yan Feng, Shanghai Scientific & Technical Publishers, 2002, pp. 96~97
[22] M. Planck, *Religion and Naturwissenschaft*, 1958, p. 26~27, cited in Qian Shiti, *Science and Religion: Their Relationship and Historical Evolution*, People’s Publishing House, 2002, pp. 157 and 158
[23] Feynman and Weinberg, *From Antiparticles to the Final Laws*, trans. Li Peilian, Hunan Science and Technology Press, 2003, p. 93
[24] Ibid.
[25] Einstein: “Science and Religion,” in Xu Liangying and Liu Ming, eds., *Selected Writings of Einstein*, Zhejiang Literature and Art Publishing House, 2004, p. 73
[26] See *Sociologist’s Tea House*, Shandong People’s Publishing House, 2005, no. 4, published February 2006, pp. 56–59
[27]Tian Song: “Absolutely Correct,” see Don Quixote’s Lance—Piercing Through the Mists of Scientific Discourse, Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, December 2002, p. 6
[28]Paul Davies: God and the New Physics, trans. Xu Pei, Hunan Science and Technology Press, 1992, p. 2
[29]Schrödinger: Nature and the Ancient Greeks, trans. Yan Feng, Shanghai Scientific & Technical Publishers, 2002, p. 96
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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