An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science

16,904 characters2007.01.16

I’ve long wanted to write an essay introducing philosophy of science to the younger students, but each time I started it I gave up halfway through. I hope today I can stick with it and finish. I no longer expect to find fellow travelers in philosophy of science at the undergraduate level, but even for those classmates who do not choose philosophy of science as their direction, I still hope to reduce a few of the many misunderstandings that philosophy of science has suffered from a little bit (for the moment, let me take my own understanding as the correct one; of course, my understanding may also be a misunderstanding—make of that what you will). I also hope to use this opportunity to express my understanding of the path I have chosen.

First, one must remember a famous remark by the great physicist Feynman: “Philosophy of science is to scientists as ornithology is to birds, a complete waste of time!” Of course, Feynman was expressing irritation here, but what I want to say is that this sentence really does capture certain key points about philosophy of science.

Philosophy of science really is useless, and this deserves to be emphasized again and again. “Uselessness” is precisely the noble quality of philosophy, as well as the noble quality of pure science—such as mathematics and theoretical physics. A pure, free scholarship does not seek any utilitarian end. Many people believe that philosophy of science ought to be useful for scientific research, ought to be able to guide scientists’ work, ought to be able to generalize a methodology of science or something of the sort, or even ought to go to the forefront of science to discover new theories—for example, by proposing some kind of quantum gravity multidimensional universe superstring symmetry harmonious dialectical grand unification theory or whatever… All of these are fantasies, and also a debasement of philosophy of science. Let me stress once more: philosophy of science does not help scientific research! Of course, if individual scientists draw inspiration or illumination from philosophy of science, that is very possible, but that does not mean this is the function of philosophy of science itself, just as individual scientists often draw inspiration or illumination from literature and art; and the activities of literature and art are obviously by no means aimed at promoting scientific research. Philosophy of science is the same.

What we call philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy, not a part of science. Just as political philosophy does not serve politicians, philosophy of science does not serve scientists; rather, it takes scientists and scientific activity as its object of study—philosophy of science studies scientists just as ornithology studies birds.

Here, we might first understand philosophy of science in the broadest possible sense—“metascience.” This field includes philosophy of science in the narrow sense (with an extension that can include natural philosophy and philosophy of technology), history of science, sociology of science (knowledge), science communication, and so on. In our department, the philosophy of science track is in fact also an entry point into this broad field. Because metascience, more often from a humanistic perspective, tries to connect science and the humanities, this field overlaps considerably with what is called “science and the humanities”; many metascientists are also called “scientific humanists.”

Simply put, the fundamental question of metascience is:

——“What, after all, is science?”

More specifically, this mainly expands into three questions:

——“How is science possible?” This mainly includes metaphysics and epistemology concerning science, and philosophy of science in the narrowest sense refers to the epistemology of science—asking how scientific knowledge is acquired and how reliable it is, and so on. Extended a bit further, it can also include more specific questions such as philosophy of mathematics, which asks how mathematics is possible.

——“How does science operate?” This mainly includes history of science, sociology of science, and so on, studying how science, as a collective human enterprise, actually functions, and examining the background factors behind scientific discoveries and the Scientific Revolution. Extended a bit further, it means examining the interactive relations between science and other human activities, such as religion, art, and culture. The above two questions may also involve the problem of drawing boundaries between science and non-science, and pseudoscience.

——“What does science mean?” One might say this is an inquiry into the value of science. From this angle one often takes a reflective and critical stance toward science.

A very common opinion is that philosophers of science and scientific humanists are not qualified to wag their fingers about what science is. I know that some people who have taken a few courses in philosophy of science also claim that unless one becomes a great scientist, it is very hard to have a say in many questions. This is also one of the main reasons why philosophers of science and scientific humanists are simultaneously looked down upon by both the scientific community and the philosophical community.

Metascience must pay attention to and respect scientists’ views—just as an anthropologist must respect the views of the people he studies. But an anthropologist’s job is to record and sort out the information he has collected and the situations he has observed. In fact, as the saying goes, “You cannot see Mount Lu’s true face, because you are in the mountain itself” (不识庐山真面目，只缘身在此山中), meaning that once one is “within the object,” then no matter how far one goes or how much one turns around, it is hard to form a relatively complete impression of that object. For “science,” those scientists, no matter how deeply they may delve into their respective fields, can hardly be said to have a truly comprehensive understanding of “what science actually is.” If one is always in the mountain, one’s field of vision is always limited; once we move away from “Mount Lu,” observing from various angles outside the mountain, from the foot of the mountain, or even from a bird’s-eye view in the sky, what we will see is another picture altogether. This is the significance of the perspective from outside science. Of course, it is equally worth stressing that to grasp “what Mount Lu is,” one cannot obtain a relatively comprehensive understanding by merely circling around outside the mountain all the time! If one has never personally walked into the mountain, yet points at “Mount Lu’s true face” on the basis of two bird’s-eye-view photographs, it is no wonder one would be looked down upon.

That is to say, if one has never approached scientific activity, one certainly is not qualified to make sweeping judgments; but if one is always immersed in scientific activity and cannot detach one’s perspective, that is equally one-sided. In fact, the question “What, after all, is science?”—like many other great philosophical questions—will never have an authoritative, definitive answer! Let me repeat again that philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy, and the characteristic of philosophy is that it never really solves problems! Philosophy of science or metascience will reveal different aspects of science from different perspectives. Just as only politicians are qualified to do political philosophy—no, not at all—one does not have to be a scientist to do philosophy of science, and one might even say it is better not to be a scientist!

Still, as mentioned earlier, familiarity with science is absolutely necessary. In fact, many philosophers of science, sociologists of science (knowledge), and historians of science are people who switched careers from science, or at least have some scientific background; the teachers in our department’s philosophy of science teaching and research section are basically all trained in the natural sciences. So what is the significance of studying the natural sciences for metascience? How much mastery of the natural sciences do we need?

For undergraduates in our department who choose philosophy of science (as well as logic), the requirement is to take at least 10 credits of courses in the natural sciences (chosen from the required courses in the departments of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and so on). This is the bare minimum. However, there is no particular body of natural-science knowledge or skills that must be mastered; whether to choose mathematics or biology, and so on, can be decided according to personal interest. For philosophy of science, studying the natural sciences in fact has no direct use—just as philosophy of science has no real use for the natural sciences. The point of taking natural-science courses is less to master some necessary knowledge or skills than to “experience life,” just as an excellent anthropologist or sociologist will often live together with the group he is studying for a period of time. When we study natural-science courses, the key is not the outcome of study and research, but rather to understand firsthand how the natural sciences are actually learned and actually researched. Therefore, it is not necessarily those who are particularly outstanding in the natural sciences who can study philosophy of science well (of course, at least mathematical logic should pass muster). Being strong in the natural sciences is certainly an advantage, but a solid grounding in the humanities is also equally important for metascience.

Natural-science courses are important for the experience rather than for mastery, but many other kinds of knowledge do need to be mastered to a certain degree:

——First, in philosophy: since philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy, the foundations of philosophy are of course crucial. Among the most important parts, for example:

————Ancient Greece, as the foundation of philosophy, must of course be understood;

————The traditions of rationalism and empiricism in the modern period, especially Bacon, Descartes’ scientific method, and Hume’s skepticism—these are the background to the problems of modern philosophy of science and must be understood;

<
p>————The tradition of analytic philosophy, from positivism to logical empiricism, logical positivism, and so on: modern philosophy of science developed in the context of analytic philosophy, and even the later new paths opened up by Popper and Kuhn did not completely break out of the framework of analytic philosophy. After all, analytic philosophy is the foundation of philosophy of science—even if one ultimately seeks to transcend or rebel against it;

————Various other inexhaustible philosophical resources should also be valued, such as Kant, whom I personally take seriously. If one is interested in philosophy of technology, one should pay attention to continental philosophy, especially Heidegger. In addition, postmodernism is also quite worthy of attention. Depending on one’s personal interests, any philosophical tradition or orientation can be connected with philosophy of science, such as Chinese philosophy, scholastic philosophy, philosophy of religion, ethics, political philosophy, and so on.

——Second, in science: apart from the experience of a natural-science specialization, a basic level of scientific common knowledge is even more necessary. There is no need to take specialized courses in every natural-science department; it is enough to reach the level of popular science. Whether mathematics, physics, or biology, one should have a certain degree of common-sense understanding, and popular science books are a convenient way in. At the same time, we will find that many academically valuable books in metascience can also be counted as popular works. However, at present, the best popular science books are basically all translations; I will later make some recommendations for reading.

——Third, in history: history of science is required reading—whether or not one studies history of science. But earlier works on history of science, especially Chinese books on the history of science, were written with a mindset of deifying science, and they contain many distortions of the real situation in the history of science, which one must be alert to. In addition, besides history of science, general human history and cultural history are worth knowing. No scholarship can be done without history.

——Finally, in literature and art: since one is a “scientific humanist,” one should also have a bit more cultural cultivation. I am not joking; literary and artistic cultivation, although it has no direct function for metascience, is certainly necessary.

Finally, let me talk about one issue: scientific humanists are often accused of being “anti-scientific humanists,” and Peking University’s metascience is especially often accused of being anti-science-centered; this is indeed true. We really are “anti-science,” and by no means singing the praises of science. I must again stress that philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy, and reflection and critique are the basic style of philosophy. Here I do not want to expand on how I “oppose science” (one can refer to my other articles). I only want to discuss a question that is often criticized: “We all live in an era of advanced science and technology; our lives cannot do without science and technology. You hear those people doing philosophy of science shouting about being anti-science, yet when they go home they still use computers to type.” Put this way, it seems quite reasonable. Since we enjoy the conveniences provided by science and technology, how can we still have the gall to oppose it?

What I want to say is that sometimes precisely because we cannot do without it, we ought all the more to “oppose” it—“reflect on it,” “re-examine it”! For example, we all cannot do without tap water; without tap water (in the city) we cannot survive. But precisely for that reason, it is even more worthwhile for us to care about the source, the connotations, and the possible impact of this tap water on our bodies. When we discover that the source of this water is polluted, if we have another choice, then perhaps we would not be in such urgent need of tracing the water source. The water coming out of this faucet is poisonous; just change to another tap to fetch water, and there would be no need to care where exactly that poisonous water came from. But if we have only one choice, then when faced with water-quality problems we can no longer avoid them, and we are forced to trace the source. Precisely because we cannot do without science and technology, and at the same time see all kinds of ills brought by science and technology, there is all the more need to trace things back to their source and examine their origins and their flows,

As for the various books on philosophy of science and metascience, I have listed my personal recommendations below:

……

Having written this far, I finally lost all enthusiasm and couldn’t be bothered to write any more. I dare not claim much about anything else, but when it comes to books, I am most assuredly experienced. Those interested can discuss with me privately.

January 16, 2007, 3:15 p.m.

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