What Is Wrong with “Eugenics” — A Review of Against Perfection

The China Science Daily (2013-08-23, p. 14, Books)

Eugenics, which once enjoyed a brief and sweeping vogue in the first half of the twentieth century, was even implemented in many places in the form of law, only to be discredited in the end by the atrocities of the Nazis. The Nazis’ wrongdoing is obvious: they tried to improve the human race through violent means such as forced sterilization and even genocide. But what, exactly, was mistaken? Was it only the violent means, or was there something wrong with eugenics itself? This question seems never to have been adequately reflected upon. Half a century later, with the development of life sciences and technologies such as genetics and gene science, the issues surrounding eugenics have once again emerged in new forms.

This is precisely the issue Michael Sandel confronts in *The Case Against Perfection*: Nazi coercion was certainly wrong, but what if everything were done voluntarily? What if parents, of their own will, used genetics and gene technology to “customize” their children more effectively? Would we still have grounds to object?

Unlike many critics of technology, Sandel does not reject gene technology wholesale, but rather conducts an ethical reflection on its use—eugenics is not merely a scientific and technical issue, but even more an ethical and value-laden one. Before studying how, concretely, to identify and screen superior genes, we must first reflect on this: what, exactly, counts as “superior”?

Sandel begins with a particularly striking case: a deaf lesbian couple wanted a child who would also be deaf, so they found a sperm donor whose family had been deaf for five generations, and eventually succeeded in giving birth to a deaf child. When the story was reported in the media, it drew much condemnation, but the couple dismissed it as nothing. In their view, they were no different from those who ask sperm donors to be tall and highly intelligent; to them, deafness was not a defect but a rare trait.

So was this couple’s conduct problematic? If they were wrong, was the problem that they should not have made the child deaf, or that the act of “designing” a child itself was wrong? And do parents who custom-make children with qualities generally regarded as excellent also do something unsettling?

Sandel’s unease resonates with Heidegger’s reflections on modern technology. Heidegger pointed out that the essence of modern technology is “Gestell” (enframing), which is like an all-encompassing rack that predefines the position of every thing; all things appear as customized products, orderly and well arranged, yet no longer possessing any surprise or mystery.

Sandel argues that life should be regarded as a “gift,” a natural “giving,” rather than as a designed product. The problem with gene customization does not lie in harming the child’s health or so-called right of choice (children have precious little choice to begin with), but in the arrogance implicit in such behavior, which will also damage the parent-child relationship, depriving parents of the humility and compassion inspired by the idea of “generosity toward the unexpected guest.”

Sandel acknowledges that this attitude of viewing life as a gift has a certain religious quality, but this idea does not require one to believe in any religion. Conversely, the arrogant mentality that human technology can control everything likewise has a certain religious background—it is just that human beings have replaced God’s position.

Modern technology seems capable, in the end, of making everything flawless, but this is only an illusion; in essence, it merely makes everything fixed and ready-made. And value concepts such as beauty, goodness, and excellence are not things technology itself can supply. When we seek to use some technology to improve the human condition, we should first reflect on what the corresponding “intentions and purposes” actually are.

Sandel devotes a great deal of space to the question of athletes—whether using technological means to improve certain conditions of athletes is good or bad. Sandel thinks one cannot generalize. For example, designing better running shoes for runners is very likely a boost to the sport of running, but allowing a runner to take the subway and thereby complete a marathon is outright destruction of the sport. What about nutritional supplements, stimulants, special training facilities, or particular surgeries? Some measures seem to occupy an intermediate zone and are hard to judge definitively, but precisely this ambiguity means such questions deserve more reflection and discussion. Whether each technological measure is good or bad depends not only on the technology itself, but also on our understanding of the “intentions and purposes” of the “sport” itself: why, after all, do we admire running competitions? How do we understand “excellence” as a runner? On the surface, the aim of running is greater speed, and a fast runner is a good athlete; but if that speed is achieved through stimulants or even by taking the subway, then it departs from the purpose of running. A “faster” result achieved with the help of technology that departs from the sport’s purpose is not necessarily a better result.

The issue of gene technology is similar. On the surface, we may prefer children who are taller, more fit, and smarter; but that alone does not necessarily make for a better outcome. The key question is whether the purpose of life, the rules of the game of human existence, have been violated. Have the things in human society that we once found admirable and exciting been diminished?

Sandel supports gene technology for medical purposes and opposes its abuse in the name of “perfection.” Of course, he acknowledges that the line between these two ends is not clear, but that does not mean we need not distinguish carefully. Blindly resisting technology does not necessarily mean returning to some so-called “natural” state; making and using technology is in fact part of what it naturally means to be human. But blindly submitting to technology is equally undesirable. There is no foolproof mechanical means by which we can determine the ethical consequences of every technology; while developing technology, we must always maintain reflection and vigilance, and make distinctions and choices regarding science and technology on the basis of human nature. This is the insight Sandel offers us.

Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.