Today in the discussion seminar, Wu Ningning criticized Dreyfus’s view that “the internet is not embodied.” Dreyfus’s understanding of “embodiment” is monotonous and one-sided: he clings too rigidly to the human body as already at hand, and emphasizes the binary opposition between embodiment and disembodiment in an overly schematic way. For him, embodiment at most has only a monotonous difference of degree, such as the seven stages of learning. But in my view, embodiment not only differs in degree, but also in kind and dimension. In some respects the internet is indeed less embodied—for example, chatting online is in some ways not as full as face-to-face conversation—but such differences cannot simply be dismissed under the label “disembodied.” For instance, there are many non-face-to-face modes of communication, such as letters, telephone calls, passing messages through others, and so on; face-to-face communication also takes many forms, such as classrooms, tea gatherings, dances, dining tables, and so forth. Online communication, of course, also has many forms. Different media of communication will all obscure certain things in certain respects; each medium will have its own shadow or blockage, but this defect is not monotonous.
The key point is that the word “embodiment” itself seems to have a misleading effect. In fact, in the texts of phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty, this word does not seem to have been especially thematized; instead, American phenomenologists with an analytic-philosophy background seem to pay special attention to it. Chinese people also seem to be more in step with Americans, and the translation “具身” makes the word seem especially “disembodied,” especially objectified and specialized, making it hard to “use fluently.” Actually, I think translating it as “体现” would be about right; if “体现” feels too everyday, then one might as well say “化身.”
The advantage of “化身” or “体现” is that when we use these two words, we always have to say: it is the化身 of…, it is the体现 of…. Of course, traditionally people only care about the object being embodied, and not about the body’s participation in the process of “embodiment.” But “具身” only emphasizes the body’s participation, while the original directedness of the concept is lost. It is as if “embodiment” had become an isolated property.
What does a technological object embody? What is a technological object the化身 of? It is precisely what is called “intentionality.” Phenomenological philosophy of technology says that artifacts have an intentional structure, and this refers exactly to the relation in which things embody consciousness. What is called learning is to understand and traverse the intentionality in technological objects. “Embodiment” speaks precisely of “the unity of person and sword”; learning swordsmanship begins with objective, formalized moves, using form to carry meaning, gradually rises to using qi to govern form, using intention to guide qi, with form following the movement of intention, and ultimately reaches the highest realm in which form and intention are both forgotten, where person is sword and sword is person. The seven stages of learning that Dreyfus speaks of are roughly this kind of pattern as well. But the key point is that the most important thing in this process is not merely the “body,” but intention, qi, and form: the integration of the intentional level, the bodily level, and the artifact level, as well as the interactions among these levels.
In the seminar I mentioned a critique of Dreyfus from the standpoint of media ecology, namely that he failed to notice how media reshape the environment. For example, he points out that internet education can only reach the novice stage and cannot reach the expert stage. Indeed, some traditional craft knowledge is not suitable for teaching via the internet, but the significance of internet media is not merely that of a simple educational tool; it also changes education itself—what is worth teaching, what outcomes teaching ought to achieve—these things also change along with the media environment. For instance, the university as a medium of teaching is no longer suitable for the master-apprentice tradition of craftsmanship; likewise, the teaching medium of written books is no longer suitable for the transmission of secret knowledge and epics in tribal culture. The emergence of the internet will also cause certain knowledge traditions to begin to be lost. Whether this loss is good or bad is another question, but we should notice that such changes are happening. That is to say, rather than saying that technology has a value bias, it is better to say that technology shapes value bias.
In the new media ecology, the standard of the “expert” will also change. For example, driving technology is indeed difficult to learn via the internet (in class I used cooking as an example), but we must also note that even this situation is changing. For example, the skill of driving a horse-drawn carriage or a bicycle is hardest to learn online; one must personally experience it before one can master it. But the activity of “driving” itself is also continuously being influenced by digital media. For example, the knowledge needed to “drive” a subway today is probably relatively likely to be learned online, because the straight-line, back-and-forth subway has already become highly formalized in large part; the driver only needs to memorize some standardized operating procedures, which can easily be rehearsed online. And as autonomous driving technology matures, perhaps one day “driving” will not only be able to be learned online, but only able to be learned online. You could sit at home connected to the internet and “drive” your car, and you could also sit in the car itself, still connected to the internet, and “drive” it. The technology of driving may well become a technology of going online.
This does not negate some of the basic claims of the so-called theory of embodiment. The key is that the technology of going online is certainly also bodily, and what needs to be examined is the multiple, historical relations among various technologies, the body, and consciousness.
Finally, let me append some of the discussion just now on Weibo with Jing Qi and Ningning. The discussion was initiated by Jing Qi; I won’t paste the original text, you can go to his place to see it. I’ll mainly paste a few passages I myself said:
So the concept of “embodiment” is a bit misleading. Something like “embodiment of embodiment” and the like sounds all mistily obscure… So I think maybe embodiement should just be translated as “体现.” Also, “沉 沦” carries too strong a pejorative sense; it might as well be translated as “沉浸.” An inauthentic state is a state of being immersed in practical, manipulative activity focused on concrete things; an authentic state is a state of facing nothingness.
Also, “world” is an overall background. For example, when doing something or looking at an object, one is always under some background, and this background can be traced back endlessly, pushed back endlessly; but when you can no longer retreat, that “horizon” that as a whole determines the boundaries of life is our “world.” Therefore, no matter how embodied the virtual world may be, as long as it still has room to retreat, still can fall back to the real world, it can still be called virtual.
(Jing Qi: The world does not need to be pursued by “retreating”; we are in the world right now~)
Being in the world right now means that we are always within some background. Heidegger’s talk of “looking around” and “seeking around” are all a kind of “retreat.” If we do not retreat, if we are completely immersed in object-oriented manipulation, then we cannot see the “world.”
(Jing Qi: At the moment of ready-to-hand, there is also no need to “retreat,” right? When we are occupied with beings within the world, we are actually also in the world, only in a fallen mode. Busy fallen-ness does not mean not seeing the world; the world is the “here” of Dasein. In the authentic moment, rather, the world is what falls away.)
This “is actually also in the world” is the result of reflection. There is no need to make it sound too mysterious: the “here” in Dasein is nothing more than saying where Dasein “is,” and this “where” precisely refers to a kind of room for maneuver, or room to retreat. When you are immersed in something, you do not care about the world; when you pull yourself out and look around, only then do you roam in the world.
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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