Reflections from Reading During the 2006 Winter Break
I. Several Metaphors Concerning “Boundary Drawing”
1. “Pure Water” and “Soda Water”
We know that human beings can never produce anything that is 100% pure; perhaps not even God could do so—for even in the imagined “absolute vacuum,” there must inevitably be virtual-real particle pairs produced along with quantum fluctuations. What we call “pumping out a vacuum” merely yields extreme rarity; it can never eliminate impurities. When factories manufacture “pure water,” at best it is only 99.99% pure, with a few more nines besides, and the very process of making pure water often adds new impurities that were not there before. So should all these efforts to evacuate a vacuum and manufacture pure water be repudiated? Are we then supposed to boast of the impurities in pure water, or even deliberately add some more?
There is always air dissolved in any water, but if the producer deliberately adds carbon dioxide, what is produced becomes “soda water.” Anyone can tell which is pure water and which is soda water, which is plain water and which is salt water—despite the fact that pure water also contains carbonic acid and tap water also contains salt.
Of course, when we recognize the inevitability of “a vacuum that is not empty” and “pure water that is not pure,” that is a form of progress; it helps reduce people’s arrogance. Yet if, on that basis, one were to go to the opposite extreme and insist on pumping air into pure water when making it, such behavior would obviously be utterly incomprehensible and absurd.
So, when we say that “science” inevitably includes factors such as the spirit of the age, social construction, irrational prejudices, and even masculine modes of thinking, we regard these impurities as deeply hidden, deeply rooted, or impossible to eliminate. But do we have reason, on that basis, to exaggerate their status? Can we infer from “science must necessarily include some reflection of the spirit of the age and social construction” that “science is a product of the spirit of the age or of social construction”? Do we have reason, because traditional science more or less implicitly contains masculine modes of thinking, to feel the need to add feminist modes of thinking into science? Can we, because irrationality cannot be ruled out in science, therefore turn science into mysticism? At least logically, these “inferences”—more precisely, merely “associations”—do not hold.
2. “Normal People” and “Mental Patients”
What is a “mental patient”? Which people are “mental patients,” and which are not? There does not seem to be a clear definition here—many people’s mental condition lies somewhere between stability and abnormality, and just like concepts such as “tall person” and “short person,” it is difficult to find a clear boundary distinguishing normal people from mental patients.
But can we, because we cannot draw a strict distinction, simply give up the effort to diagnose mental illness? Are we to treat the distinction between normal people and mental patients merely the way we treat the difference between “tasty” and “bad-tasting,” contenting ourselves with arbitrary subjective feelings, or even abandoning the distinction altogether so that everyone is either normal or everyone is mentally ill? Wouldn’t such mutual “tolerance” and peaceful coexistence be wonderful?
Clearly, such an idea is absurd. We need to diagnose mental illness, and we hope to adopt quantitative and qualitative standards as strict as possible—even if those standards are only provisional and relative. Likewise, we need to adopt some method for defining heart disease, hypertension, and so on, even though absolute strictness is impossible.
For if such definitions are handled carelessly and perfunctorily, then people who are ill will not receive proper treatment and timely care, which will bring many harms to themselves and to others that could originally have been avoided. Only when we have (relatively) clearly identified someone as a mental patient can we help him recover his health in a targeted way; if he cannot recover for the time being, we can also guard against his behavior and place limits on it, so as to avoid danger to others.
Then, when we say that there is no clear-cut line between “science” and “pseudo-science” [①], does that mean we no longer need to take the diagnosis of “pseudo-science” seriously? The principle is the same—even if absolute strictness in definition is impossible, relatively strict definition is still necessary and cannot be shirked!
3. “People with White Hair” and “People with Black Hair”
Similar to the previous metaphor of “mental patients,” “people with white hair” and “people with black hair” also cannot be strictly divided. But here let us change our perspective and discuss the issue of the “measure” used for definition.
As just discussed: even if an absolutely strict distinction is impossible, making a distinction in some way is often still necessary. Then, to make such a distinction, there must be some standard, and some attribute must be used as the quantitative or qualitative measure. For example, the measure for distinguishing “tall people” from “short people” is “height,” not “weight.”
So what is the measure for distinguishing people with white hair from people with black hair? First, let us assume that we do not know in advance how the measure is defined, but instead know first that there are some people called people with white hair—represented by A—and some other people called people with black hair—represented by B (of course there may be overlap between the two). It is analogous to how one first has “religion” and only later thinks of defining “religion,” or first has “science” and only later thinks of defining “science.”
Through observation and on the basis of statistics, we may discover some features:
Feature 1: People in group A “often,” compared with those in group B, have a greater proportion of white hair on their heads.
Feature 2: People in group A “often,” compared with those in group B, are older.
Then which feature should we use as the “measure” for distinguishing “people with white hair” from “people with black hair”? Obviously, we all know the answer should be feature 1; if we were to use feature 2 to define “people with white hair,” that would obviously be seen as incomprehensible!
This shows that one cannot infer from a simple statistical tendency—“X often is Y”—that “Y is what constitutes X.”
Then, when it comes to “science,” should we also be more cautious when trying to define its characteristics? Can we infer, because “the ‘truth’ of science always tends to gain the agreement of more and more people in the scientific community,” that “the theory that gains the agreement of more and more people in the scientific community is scientific truth”? Can we infer, because “science is often skeptical and critical,” that “the spirit of skepticism and criticism is the spirit of science”? Can we proclaim, because “religion is often highly despotic and dogmatic,” that “despotism and dogmatism are the nature of religion”? …At least, these “inferences” are not rigorous enough logically.
Of course, discovering these “tendencies” is also very meaningful. For example, through our understanding of the history of science, we find that scientists are often tolerant and kind; thus we propose the “hope” that people who stand from the perspective of “science” should also be tolerant and kind. Making this kind of “imperative sentence” does not involve any logical contradiction. However, if one tries on this basis to make the categorical assertion that tolerance is scientific spirit and intolerance is not science, that would be improper.
February 21, 2006
[①] Teacher Liu Huajie uses the neutral term “parascience” to replace “pseudo-science,” whereas here I do not mind expressing the pejorative sense of “pseudo-science,” so I still use “pseudo-science.” In addition, if the “para” in “parascience” means “similar,” then I am inclined to use “parascience” and “pseudo-science” to express different meanings. “Pseudo” originally means “artificial,” so “pseudo-science” should refer to things that were not science to begin with but are “artificially” labeled as and passed off as science; “science-like,” by contrast, may not necessarily carry this layer of meaning of “artificial impersonation.” For example, Chinese medicine, traditional feng shui, and so on: I think these theoretical systems need not present themselves as “science”; in fact, they are quite different from Western science in both thinking and method. So if Chinese medicine does not “artificially” present itself as science, but instead consciously keeps its distance from science and does not use scientific methods and thinking to explain itself (as Dr. Tian Song hopes), then such a theory of Chinese medicine could not possibly be called “pseudo-science.” Yet Chinese medicine does, to a certain extent, resemble science; it also has self-consistent, complete, and complex theoretical systems, unique practical methods, and so on, and the therapeutic efficacy of Chinese medicine can also withstand double-blind testing, except that its theories cannot be incorporated into science. Then these theoretical systems also need a special term to define them, and “parascience” seems appropriate. Of course, this in turn requires finding a term to serve as the general designation for both such “parascience” and “pseudo-science.” Perhaps what Teacher Wu Guosheng calls “alternative science” is more accurate (see the preface to Liu Huajie’s Chinese Parascience)?
However, “parascience” is the Chinese translation of Alternative Science, and Alternative seems to express more the sense of “replacement” or “novel and unconventional,” with no apparent meaning of “similarity,” while “para” does not convey the sense of replacement or novelty; this translation seems somewhat problematic?
Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.
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