Doctoral Research Plan (Media Phenomenology)

Following Professor Wu, the direction I am undoubtedly taking as my main focus in the doctoral stage is the philosophy of technology in phenomenology; more specifically, my research should be organized around the theme of “media phenomenology.”

Under the theme of media phenomenology, my research can unfold from three angles, or in three ways. Depending on the progress of study and research over the next few years, the final doctoral dissertation will be confined to one of these angles and developed under an appropriate title. The themes and angles proposed in this research plan are merely lines of inquiry, or points of entry, for the research.

This theme mainly involves two major academic resources. The first is the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, centered on Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and so on, with excursions into existentialism, hermeneutics, structuralism, and other philosophical currents, plus Kantian philosophy, postmodernism, and the like as antecedents and consequences; this will also be the main focus of my study. The second is the field of media studies, which includes two branches: the critical school (the Frankfurt School, etc.) and the school of Media Ecology. Since the mainstream positivist tradition of media studies is not my main concern, I will place particular emphasis on the relevant research resources of Media Ecology.

Accordingly, the angles my research can take include the following three: first, using the philosophical foundations of phenomenology to interpret relevant issues in Media Ecology; second, using the analytical examples provided by Media Ecology to explain relevant claims of phenomenology; third, integrating the resources of both sides to analyze concrete cases of technology.

At present I am only a beginner in both phenomenology and Media Ecology, and I still need to strengthen my reading and study greatly. But as a research plan, I can only use my present accumulation of knowledge to sketch out some contours and lines of reasoning for my research direction.

First let me talk about Media Ecology. This school arose with McLuhan, and McLuhan’s students Walter Ong, Neil Postman, and others are representative figures of the second generation; representative figures of the third generation, such as Paul Levinson, appeared in the 1990s and remain active to this day. In 1998, the Media Ecology Association was formally founded in the United States.

The name Media Ecology was initiated by Postman; literally translated, it should be “media ecology.” I still adopt the Chinese translation “媒介环境学” used in Chinese communication studies, for the following reasons. First, from an academic standpoint, Postman’s own definition of Media Ecology is “the study of media as environments”; “environment” is always the key term in Media Ecology, whereas the concept of “ecology” is not the focus of their discussion. Second, out of respect for earlier scholars: it is said that this translation was chosen after repeated discussion among the Chinese-American scholar Lin Wengang and domestic scholars such as He Daokuan and Li Mingwei. Lin Wengang himself is vice president of the Media Ecology Association, while He Daokuan and Li Mingwei are the scholars who first and most vigorously introduced Media Ecology in China.

McLuhan is the founder of Media Ecology, and his thought is also the most original and representative. McLuhan’s writings have already been extensively introduced into China through the efforts of He Daokuan (among his major works, only Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man has still not been translated into Chinese), but there has not yet been much in-depth study of him by domestic scholars. As for interpreting McLuhan from a phenomenological perspective, there have been some attempts already, such as Chen Zuoping: “The Logical Starting Point of Phenomenological Method and Journalism Theory Research,” in Modern Communication, no. 2 (2006); Mei Qionglin: “Transparent Media: McLuhan’s Phenomenological Intuition of the Essence of Media,” in Humanities Journal, no. 5 (2008); Fan Long, The Intuition of Media: On the Phenomenological Method in McLuhan’s Communication Studies, Jinan University Press, 2009. But in my view these studies often understand phenomenology too superficially and are of little reference value. There are also some related studies abroad, but perhaps because phenomenology and Media Ecology are both marginal currents in North America and have relatively little influence, there are not many studies that combine the two. The main things I have found are some topical studies—for example, in phenomenological analyses of film, phenomenology of virtual reality, and similar topics, McLuhan is occasionally cited. Of course, the key may very well be that my own ability to search foreign-language literature is still fairly weak. I have already read one doctoral dissertation: Jon Markus Buli Holmberg, The Phenomenology of Technology (A Clinical Dissertation, Presented to the Faculty of California School of Professional Psychology, 2004). It is an attempt to integrate Heidegger and McLuhan. I translated the first two chapters and also skimmed the last two chapters roughly; my impression is that it still does not quite satisfy me. Even so, this dissertation did give me direction and supported the feasibility of this topic.

I have also carried out some exploration of McLuhan’s media thought. Last year I wrote a paper, “A Preliminary Inquiry into McLuhan’s Media Ontology” (20,000 words), and after rewriting it I submitted it to the Third Nanning Conference on Phenomenological Philosophy of Technology for presentation. This paper calls the basic position or method of McLuhan’s media theory “media ontology,” and points out that, in McLuhan’s view, media are not neutral conduits through which information is transmitted between subjects, or between subject and object; rather, media themselves constitute nature and human nature. Media, or technology, are extensions of man; people can see their own reflections in media technologies, and reflecting on media is also reflecting on human nature. Theories concerning the cultural differences produced by oral and written technologies, as well as the correspondence between oral/written technology and acoustic/visual space, are the most central and典型 applications of McLuhan’s media theory. The development from oral technology to written technology, together with the accompanying shift from acoustic space to visual space, has fashioned the distinctive conception of time and space characteristic of Westerners, and has determined the features of Western modern thought, such as abstraction, linearity, objectivity, disenchantment, isolation, analysis, stillness, and so on.

This exploration in that paper was indeed quite preliminary. On the one hand, I merely employed an “existentialist” philosophical perspective to interpret McLuhan, without really introducing phenomenology; on the other hand, I only commented on some of McLuhan’s representative major topics, such as the shift from speech to script and from acoustic space to visual space, without venturing into the finer parts of McLuhan’s detailed criticism of various media. Yet this kind of close and detailed analysis is precisely the hallmark of Media Ecology (as well as phenomenology).

In the next stage of research I will try to clarify how the phenomenological method operates in media studies (with McLuhan as an example of this method), and, within phenomenological research, what significance the concept of “media” has. I will try to argue that the significance of “media phenomenology” is not limited merely to the application of phenomenological method in a specific field, but is at the same time also an interpretation of phenomenology itself.

Almost every phenomenologist gives his or her own interpretation of phenomenology. For Husserl, the core of phenomenology is the concept of “intentionality”; Heidegger, by contrast, places the ontological question first; Merleau-Ponty introduces the body as the central issue. Each person uses a different vocabulary to speak about phenomenology. So, can we begin from technology or media and give an expression of phenomenology? That is my further aim.

Of course, as a beginner, I cannot presumptuously formulate an entire doctrine of my own in the way great philosophers do. What I will do is still to interpret philosophers, except that I can take “media” as a key for reading those great thinkers, and retell their thought.

If we start from Husserlian phenomenology, perhaps we can regard media as some kind of reified intentionality. For Husserl, “intentionality” belongs to the human being—or, more precisely, to the transcendental ego. It would seem impossible to speak of an intentional structure within technical objects (this was the objection Professor Jin Xiping raised to Professor Wu at the Nanning conference). On this point, I support Professor Wu’s usage, acknowledging that technical objects contain intentional structures; only then can the philosophy of technology in phenomenology advance further.

Here, McLuhan’s media theory can offer some inspiration. For McLuhan, media (or technology) are “extensions of man,” extensions of perception and will. And we know that perception and will are intentional, and that different kinds of perception have different intentional structures. Then the various forms of “extension” of these perceptions naturally also possess corresponding intentional structures. And when such extensions are “amputated” or reflected upon, we can say that what we are facing is precisely a solidified intentional structure.

Indeed, perhaps we can even replace the concept of intentionality with that of mediality. Intentionality simply means that consciousness is always consciousness directed toward something; mediality likewise simply means that perception is always “toward” something. This “toward” is mediality. To say that human consciousness is always medial does not mean that consciousness is always separated from the external world by a wall, with media as the thing interposed in between; in fact, mediality precisely includes accessibility. Mediality means that human beings are always able to attain a grasp of things; only such “attainment,” depending on the situation, takes different forms, and these forms are the structure of what is called “media.” Mediation and immediacy are not contradictory. For example, a person with poor eyesight can only “intuit” the object before him through glasses as a medium; here the medium is precisely the way to establish immediacy. What is called “direct encounter” simply means “to be separated in the appropriate way.” To directly encounter a cup and to directly encounter a mountain range require different distances of separation: for the former, perhaps 50 centimeters of separation is the most direct; for the latter, perhaps 50 li is the most direct. To seek “intuition” is simultaneously to seek the “appropriate mediation.” And people’s making and using all kinds of media technologies is like trying to intuit a cup from different distances; it is precisely in order to try, through different media, to grasp all kinds of things. For the same thing, we intend it in different intentional ways, or, in other words, we access it through different media. Every actual medium is an embodiment of one intentional way, or rather, every intentional structure is nothing but a potential medium.

Thus, the shift from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude is, in other words, a shift from “immediacy” to “mediality,” that is, a reflection on media (the natural attitude and the phenomenological attitude are not contradictory, just as immediacy and mediality are not contradictory). In Sokolowski’s words: “In the natural attitude, we move directly toward the object; we move through the appearance of the object and head straight toward the object itself. From the standpoint of philosophical reflection, we make these appearances thematic. We look at what we ordinarily look through. …” What is called “appearance” always has a “screen” in which the “image” appears; so what is this place of “appearance,” if not “media”? Recasting the above discussion in the terminology of media phenomenology, that is to say: in the natural attitude, “media” are transparent; we are unaware of the existence of media and go directly toward the object. Philosophical reflection raises up the “mediality” of that which we “ordinarily look through,” namely the object; we suspend the “content” conveyed by the medium and reflect on the nature and structure of the medium itself.

But a phenomenological reflection on media does not mean completely breaking away from the content of media and treating media themselves as a new object of study. In phenomenological reflection, the objects of consciousness under the natural attitude are not discarded; they are merely suspended, or “bracketed.” What sort of mode is this reflection, then? Let me give an example. Suppose I look at an object through glasses (eyes, a telescope). Under the natural attitude, my glasses are “transparent”; I am not aware of my glasses, but directly engage the object through them. Then the first situation is an unselfconscious alternation between the natural attitude and the reflective attitude: for example, I can no longer see clearly, so I begin to reflect on the way I see, discover that something is wrong with the glasses, and take them off to inspect and wipe them. In the process of inspecting the glasses, my intention has already moved away from the previous object of sight and turned toward the glasses themselves. At this moment, the glasses do not exist as glasses; they no longer function as a medium, but are examined as another experiential object, as an actual technical artifact.

But there is also a third attitude or mode, namely one that preserves the existence of the glasses as glasses while simultaneously reflecting on the glasses themselves. That is to say, I am still wearing the glasses, still looking at the object through them, but what I am focusing on now is no longer the content of what I see through the glasses, but rather the activity itself of seeing through the glasses. I still need to look at the object behind the glasses, yet this looking is no longer aimed at investigating the content of those objects; rather, it is to help me adjust or understand the function of the glasses. Only in this special act of looking does the glasses, on the one hand, play the role of glasses themselves, while on the other hand being subjected to reflection and examination.

Correspondingly, there are three forms of media study: first, only caring about the content transmitted by media, as in “journalism studies”; second, only caring about the mechanism of media, like taking off the glasses to study their structure, as in positivist “communication studies”; the third is precisely Media Ecology, or media phenomenology: it neither studies the objects of media nor treats media as objects, but instead studies the meaning of media as media in operation.

Here we can introduce Heidegger’s phenomenology. Heidegger does not speak of “intentional structures”; instead, he speaks of the structure of Dasein as “being-in-the-world,” and “world” is precisely a network of mutual reference among “equipment.” And this network of equipment-reference can perhaps also be interpreted as a nested structure of media (McLuhan: the medium is the message; the content of media is another medium).

And Heidegger’s so-called “equipment” truly is what it is only in its “ready-to-hand” state. For example, hammering with a hammer, seeing with glasses, reading through writing, and so on—studying the content conveyed by writing (speech) cannot reveal what writing is, because the meaning of writing is not the “speech” it brings forth, but its “bringing-forth” of speech; nor can studying writing itself, its graphic structure and form of inscription, reveal what writing is. Only when writing functions as a medium, that is, when speech appears through writing, can the meaning of writing be grasped. Every object presents or indicates another thing to us in its own unique way; this mediality of “making something be indicated in such-and-such a way” is the essence of things.

In Heidegger’s words, Dasein “comports itself busying itself with the world,” and “only in dealings does equipment become truly manifest in its own nature.” Do terms such as “comport,” “dealings,” and so on here also imply the legitimacy of introducing the concept of “media” at this point?

Of course, in the media phenomenology I am describing, and in Media Ecology represented by McLuhan, the word media is mostly understood in the broadest possible sense. But after all, the narrowest sense of media refers to tools of interpersonal communication (conversely, one could also say that the narrowest sense of technology refers to the media of human communication), while a slightly broader sense of media includes meanings such as background, channel, and environment. Choosing the word media, rather than technology, equipment, or other broadly synonymous terms, as the core concept undoubtedly reflects certain biases. For example, it emphasizes human sensibility rather than control, emphasizes communication rather than transformation, and gives even greater prominence to meanings such as background and context.

Finally, media phenomenology may open a path beyond technological optimism and pessimism. Husserl speaks of “suspending judgment,” Heidegger speaks of “releasement,” and McLuhan says, “I only describe, I do not explain,” and, borrowing the parable of Narcissus, points out that the so-called “narcissism” of the technological age is in fact numbness; the key is not to find a way out but to recognize oneself clearly. With a few individual exceptions such as Postman, Media Ecology has generally held a similar attitude toward technological development, one that is neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Suspension or releasement—such an attitude is not meant to stand outside the world and watch coldly from afar; rather, it is precisely to stand within it and restore the most genuine experience.

What I have roughly and casually set out above are some preliminary understandings and ideas of mine regarding media phenomenology as a research topic, but I have not provided literature or arguments to support them; of course, these are things my future research will need to flesh out. In my concrete research, I will first probe some small topics, such as “McLuhan’s concept of the ‘rearview mirror,’” “the concept of ‘guidance’ in Heidegger’s early philosophy of technology,” and so on. Then, according to what I have accumulated, I will choose an angle—namely, whether to organize my materials around a main line of commentary on the theses of media ecology, or around a main line of interpretation of phenomenological theses, or around a main line of case analysis—and form the final paper.

Latest comments

• Beowulf2010-04-14 05:33:47 Anonymous 60.195.202.124 http://blog.sina.com.cn/zhangchenguangI often read your blog, because as an undergraduate I studied literature, history, and philosophy, and I am also very fond of philosophy; of you, of course, I am full of admiration and cannot help feeling I fall short. Today, reading what you wrote about your doctoral research plan, I found that we have some common interests, because I am about to begin my master’s research at Tsinghua. I study communication in the School of Journalism and Communication, and I am very interested in the Frankfurt School and in research on the ontology of media. I very much look forward to exchanging ideas with you—probably in one direction only, hehe.
• Gu Chu2010-04-14 14:21:55 I am completely ignorant when it comes to communication studies, but of course I would be very happy to exchange ideas with you. I believe there will be opportunities for two-way exchange 🙂
• Beowulf2010-04-14 19:50:07 Anonymous 60.195.202.16 Could you give me your contact information? Once I get here next semester, I can have a chance to ask you for guidance. My Email: zcg1120@gmail.com, many thanks to you 🙂
• Gu Chu2010-04-14 20:57:48 hyl510＠Ｇｍａｉｌ．ｃｏｍ
• shishi2010-04-25 21:25:01 Anonymous 61.135.188.95 Xiao Gu, I’m Xiao Shan. Last semester I attended one event at Suzhou Street’s Xindao Café. May I ask whether the location has changed this semester? Will there still be everyone’s discussion activities every week? I’m really looking forward to participating again.
• Gu Chu2010-04-27 02:47:42 For various reasons, the salon has remained in a suspended state. After May Day we may try to revive it…
• L.Ryk2010-10-20 01:56:08 Anonymous 10.8.0.4 Today, while looking at media ecology, I suddenly thought of my favorite phenomenology, and of the points of connection between them. I suddenly came up with the idea of doing media phenomenology. I didn’t expect that after a search, it really exists… I should call you a senior. I hope we can exchange ideas more often. I’m probably much younger than you. 61712901.
  If you don’t mind, let’s exchange ideas more often.
  www.douban.com/people/rwx
  A Douban account, to show my sincerity in wanting to exchange ideas
• Gu Chu2010-10-20 23:39:48 Leave your Email or QQ or something.. I don’t use Douban…
  Regarding media phenomenology, I have written three articles:
  Outline of Media Ontology http://epr.ycool.com/post.4555608.html
  A Preliminary Exploration of Heidegger’s Media Ontology http://epr.ycool.com/post.4505027.html
  Media · Sensation · Space-Time — A Preliminary Exploration of McLuhan’s Media Ontology http://epr.ycool.com/post.3730312.html
• L.Ryk2010-10-25 05:17:11 Anonymous 10.8.0.2 ok～
  email：61712901@qq.com
  qq is the one above～

Translated from the Chinese original with AI assistance. The original text is authoritative.